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defined security mechanisms are tightly bound to the presented mobility architecture, providing alternative ways to
optimize mobility management signalling. The focus is on minimizing end-to-end signalling latency, optimizing the
amount of signalling and optimizing packet forwarding paths. In addition, the architecture provides identity and
location privacy for hosts.
The presented work defines one specific kind of engineering balance between the security, privacy, and efficient
mobility signalling requirements. This thesis indicates that the added security, indirection, backwards compatibility,
and inter-operable mobility solutions can overcome several of the current TCP/IP restrictions. The presented mobility
architecture also provides a migration path from the existing Internet architecture to a new
cryptographic-identifier-based architecture.
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Tämä väitöskirja määrittää joukon muutoksia TCP/IP-pinoon. Muutokset koskevat liikkuvuudenhallinnan eri asteita.
Ne mahdollistavat yhteyksien ylläpidon olemassa olevien sovellusten välillä nykyaikaisissa ja heterogeenisissä
tietoliikenneverkoissa. Väitöskirja esittää joukon ratkaisuja datavuon, verkkojen ja osoiteperheiden
liikkuvuudenhallintaan. Viimeisin näistä tarkoittaa liikkuvuutta IP-versioiden välillä. Lisäksi työssä esitetään ratkaisu
alueelliseen liikkuvuudenhallintaan. Väitöskirjassa kaikkien isäntäkoneiden on tuettava esitettyjä
liikkuvuudenhallintaratkaisuja. Esitetyt ratkaisut pohjautuvat jakoon tunniste- ja paikkatiedon välillä. Jako
mahdollistaa, että liikkuvat isäntäkoneet kykenevät samanaikaisesti kommunikoimaan useiden liittymäverkkojen
kautta tukien sekä eri IP-versioita että linkkikerroksen tekniikoita.
Liikkuvuudenhallintaratkaisuiden osana väitöskirja määrittää joukon heikkoja ja vahvoja turvallisuusmekanismeja.
Ne suojaavat yhteyskäytännöt uudelleenohjaukseen, palvelunestoon ja yksityisyydensuojaan liittyviltä hyökkäyksiltä.
Määritetyt turvallisuusmekanismit on tiukasti sidottu työssä esitettyyn liikkuvuudenhallinta-arkkitehtuuriin, mikä
tarjoaa vaihtoehtoisia tapoja optimoida viestintää isäntäkoneiden välillä. Painopiste on viestinnän viiveen ja määrän
minimoinnissa sekä pakettien reitin optimoinnissa. Lisäksi arkkitehtuuri tarjoaa yksityisyydensuojan tunniste- ja
paikkatiedolle.
Väitöskirja määrittää tarkasti yhden tasapainoisen ratkaisun turvallisuuden, yksityisyydensuojan ja tehokkaan
liikkuvuudenhallintaviestinnän vaatimusten välillä. Työn tulokset osoittavat, että lisätyt turvallisuusmekanismit,
esitetyt sidonnat tunnistetietojen välillä, yhteensopivuus vanhojen sovellusten kanssa ja yhteensopivat
liikkuvuudenhallintaratkaisut poistavat yhdessä useita nykyisiin TCP/IP-yhteyskäytäntöihin liittyviä ongelmia.
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1 Introduction
An essential problem with the existing mobility and multi-homing approaches is
that they do not offer integrated security and mobility management mechanisms
for different mobility dimensions such as host mobility, flow mobility, network mo-
bility and local mobility (mobility terminology is explained in [118]). Due to the
design of the existing TCP/IP architecture, it is difficult to achieve flexible and
granular mobility solutions without modifying the host stack [185]. Here, granular-
ity means the scope of a hand-off to which a mobility mechanism can be adjusted.
In this thesis, the author defines a set of required modifications to the host stack
to achieve a flexible and scalable mobility architecture. The presented architec-
ture integrates multiple authentication, privacy protection, key-management and
mobility-management mechanisms together in a seamless way (security and privacy
terminology is explained in [148]). The integrated security and mobility protocols
presented in this thesis reduce significantly the mobility and key management sig-
nalling and hand-off latency without causing substantial trade-offs between security
and mobility requirements. The following sections define a number of basic terms
used throughout the rest of the thesis. While the terminology used in this the-
sis largely adheres to the way these terms are typically used in the literature, the
definitions are included here to achieve the desired level of preciseness.
1.1 Heterogeneous Datacom Networks
In a heterogeneous data communication (datacom) system, hosts are connected to
a network via attachment points employing different kinds of link technologies. A
datacom system can roughly be divided into software and physical devices. The
physical devices are connected to each other via links providing physical commu-
nication media for software. Hosts are devices that work as endpoints for routing
paths. The routing paths consist of multiple links that are connected to each other
via packet forwarding devices [96].
Processes are instances of programs that are executed at hosts. They establish com-
munication channels that are called connections to communicate with each other.
This is also known as interprocess communication (IPC) [193]. A connection con-
sists of a set of protocol machine instances that are located on the packet forwarding
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path between processes and have tightly coupled states (see also [89]). A finite state
machine keeps each protocol machine in a correct state based on the phase of a
connection [9][43][89]. Moreover, a protocol denotes a set of rules that define a com-
municating policy between two nodes [15]. The hosts may even spread connections
over the multiple link technologies simultaneously. In this thesis we are primarily
interested in wireless link technologies. The availability of these link technologies
is bound to geographical locations. Typically, high-bandwidth access is offered in
urban areas, while rural areas may be covered by radio technologies providing wider-
ranging coverage with limited bandwidth.
Hosts may send and receive packets but they cannot forward packets between links
in the same way as intermediate nodes do [118]. An intermediate node denotes
a device that is on a routing path between hosts. Both hosts and intermediate
nodes are just called nodes in the context of this thesis. Depending on the role
of node in the system, the node may either have a fixed or a dynamic attachment
to the network. An attachment point is a place where a node’s network interface
is attached to the network [96]. A network interface is also known as a Network
Interface Controller (NIC). The parts of the network providing attachment points
for hosts are called access networks.
The Internet protocol (IP) is used for transmitting blocks of data between hosts over
globally-interconnected datacom networks, i.e., the Internet. The datacom networks
may support different IP versions, namely, Internet Protocol version (IPv4) [81] and
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [163]. An IP address is used for identifying both
a node and its topological location in the current Internet [68]. The shortage of
the IPv4 addresses coupled with privacy requirements has led several operators,
companies, and individual end users to decouple their networks from the Internet
with intermediate nodes called Network Address Translation (NAT) [136] devices.
NAT devices map IP addresses used in the private networks to global IP addresses
used in the Internet. It seems that when the IPv4 address space runs completely
out, the role of the IPv6 protocol will be increased in the operator networks. A
problem will then be inter-operation between IPv4 and IPv6 protocols.
The IPv4 and IPv6 protocols are part of the so-called TCP/IP stack that consists
of the physical, link, network, transport and application layers [185]. Typically, a
specific end-to-end routing path consists of several combinations of link and net-
work layer technologies in a heterogeneous datacom network. The main purpose
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of a mobility-management mechanism is to keep the end-to-end connections alive
independent of the underlying network technology. In this thesis, a mechanism de-
notes specific technical processes used to implement well-specified functions, such as
mobility-management or key management (explained later). In a basic case, mobil-
ity denotes a hand-off [118] procedure where a network interface changes its point of
attachment to the network. Typically, the different parts of a mobility-management
mechanism are distributed between multiple nodes. To synchronize the distributed
parts of the mechanism, mobility-management protocols are used for data commu-
nication between nodes.
1.2 Research Methodology
“When you step into an intersection of fields, disciplines, or cul-
tures, you can combine existing concepts into a large number of ex-
traordinary new ideas.”, F. Johansson [56].
In this thesis, the focus has been on removing obstacles in the TCP/IP host stack de-
sign to achieve a mobility architecture that integrates multiple mobility dimensions
together. The dimensions consists of host mobility, flow mobility, local mobility,
network mobility and address-family agility as illustrated in Figure 1.1, on page 22.
Additionally, the author has been looking for countermeasures to some security vul-
nerabilities. This has resulted in a set of research problems, and in a set of conflicting
goals. The author has been looking for the right engineering balance in the intersec-
tion of the different mobility and security requirements. Finally, the different kinds
of security and mobility concepts are combined together in a novel and seamless way
resulting in a new kind of mobility architecture. An essential part of the research
methodology has also been testing and verifying the architecture using a real code1.
1.3 Mobility Dimensions
This thesis defines secure and efficient mobility-management signalling in different
kinds of mobility scenarios in heterogeneous datacom networks. From the protocol-
design point of view, mobility can be divided into different categories based on the
1“Code is Law.”, L. Lessig [111].
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Figure 1.1: Heterogeneous datacom network environment.
scope of the hand-off. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between the different
granularity levels of mobility and the network environment.
Typically, a geographical movement of a host or a change in the experienced Quality
of Service (QoS) triggers a hand-off between access networks. This is called host
mobility [118]. QoS describes some characteristics of communication that a user of a
host desires [89]. In addition, a multi-homed host that is simultaneously attached to
multiple access networks may divide its connections between its network interfaces.
Flow mobility makes it possible to move data communication between network in-
terfaces even on a per connection basis. In addition, the traffic flows can be moved
between IP versions. This kind of IP address-family agility enables communication
between different IP versions.
A group of hosts can benefit from network mobility when the group is reachable
via the same mobile router, and the hosts in the network are moving to the same
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geographical direction [118]. The (mobile) routers connect links together and for-
ward IP packets between hosts using the IP addresses carried in the packets for
routing decisions [15]. In all cases, local mobility mechanisms can be used to min-
imize hand-off latency and to offer location privacy for hosts that are moving in a
restricted region; i.e., typically in the same operator domain [118]. Local mobility,
sometimes also calledmicro-mobility, denotes mobility signalling between the mobile
node and an intermediate node that is located in the local operator network while
macro-mobility results in mobility signalling between end hosts [118]. The hand-off
latency denotes the time spent by detaching from the previous attachment point
and receiving the first packets from existing connections after attaching to the new
attachment point.
1.4 Identifier, Identity and Name
In the current Internet, most security problems are related to mechanisms that asso-
ciate identifiers and identities with each other. The relationship between identifiers
and identities is illustrated in Figure 1.2, on page 24. According to RFC 4949 an
identity is “the collective aspect of a set of attribute values (i.e., a set of charac-
teristics) by which a system user or other system entity is recognizable or known”.
An identifier represents a specific identity in the network and it is used to distin-
guish an identity from all others [148]. However, this definition is too broad for the
purposes of this thesis. It is necessary to consider separately non-verifiable and ver-
ifiable identities based on the type of the association between the identifier and the
identity. The difference is that a non-verifiable identifier, i.e., a name is associated
to an identity using a non-cryptographic mechanism, while a verifiable identifier,
i.e., a cryptographic one can be associated with an identity using a cryptographic
mechanism. In other words, a name is associated to a non-verifiable identity using
a non-cryptographic mechanism, while a cryptographic identifier is provable asso-
ciated to a verifiable identity [131] by cryptographic means. It is good to notice
that an identifier that is associated to more than one identity may cause misidenti-
fication. For example, if a single Mobile IP’s [26] home address would be bound to
two different mobile hosts, packets could be forwarded to the care-of addresses of
both mobile hosts. Therefore, it is important to have a one-to-one mapping between
identifiers and identities.
In a way, names are a subset of identifiers, like hosts are a subset of nodes. For
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Figure 1.2: The relationship between the identity, identifier and name concepts.
example, a legacy IPv6 address [163] is a name but a Cryptographically Generated
Address (CGA) [175] is an identifier that can be associated to a private key using
public-key cryptography [14]. A private key of a public-key pair [14] and a root
value of a one-way hash chain [110] are examples of verifiable identities. The root
is an initial value of a hash chain while the last generated value of a hash chain is
called the anchor value. The identity, identifier and name concepts are discussed in
detail in publication [P2].
1.5 Key-management Mechanism
The earlier mentioned cryptographic associations between identifiers and identi-
ties can be used with key management mechanisms. Key management controls
the process of creating and updating cryptographic keying material at nodes and
sharing the keying material and associated information between the communicating
nodes [148]. A key exchange protocol is an essential part of the key-management
mechanism. It is used for generating keying material and distributing the material
between hosts for establishing Security Associations (SAs). Security association de-
notes a cryptographic coupling of two identities using a mechanism that provides
a way for protecting data communication between the identities [148]. Re-keying
procedure is another part of the key-management mechanism that replaces the used
cryptographic keying material with new material.
In this thesis, the author defines a set of new key exchange mechanisms and utilizes
parts of the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) security protocols and databases.
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The original IPsec security architecture consists of security protocols, security as-
sociations, key management, authentication and encryption algorithms [166]. Au-
thentication denotes a cryptographic mechanism used for verifying that an identifier
is associated to an identity in a provable way. From the key-management point
of view, the author replaces the Internet Key-Exchange (IKE)[44] with other key-
management mechanisms. The new key-management mechanisms presented in this
thesis utilize the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [165] protocol from IPsec.
In addition, the author enhances the IPsec databases for the purpose of this thesis.
The IPsec databases are called the Security Policy Database (SPD) and the Secu-
rity Association Database (SAD). The SDP contains static policies that determine
the decisions concerning inbound and outbound IP traffic. The SAD contains the
dynamic protection state, including the confidentiality and integrity protection keys
that are used for encrypting and authenticating the IP traffic. Basically, a policy
indicates which security association should be used for a specific IP packet. Each
security association in the SAD is identified by a Security Parameter Index (SPI).
The SPI is also included in the ESP header that is carried in an IP packet after the
IP header and before the upper layer protocol headers [165].
1.6 Internet Architecture
This section briefly presents some essential parts of the current Internet architec-
ture. Section 1.6.1 discusses packet forwarding functionality. Section 1.6.2 intro-
duces mobility-related security problems, and sections 1.6.3-1.6.5 cover basic mobil-
ity protocols.
1.6.1 Packet Forwarding Functionality
The basic infrastructure required for packet forwarding can be roughly divided into
two kinds of intermediate nodes: switches that operate at the link-layer, and routers
which operate at the network layer. Switches forward IP packets between nodes
based on the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses carried in the headers of link-
layer frames where each link-layer frame encapsulates an IP packet. The MAC
address is a hardware address that identifies a NIC in the local network. It is also
called a link-layer identifier.
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“The function or purpose of Internet Protocol is to move datagrams
through an interconnected set of networks.”[81].
In other words, IP packets are forwarded via multiple links and the associated MAC
addresses are dynamically changed at the routers [36]. From the topological point of
view, the IP address carried in the packet header defines the destination host for the
packet, while the MAC address determines the next hop router. From the routing
point of view, a router maps the destination IP address of each packet to the IP
address, and then to the MAC address of the next-hop router. The mappings are
stored in the routing tables. Each routing table consists of multiple entries, where
a single entry contains a mapping between an IP-address prefix and an IP address
or a MAC address. A prefix denotes the network-identifier part of the address. The
structured address prefixes carry information of the hierarchical network topology.
The closer the packet is delivered to the host, the longer part of the prefix is used for
routing. Finally, the host identifier part of the address, also called suffix, identifies
a host in the destination subnetwork. From the security point of view, the main
problems are related to the integrity of routing tables. In particular, only authorized
nodes should be able to update the routing tables.
To minimize the amount of data that needs to be stored in routers, they should
maintain only the minimal set of IP-address prefixes that are required to deliver
packets in an efficient way to the destinations. Depending on the granularity of
the routing-table entries, routing protocols can be divided into interior and exte-
rior ones [117]. Interior routing denotes routing inside an autonomous network
while exterior routing denotes routing between autonomous networks [15]. In addi-
tion, there are some proposals to replace the legacy IP routing with flat-namespace,
packet-content-based or geographic routing [29][33][184]. The design goals of all
types of routing protocols are mainly related to scalability, security, extensibility,
performance, robustness and supporting different kinds of QoS requirements (see
e.g. [78][30]).
1.6.2 Security and Privacy Aspects
In the protocol stack, protocols for host mobility and related authentication are im-
plemented above the packet forwarding functionality. However, the authentication,
key management, and mobility mechanisms cause overhead in control signalling,
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Figure 1.3: Two kinds of re-direction attacks.
and add complexity to the current Internet architecture. Security problems may
also arise from the current IP-address-based host identification. Here, identification
denotes a non-cryptographic mechanism used for recognizing that an identifier is as-
sociated to an identity, as opposed to cryptographic authentication. The problems
caused by location-bound identification are related to host authentication during
hand-offs and to the way currently deployed TCP/IP protocol machines identify
connections.
Mobility-management protocols may even contain flaws that result in Denial-of-
Service (DoS) vulnerabilities, and in leaks of identity and location information (see
[148][91][176]). Identity privacy denotes controlled sharing of identity related in-
formation, while location privacy denotes controlled sharing of topological location
information [148]. To mitigate identity leaks, it is possible to use identity protection
mechanisms that provide identity privacy.
From point of view of this thesis, the essential DoS attacks can be divided into
re-direction and Distributed-DoS (DDoS) attacks. In the former, an attacker may
re-direct a connection to a new location, hi-jack the connection, and pretend to
be the victim host as illustrated in Figure 1.3 (a). This kind of identity theft is
the result of unauthorized use of an identifier. An attacker may also cause DoS by
re-directing big data streams to the victim host’s IP address or to its subnetwork.
This is called a flooding attack and it is illustrated in Figure 1.3 (b). One form of a
DoS attack is called a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack where multiple (zombie) hosts
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Figure 1.4: Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack.
bomb the same IP address with multiple service requests, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.
This may result in CPU and memory exhaustion if the victim host cannot process
(consume) the incoming service requests as fast as than they are produced. From
the system-security point of view, it is important to protect mobility protocols from
all these attacks.
1.6.3 Host Mobility Support
In the current Internet, Mobile IP [26] and Mobile IPv6 [45] protocols provide basic
mobility support for IPv4 and IPv6 hosts. The basic functionality of the protocols
is illustrated in Figure 1.5, on page 29. To bring out the essential the differences
between the two protocols, Mobile IP foreign agent [26] has been omitted from the
Figure. The many extensions to Mobile IP and Mobile IPv6 are out of scope for
this section. However, it is still good to notice that there are proposals that provide
an integrated solution for IPv4-IPv6 dual stack mobility [71].
In both Mobile IP and Mobile IPv6, the mobile host registers with the home agent to
acquire a so-called home address from the home link. The mobile host is reachable
via the home address, which has a one-to-one mapping to the mobile host’s topolog-
ical IP address, called the care-of address. The mapping between the addresses is
called a binding. In Mobile IP, the binding is stored only at the home agent and the
connections to and from the mobile host are routed via the home agent. In Mobile
IPv6, the binding may be stored also at peer hosts. As a result, the peer hosts are
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Figure 1.5: host mobility support in IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
aware of the mobile host’s actual location and are able to send packets directly to
the mobile host. This is also called route optimization. In both cases, the mobile
host updates the binding at the home agent after each hand-off from one care-of
address to another. In the route-optimization case, the mobile host also updates
the bindings at the peer hosts. The location update messages are called binding
updates.
To overcome the hi-jacking attack (Figure 1.3 (a), on page 27), the mobile host
establishes an IPsec tunnel with the home agent. Using the IPsec security associ-
ation, the home agent is able to authenticate the binding updates that are sent by
the mobile host. However, the security association does not completely solve the
flooding attack (Figure 1.3 (b), on page 27). Basically, a mobile host may re-direct
its traffic to a victim host’s location because the home agent does not verify that
the mobile host is in the claimed location. However, the research community has
not reached a consensus about the seriousness of this attack.
In Mobile IPv6, the mobile host and the peer host do not establish an IPsec security
association. Instead, Mobile IPv6 uses so called Return Routability (RR) test to
mitigate re-direction attacks. Basically, the peer host uses the RR test to verify that
the mobile host is reachable at the claimed care-of address. The RR test is based
on sending a challenge cookie via two different paths between the hosts. The first
packet is routed via home agent from the mobile host to the peer host. In addition,
the mobile host sends another packet directly to the location of the peer host. The
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peer host replies to both of these messages and sends the messages via reverse routes
back to the mobile host. Both of the messages contain different tokens that are used
at the mobile host to generate the same key that is known by the peer host. The key
is used to protect the final binding update message between the mobile host and the
peer host. The RR test protects the hosts from the re-direction attacks presented
in Figure 1.3, on page 27. Basically, the peer host does not send traffic to unverified
locations. It is good to notice that the packets are forwarded via the IPsec tunnel
between the mobile host and its home agent.
1.6.4 Local Mobility Support
Figure 1.6 (a), on page 31, illustrates Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [34][72]
approach to local mobility-management and signalling optimization. It defines a
network node called the Mobility Anchor Point (MAP). Basically, a MAP works
like a home agent in a visited network. A mobile host can register with a number of
MAP nodes at the same time. MAP hides the actual location of the mobile host from
its home agent and from the peer hosts. The mobile host has two different kinds of
care-of addresses. The on-link care-of address (LCoA) is the address assigned to the
mobile host on its local link. A regional care-of address (RCoA) is an address that
a MAP device has assigned to a mobile node. The RCoA is not changed as long as
the mobile node moves only within the same MAP region. The mobile node signals
changes of the LCoA to the MAP using local binding updates. HMIPv6 does not
use the Return Routability (RR) test for the local binding updates.
The local binding updates, exchanged between the mobile host and a MAP, can
optionally be protected with IPsec. The main reason to use IPsec is to protect
the mobile host from connection hi-jacking. IPsec requires a pre-shared secret or
public-key certificates for authentication. This is a problem because the mobile host
needs to have prior knowledge of the MAP. However, since the RCoA addresses
are ephemeral, the IPsec security association (SA) does not necessarily need to be
strongly authenticated.
A scalable way to create the SAs is opportunistic authentication which is not sup-
ported in IKE. Here, opportunistic authentication denotes a mechanism that uses
the Internet’s routing infrastructure for binding an IP address to an authentic iden-
tifier. Typically, the first key exchange message is sent to an IP address without
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Figure 1.6: Local and network mobility support.
knowing the peer’s public-key. The peer’s public-key is received in the reply mes-
sage. The solution is vulnerable to Main-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks where the
attacker is located on the mobile-host-to-MAP signalling path.
1.6.5 Network Mobility Support
Figure 1.6 (b) illustrates the Network Mobility (NEMO) basic support protocol [50].
In NEMO, a mobile router acquires a single IP address at an access network and
establishes a bi-directional IPsec tunnel with its home agent. Connections to and
from the moving network are routed via this tunnel. The clients attached to the
moving network may additionally support host mobility or they may be fixed to
the moving network. In a basic case, the mobile router registers a moving network
prefix with its home agent and advertises the same prefix for address configuration
in the moving network. Once the home agent receives packets carrying the moving
network prefix, it tunnels the packets to the mobile router. From the peer host point
of view, the hosts on the moving network are reachable via the location of the mobile
router’s home agent. Once the mobile router changes its point of attachment to the
Internet, it sends a binding update to the home agent. As a result, the endpoint of
the IPsec tunnel is updated and all the end-to-end connections are routed via the
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new location of the mobile router. The mobile router and its home agent do not run
any RR test during the hand-off.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses identifier bind-
ings in the current TCP/IP protocol stack. This chapter provides the necessary
background for the rest of the thesis.
Chapter 3 presents the main research problems and goals. The chapter also discusses
the engineering trade-offs between the goals and defines the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 4 provides an the architectural overview of the proposed solutions. The
description is divided into the architectural components, functional architecture and
implementation architecture. This chapter binds the different contributions of the
thesis together.
Chapter 5 describes the mobility and multi-homing functionality that is common
to the different mobility solutions considered in this thesis. The chapter presents
the functionality from the connection’s, end host’s, and intermediate node’s point
of view. The focus is on secure state establishment and update events.
Chapter 6 describes four granularity levels for mobility: flow mobility, address-
family agility, local mobility, and network mobility. The different mobility solutions
are integrated together at the implementation level.
Chapter 7 analyzes the presented mobility solutions from the viewpoints of bindings,
cryptographic association mechanisms, signalling optimizations, and implementa-
tion. Finally, chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
A list of the author’s contributions and original publications is presented after the
conclusions.
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2 Background: TCP/IP Stack Identifier Bindings
This chapter provides a background to internals of the TCP/IP stack, describing how
the various identifiers are bound together. The author will focus on the reasoning
behind the choices made in the current TCP/IP stack for binding identifiers together,
and on the resulting tensions. The chapter describes the author’s best understanding
of the situation, and acts as a deep problem description for the rest of the thesis.
The interested reader may look, e.g., at [12][13][38][40][42][84][112][147][155] to get
familiar with the generic evolution of the Internet architecture.
An introduction to identifier bindings at TCP/IP layers is presented in sections 2.1-
2.2. Sections 2.3-2.6 analyze the bindings in a bottom-up order, starting from the
link layer and ending with the application layer bindings.
2.1 Definition of Binding
A binding, created by a protocol machine, associates some identifiers together in
the TCP/IP stack; such identifiers include IP addresses, port numbers, protocol
values and various credentials. In this thesis, a binding denotes a minimal shared
state required for coupling a given set of identifiers together (see [89]). It is created
by either a cryptographic or a non-cryptographic association mechanism2. A bind-
ing may associate two or more identifiers together, typically belonging to different
namespaces.
Namespace is a set of identifiers associated to a given collection of identities [89].
The instances of protocol machines are a representation of identities in the current
TCP/IP stack [96]. The states of protocol machines are typically identified using a
subset of the associated identifiers. In a NAT device, a single IP address and a port
value, carried in a packet, are used for identifying a binding that associates a pair
of IP addresses and a pair of port values together. In addition, a state transition
of a protocol machine may replace an associated identifier with a new one, such as
a Mobile IP [26] host that updates a binding between its home address and care-of
address.
2The different kinds of association mechanisms used in the TCP/IP stack are discussed later in
sections 2.3-2.6
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Each binding, created by a protocol machine, is stored in a data-communication
state [43] at some TCP/IP layer. The multiple data-communication states form
a chain of bindings that results in a connection between hosts. In other words,
the multiple protocol machines at different nodes create bindings during connection
establishment that are required to deliver packets between end hosts. The different
protocol machines, distributed between nodes, depend on each other during the
lifetime of a connection.
From the protocol-design point of view, one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many
bindings are used for implementing identifier translation, tunneling and (de)multiplexing
mechanisms. A one-to-one binding at Mobile IP’s [26] home agent between a mobile
host’s home address and care-of address is an example of an identifier translation
mechanism. Here, identifier translation denotes label switching operations for iden-
tifiers carried in packet headers. Typically, a header is located at a beginning of
each packet, containing routing information and describing the content of the car-
ried data.
Another example are Virtual Private Network (VPN) gateways that use tunnel-
ing techniques for encapsulating IP packets, from different sources, in IPsec [166]
protected packets carried between the gateways. In other words, the gateways im-
plement many-to-one and one-to-many bindings. In general, tunneling denotes a
mechanism that encapsulates a packet in another packet.
A binding between IP addresses at NAT [136] devices is an example of a (de)multiplexing
mechanisms implementing one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many bindings.
For example, port-multiplexed NAT (NAPT) [136] devices implement many-to-many
bindings between port and IP address values. Port values in the TCP/IP stack are
local abstractions used together with IP addresses and protocol values to uniquely
identify connections at hosts [48]. Basically, multiplexing denotes many-to-one bind-
ings where several identifiers are mapped to a single identifier [48]. In this thesis,
multiplexing denotes a mechanism that is used for identifier translation for outgoing
packets. Demultiplexing is a reverse operation for multiplexing and it is applied to
incoming packets where a single identifier is mapped to multiple identifiers [48].
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To clarify the type of different kinds of bindings in this thesis, the author
includes the direction and type of the mapping in the notation for essential
bindings. The A1↔1B binding denotes a bidirectional one-to-one mapping
between A and B identifiers, while the Am→nB binding denotes a unidirec-
tional many-to-many mapping between A and B identifiers. The bindings
described in the following chapters have different combinations of the direc-
tion and arity.
2.2 Binding Identifiers
All data communication between nodes is based on a set of different kinds of bind-
ings. This section analyzes bindings from viewpoint of their origin, scope, lifetime
and location. The goal of this section is to illustrate the limitations of the bindings
used in the current TCP/IP stack. These limitations explain many key problems in
the existing mobility and multi-homing protocols.
In this thesis, an intermediate node denotes any device that is located between end
hosts on the routing path. Depending on the context, the intermediate node may
be, e.g., a switch, a router, or a NAT device. Based on this flexible definition of an
intermediate node, a connection can be seen as a result of multiple identifier bindings
at the end hosts and different kinds of intermediate nodes on the routing path; this
is discussed in example 1 on page 36 and the generalization of the observation is
illustrated in Figure 2.1 on page 36. The scope of the bound identifiers, the lifetime
of bindings, and the number of bindings per connection determine the flexibility of
a mobility architecture as presented later in chapters 4-7. Briefly, the scope of an
identifier is defined by the corresponding namespace [89]. The lifetime of a binding
depends on the lifetime of an instance of a protocol machine. The scope and lifetime
of bindings are discussed later in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5.
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Figure 2.1: Connection consists of multiple bindings.
Example 1. A Mobile-IP [26] host is located in private network behind a
NAT node and a peer host is attached directly to the Internet. When the
client host opens a connection, the packets are forwarded via the home agent
to the peer node. The on-the-path switches, the NAT node, and the home
agent each establish states bound to the different identifiers carried in the
packet headers. For example, each switch creates a binding between a MAC
address and an attachment point. The NAT node creates a binding between
the IP addresses and port values. Finally, the home agent implements a
binding between the home address and the care-of address. Due to the mo-
bility of the host and the limited lifetime of bindings, new bindings may be
established and old ones destroyed during the lifetime of a connection.
2.2.1 Saltzer’s Principles
Saltzer presented the main principles for naming and binding of objects already
in 1978 [95]. Later on, Saltzer et al. presented their end-to-end communication
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arguments in 1981 [171]. From the protocol-layering point of view, Saltzer identi-
fied four kinds of fundamental network objects and relationships between them (see
[96]). Saltzer’s network objects were: services, nodes, network attachment points,
and paths. Layering denotes the way of developing protocols in layers where each
layer is responsible of implementing a specific part of the communication proce-
dure [89]. Nowadays, the rough correspondence between the presented objects and
the operating system layers is visible. Operating system layers can be divided into
application processes, a socket layer, a protocol layer, an interface layer and a phys-
ical medium [63].
Saltzer also identified three bindings between the objects: bindings between services
and nodes, between nodes and attachment points, and between attachment points
and paths. According to Saltzer, the resulting four namespaces, together, define the
location for a network end point, i.e., a service. Since 1978, the Internet architecture
has evolved, and the required granularity of the network objects has become more
fine-grained. From the addressing point of view, this phenomenon is analyzed by
Day [89]. However, Saltzer’s naming and binding principles are still as valid as they
were 30 years ago.
In [171], Saltzer et al. presented ideas about avoiding the placement of extra func-
tionality at lower layers of the communication stack. The principle of providing min-
imal common functionality at each layer has been realized quite well in the TCP/IP
stack. Saltzer’s end-to-end ideas have been implemented partially (e.g. [38]) but not
fully (see [41]) for the namespace part. The choices made in naming network objects
differ from Saltzer’s ideas [95] in that the different layers use the same namespaces to
identify different network objects. An example is the tight binding between services
and nodes. Nowadays, both of them use the same IP namespace for identification.
For example, legacy applications and services open sockets that work as connection
endpoints. A legacy application uses standard and widely deployed networking li-
braries and socket APIs. The sockets are identified with a set of identifiers including
IP addresses, which will be discussed in more detail in section 2.6.1. Moreover, the
nodes are identified at the network layer with the same IP addresses that are as-
sociated with the sockets. Balakrishnan et al. analyze the phenomenon in detail
in [17].
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2.2.2 A Connection Results in Multiple Bindings
A connection life-cycle between two nodes in the Internet can be divided roughly into
three phases: creating a number of bindings, updating the bindings, and destroying
the bindings (see Figure 2.1 on page 36). A binding update denotes a protocol state
machine transition results in a new identifier association. The number of bindings
per connection and the number and frequency of binding updates have an influence
on the scalability (see [74]) of an architecture.
Example 2. The explosion of routing table sizes [46] is an example of
protocol machine design that produces a large number of distributed bindings.
Basically, each routing table entry defines a binding between an IP address
prefix and an IP address or a MAC address (or both), requiring a piece of
memory.
Example 3. The growth of the Internet, and the limited number of IP
addresses, have created a demand for NAT devices. The NAT devices dy-
namically create bindings between IP addresses and port values during the
establishment of an end-to-end connection. A major problem with NAT
devices is that the protocol machines at end hosts and at the NAT devices
cannot be kept in synchrony, at least not easily. In other words, the bindings
at NAT devices remain static for their lifetime, even the protocol machines
update bindings at end hosts. This is a problem for the mobility-protocol
design, because creating new bindings at the current NAT devices after a
hand-off, instead of updating them, results in complex signalling during host
mobility.
In the connection-establishment phase, bindings are created at different layers both
at the communicating endpoints and at some intermediate nodes. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2.2, on page 39, and discussed in example 4. In many cases, the
intermediate nodes dynamically update and destroy bindings to provide efficient
packet forwarding functionality (see [113]). For example, routing protocols can mit-
igate network failures and update routing table entries according to the dynamically
changing routing paths. Another example is NAT devices and switches that destroy
their communication states after certain period of connection inactivity.
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Figure 2.2: Creating communication states for bindings.
Example 4. This example presents a connection establishment between two
hosts on the same local link from the viewpoint of layers 1-3. The layers
can be mapped to layers (N-1)-(N+1) in Figure 2.2. The connection, in this
case, refers to the states created by Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [47].
When the two hosts want to communicate with each other, a physical link
(layer 1) must be established between them. When the hosts are attached
to the link, they initiate ARP at layer 2. During this procedure, the inter-
connected switches and hosts in the local network establish bindings between
MAC addresses (layer 2) and the physical ports (layer 1). Logically, the
corresponding states are stored at layer 2 at the hosts and at the interme-
diate switches. The ARP also creates bindings between IP addresses (layer
3) and MAC addresses (layer 2) at the hosts. Logically, this state is stored
at the layer 3 at the hosts.
When a host makes a hand-off a number of new bindings are created at some inter-
mediate nodes on the new routing path. To provide seamless binding updates and to
minimize hand-off related latency, it is possible to create the required bindings below
layer
n
at the new routing path before updating the bindings at the layer
n
at the end
hosts (like [70][145][120]). This is also called make-before-break and discussed in the
next example. In this thesis a seamless binding update denotes a hand-off that does
not affect the experienced QoS [118].
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Example 5. A Mobile-IPv6 [45] host may have a NIC that supports si-
multaneous communication with two access points. Before the host breaks
an attachment with the current access point, it may initiate an attachment
with the new access point (see Petander et al. [70]). During this procedure,
the host may acquire a new IP address at the new link. Basically, the host
creates a new binding between its MAC address (layer 2) and the new IP
address (layer 3) leased from the new link. After that, the host updates the
binding between its home address and the new (care-of) IP address.
2.2.3 Scope of Identifiers
Each protocol layer defines a logical scope for its identifier namespace. Whenever
the protocol machines at two different layers use the same identifiers for state iden-
tification the protocol layers become coupled with each other. The same identifier
may be used for different purposes in different protocol machines.
The states of the protocol machine are defined by the type of a connection and
by the role of the node. In Mobile IPv6 [45], a mobile node, a home agent and a
correspondent node have different kinds of protocol machines depending on the role
of the node, albeit they all have bindings between the same set of home addresses and
care-of addresses. In addition, the protocol machine defines, e.g., the identification,
routability and QoS properties of the identifiers. For example, a TCP state machine
uses a pair of IP addresses for connection identification, while the same set of IP
addresses is used for packet forwarding by the Internet routing mechanism. It is
also good to notice that the same identifier may be called a static identifier in one
protocol machine and a temporary identifier in another protocol machine.
Example 6. A Mobile-IP [26] host is located behind a NAT node. It estab-
lishes a connection through the NAT node with a peer host. The NAT node
creates a binding for the IP address of the mobile host. From NAT protocol
machine’s viewpoint, the IP address is static because it is not changed during
the lifetime of the binding. However, from the Mobile IP protocol machine’s
viewpoint, the same (care-of) IP address is a temporary identifier because
it is changed during hand-offs.
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2.2.4 Bindings and Mobility
Mobility protocols update bindings between static and temporary identifiers. An
example of this is a binding between Mobile IP’s [26] static home address and tem-
porary care-off address. The scope and number of bindings that are updated during
each hand-off define the granularity level of mobility. A micro-mobility hand-off
(section 1.6) may result in a binding update between a MAC and an IP address,
while a macro-mobility hand-off may update a binding between a home address and
a care-of address [26]. The connection related static bindings set constraints for the
granularity of mobility design (discussed later in section 2.4.5).
Adding a dynamic binding between layer
n
and layer
n+1 identifiers provides a way to
sustain connections above layer
n
during hand-offs. For example, a TCP connection
is bound to a static Mobile IP’s home address at layer-4 while the care-of address
at layer-3 is dynamically bound to the home address. In addition, a right balance
between dynamic and static bindings that are part of a connection can minimize the
amount of signalling during node movement and provide backward compatibility for
applications.
Example 7. Depending on the mobility approach, the dynamic binding be-
tween identifiers takes place at different layers in the TCP/IP stack. From
the legacy application point of view, it is important to provide static identi-
fiers at the application layer. From the TCP point of view, it is essential to
provide fixed identifiers for the TCP protocol machine. From the reachabil-
ity point of view, it is important to have a static IP address. The presented
viewpoints should be accommodated during a mobility protocol-design pro-
cess. If a mobility approach is based on re-establishment of TCP connections
after each hand-off, the mobile host must communicate with all peer appli-
cations. On the other hand, if the mobility approach hides the change of an
IP address from the TCP, like Mobile IP[26] does, it is possible to optimize
the required hand-off signalling.
2.2.5 Lifetime of Bindings
A connection consists of multiple bindings and lifetime of the bindings may differ
from each other. Whenever a single binding is destroyed, the whole connection will
be broken at least temporarily. For example, if a NAT device or a router loses its
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Figure 2.3: Binding identification problem.
state, the broken routing path cannot be used for packet delivery between hosts.
Thus, the bindings must be updated or re-created to keep the connections alive
between hosts. One design choice is to identify bindings at intermediate nodes with
identifiers that do not change during hand-off or rekeying events. In this way it is
possible to sustain connections and to avoid synchronization problems between the
multiple states of a connection during hand-offs. However, this causes privacy and
traceback problems.3
When connection identifiers are changed during hand-offs, e.g., for identity protec-
tion reasons, this may result in synchronization problems at intermediate nodes, as
illustrated in Figure 2.3 on page 42. The main problem is that a binding identifier
is replaced with a new one during the hand-off. Figure 2.3 illustrates a situation
where an intermediate node cannot update the binding identifier to correspond to
the situation at the end hosts. The dynamically changing connection identifiers can
be used for providing identity protection for hosts. However, there is a trade-off
between the privacy requirements and connection identification requirements at in-
termediate nodes. To support identity privacy, the connection identifiers should be
changed during the lifetime of a connection. On the other hand, to identify connec-
tions at intermediate nodes the connection identifiers should not be changed during
the lifetime of the connection.
3Here, traceback denotes identification of the source of a packet.
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Example 8. The following example is based on Figure 2.3. A host without
any mobility-management mechanism establishes a UDP connection with a
peer host through a NAT node. The NAT node creates a state for the source
IP address (identifier 1 in Figure 2.3). Later on, the host is attached directly
to the Internet without explicit mobility support. Even the host allocates a
new IP address for itself, the connectionless UDP based communication con-
tinues (identifier 2 in Figure 2.3). Soon, the host joins again the previous
private network and allocates a new IP address for itself (identifier 3 in
Figure 2.3). The earlier created state at the NAT device is not expired. The
NAT node is not able to identify the earlier created binding because the host
uses a new identifier, i.e. IP address. The same problem applies also to
later presented SPINAT [P7] approach, but in a different form.
2.2.6 Churning Saltzer’s Bindings
In this section, the author analyzes protocol machines that bind the Saltzer’s network
objects together in ways that were not initially preferred in [95]. Multiplexing and
tunneling techniques are examples of this kind of protocol machine implementations.
For example, overlay routing can be implemented with either of these techniques.
From the IP viewpoint, overlay routing denotes that identifiers above network layer
are used for routing packets between end hosts. Another example is the definition
of size of a specific namespace in the different parts of the TCP/IP stack. Typically,
size of an identifier namespace is based on the estimated maximum population size.
Some initially made estimations have turned out to be insufficient, like with the
IPv4 address namespace. This has resulted in multiplexing namespaces with others.
Multiplexing is mainly used to enlarge an existing namespace with another one,
and to optimize payload size (see example 9 on page 43). Multiplexing also adds
bindings at intermediate nodes that are identified with multiple identifiers, like IP
addresses and port values at NAT devices. On the other hand, tunneling techniques
minimize the number of bindings at intermediate nodes but increase the header
size (see example 10 on page 44). They can also be used to optimize the bindings
updates. For example, using triangular routing via a Mobile IP’s home agent [26].
Example 9. In a way a NAT device enlarges the existing IP address space
by multiplexing public IP addresses with port values.
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Example 10. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) connects two private net-
works to each other via an IPsec tunnel [166]. When one of the security
gateways is behind a NAT node, the NAT node establishes a single binding
for the tunnel, not per connection between end hosts.
Protocol headers carried in the packets are not always in the same order as the
corresponding protocol layers in the TCP/IP stack [168]. Alternative tunneling
techniques provide a way to implement cross layer bindings at the TCP/IP stack.
As a result, the packets are not processed in the TCP/IP layering order. An upper
layer protocol may carry a lower layer protocol; the obtained benefit varies depending
on the combination. For example, an IPsec [166] tunnel consists of IP packets that
carry encrypted IP datagrams.
2.2.7 Services
A requirement for naming different network objects and binding them to each other
comes from the interprocess communication (IPC) [193]. Typically, services are
implemented at the application layer as user-space processes. Operating System
(OS) can be divided into user and kernel spaces based on control of memory access.
Even lower layer services are typically implemented as user space daemons, like
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [143] servers.4 Thus, the realization,
i.e. implementation, of a communication service may be closer to Saltzer’s end-to-
end principles than the actual specification of the service.
As long as processes are located at the same host, they may communicate with
each other using a local communication channel and local scope identifiers. When
processes are running at the same host they still are logically executed at different
locations, i.e. different parts of the memory address space. The host defines the
scope of process identifiers, and thus the number of the alternative logical locations.
The current TCP/IP stack is based on the assumption that the port numbers remain
the same during the connection.
However, with additional support a process may change its location that is also called
process migration. Process migration is a mechanism supporting process movement
between hosts during execution of processes [179]. In other words, the process
4Daemon processes run in the background and are not associated to any terminal [192].
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can update its location, and inform the peer process about the new port number
bindings. While process migration is out of scope for this thesis, the purpose is
to illustrate that each dynamic binding is bound to a specific granularity scope of
mobility (discussed in chapter 6).
2.3 Link layer Bindings
The link-layer is the second layer in the TCP/IP 5-layer model that refers to a
physical frame format and addressing [48]. The link-layer identifiers name a network
interface in a physical link. Each access technology defines a link layer namespace,
like IEEE 802.11g[79] or IEEE 802.3[80]. From the connection point of view, the
different link layer namespaces provide the same semantics, while each NIC attached
to the node may support different kind of link layer namespace.
2.3.1 Attachment Point Identifiers
The link-layer identifiers do not carry information about the services. From the
location information viewpoint, the current link layer identifier namespace is flat.
Flat namespace denotes that an identifier of the namespace is unstructured and
cannot carry hierarchical routing information. Structured identifiers, like IP ad-
dresses, contain information of a hierarchical network topology. However, part of
the link layer namespace is typically divided into hierarchies by the manufacturers
to avoid identifier collisions. Here, identifier collision denotes the probability of
the same identifier being associated to multiple identities in a specific namespace
scope. When the collision probability is low enough it can be ignored in real life
use-cases [133].
The size of the link layer identifiers defines their collision probability. In the case of
collision, a colliding host is assumed to change its link local identifier. The collisions
may result in process mis-identification, which is also used for identity theft. The
existing link layer protocols like ARP [47], and neighbor discovery in IPv6 [180][86]
are examples of protocols that bootstrap link layer communications and handle the
collisions. A bootstrapping mechanism defines which event takes place first in a
system. This is also called the chicken or the egg dilemma.
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2.3.2 Identifier Binding Problems
The security problems with the link layer identifiers are related to the ownership [123]
of identifiers and to privacy issues. Non-cryptographic link layer identifiers cannot
be used for strong authentication. Strong authentication denotes a public key based
cryptographic security mechanism that is used to verify an identifier-identity as-
sociation [148]. ARP spoofing and neighbor discovery related redirection attacks
are examples of the link-layer vulnerability (see [88]). In a spoofing attack, an at-
tacker pretends to be another authorized host in the network [148]. In a link-local
re-direction attack an attacker tries to give a false link-local address to the router
and other hosts in the link to redirect data to this address. The identifier ownership
problems [123] are similar at the link and network layers. The scope is just different,
and therefore also the severity of the potential DoS attacks.
The privacy issues are related to static link layer identifiers and traceback. As long
as the node uses the same link layer identifier at different links, it is possible to
identify the host. Dynamically changing identifiers provide anonymity but make
also the authentication and access control more difficult to implement. Anonymity
denotes that an identity is unknown. Here, access control denotes the protection of
local network resources against unauthorized access [148].
2.3.3 Node Namespace Required
The scalability issues related to the flat link layer namespace are visible when lots of
links are connected at the link layer via intermediate nodes to each other [52][160][154][83].
Depending on the access technology the intermediate nodes are called switches, re-
lays or repeaters at the link layer [104]. When a process initiates a connection with
another process at a peer host, the local host triggers a peer host discovery. Due
to the flat namespace structure, the discovery procedure is typically based on local
broadcasting. Local broadcast means the delivery of data to every node in a link.
The messages are forwarded between links via the intermediate nodes. As a result
of the discovery procedure, the intermediate nodes, e.g. switches, create bindings
between the link layer identifiers and network interfaces.
The size of the population defines the scalability limits for simple flooding based
spanning tree approaches. In a spanning tree approach a source node (a root) sends
packets to other nodes (leaves) that belong to the group. Therefore, alternative node
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discovery proposals are based on overlay of tunnels (like [52][154][140]), Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) techniques (like [28][191]) and sophisticated Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
flooding techniques (like [18]).5 Overlay of tunnels denotes here that identifiers
above link layer are used for forwarding packets between NICs. Moreover, DHT
is based on key-value mappings that are distributed between several intercommu-
nicating nodes. Each of the nodes stores a subset of entries of a complete hash
table. In P2P networking clients communicate directly with each other instead of
communicating via a server (a client-server model).
2.4 Network Layer Bindings
Due to the limited scope and large spectrum of link layer identifiers an additional
global node identifier namespace is required to avoid identifier collisions and to
provide transparent [13] end-to-end communication [35]. Following the layering
design, the global IP address namespace is defined at its own layer. That is, at the
network layer. Network layer is the third layer in the TCP/IP 5-layer model. It
provides connectionless packet delivery service for upper layers.
2.4.1 Routing Paths between Attachment Points
Logically, unicast communication at the network layer is based on one-to-one bind-
ings between IP addresses, while multicast traffic is based on one-to-many bindings.
The multicast traffic uses group identifiers, also called multicast addresses, where
multiple NICs are associated with the same multicast address. From the end host
point of view, an IP address pair defines a routing path between the hosts. From the
identifier binding point of view, the routing path may consist of several sub-routing
paths that are defined by link-layer identifier pairs. To overcome failures on the
routing paths, routers have a set of alternative bindings between IP addresses and
link-layer identifiers. The scope of the routing path identifiers is just different, as
illustrated in Figure 2.4 on page 48.
It is good to notice that the network layer does not keep a state for each end-to-end
path. Thus, the network layer provides a stateless delivery mechanism between loca-
tions of hosts. Stateless denotes that the network layer does not need to dynamically
5Here, flooding denotes forwarding of packets to every node in the scope of the local link layer
namespace [118].
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Figure 2.4: The scope of a routing path.
create new protocol machine instances. However, when the size of routing tables
depends on the number of destination locations, the network layer is not totally
independent of the end-to-end paths.
2.4.2 Dynamically Changing Identifiers
The lifetime of the link layer identifiers and IP addresses naming the routing path
may differ from each other. Due to network failures the routing path between IP
addresses may be changed from the link-layer identifiers point of view. The packets
are forwarded via a topologically different routing path. As a result also the chain of
link layer identifiers that identify the path is changed. In addition, an IP address of
a node may be changed due to topological movement or a prefix renumbering event.
Renumbering denotes the procedure of changing the IP addresses or a network prefix
of each network interface attached to the network [129]. The IP based mobility
results in dynamic bindings above the link layer.
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Either the end hosts or intermediate nodes may dynamically update the bindings
related to the end-to-end routing path. Depending on the approach, the changes on
the path are visible or transparent to one or both of the end hosts. This is discussed
in the following section 2.4.3. A common thing with the mobility architectures is
that almost (excluding e.g. [124]) all of them depend on intermediate node support.
To manage the changes on the routing path, the mobility approaches need protocol
machines at intermediate nodes to provide rendezvous functionality. A rendezvous
node works as an initial (or constant) contact point for a moving node. The inter-
mediate nodes also help to mitigate double jump related problems. Double jump
means that both end hosts are moving simultaneously and the binding update mes-
sages are sent to the old locations of the nodes. The rendezvous nodes hide the
changes on the routing path temporarily or completely. A non-optimal routing path
that goes via a rendezvous node offers location privacy for an end host because the
rendezvous node hides the actual location of the host.
The rendezvous nodes may also interact with each other and form a logical over-
lay routing infrastructure above the network layer (see [122][67]). An IP-address-
independence overlay infrastructures use namespaces above the network layer for
routing packet between end hosts. This kind of routing path naming allows to bind
different kinds of network layer identifiers together.
2.4.3 Mobility Approaches
The network layer mobility protocols can be analyzed from the routing path update
point of view as illustrated in Figure 2.5, on page 50.
Mobility Model 1. Some of the mobility protocols update the end-to-intermediate
routing path, like Mobile IP [26] (see also [32]). This is illustrated in the first row
in Figure 2.5 and discussed in example 11 on page 50. In this kind of approach,
the routing path remains the same from the peer node’s viewpoint. The mobile
node updates the forwarding path at intermediate nodes, which results in non-
optimal packet forwarding paths. Typically, only the mobile node is authorized to
communicate with the intermediate nodes.
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Figure 2.5: Routing path update scenarios.
Example 11. In Mobile IP [26], packets are routed via a home agent,
through a tunnel, to the mobile host. This kind of routing is also called
triangular or dog-leg routing. A mobile host has a security association with
the home agent. After each hand-off, the mobile host updates its location to
the home agent only. Due to the triangular routing the mobility is invisible
to the peer host.
Mobility Model 2. Another mobility approach is to update the end-to-end and
end-to-intermediate routes, like in Mobile IPv6 [45] (see also [173][152][58][31]). This
is illustrated in the second row in Figure 2.5 and discussed in example 12 on page 51.
The approach extends the mobility model 1. The main difference is that the packet
forwarding path is updated both at the intermediate and peer nodes. The end-to-
end signalling provides routing path optimization. The target of the routing path
optimization is to minimize the end-to-end packet forwarding latency. A direct
routing path means topologically shortest path between two nodes.
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Example 12. In Mobile IPv6 [45], the mobile host does not have a security
association with its peer host but with it home agent like in Mobile IP [26].
However, the mobile host updates its location both to its home agent and to
the peer hosts. The security is based on sending different pieces of binding
update related information via two different paths. One path goes through
an IPsec tunnel via a home agent, and the other path goes directly between
end hosts. A MitM attacker must be located on the end-to-end signalling
paths to break the security solution as discussed earlier in section 1.6.3.
Mobility Model 3. It is also possible to update the end-to-intermediate and
intermediate-to-intermediate routing paths like Stoica et al. present in Internet
Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [174] (see also [198][61] [186][109][107][172]). This is
illustrated in the third row in Figure 2.5 and discussed in example 13, on page 51.
In this approach, the routing path remains the same from the peer node’s viewpoint.
Both the mobile nodes and the intermediate nodes may be authorized to update the
routing path. The approach may improve the hand-off latency and provide route
optimization.
Example 13. i3 [174] defines an overlay routing mechanism for multicast,
anycast and mobile communication. The architecture decouples the sender
and receiver of each other using rendezvous servers, called i3 nodes. Pack-
ets are routed from the sender to the receiver via these i3 nodes. After each
hand-off the mobile host updates its location at an i3 node. Due to the tri-
angular routing latency, the mobile host may change the i3 node and update
a binding between the old and current overlay identifiers for reachability
reasons. This results also in a routing path update in the i3 infrastructure.
Mobility Model 4. Another approach is to update the end-to-end, end-to-intermediate
and intermediate-to-intermediate routing paths like Nikander et al. present in
Hi3 [126] (See also [57][139][6]). This is illustrated in the fourth row in Figure 2.5
and discussed in example 14, on page 52. The approach combines the mobility mod-
els 2 and 3. The additional end-to-end signalling may be needed for security and/or
for additional route optimization reasons.
52
Example 14. Hi3 [126] is an instantiation of the i3 [174] architecture that
defines a detailed security solution at the protocol level. Hi3 combines ideas
from Secure-i3 [5] and HIP [P3]. Hi3 is based on the observation that a DHT
extended HIP rendezvous server [90] and the basic Secure-i3 infrastructure
are fairly close to each other. From the routing path viewpoint, the main
difference between Hi3 and i3 (see example 13) is that the mobile host may
update its location also directly to the peer host.
Mobility Model 5. It is also possible to update only the intermediate-to-intermediate
routing path like Proxy Mobile IPv6 [164] (see also [159][156]). This is illustrated
in the fifth row in Figure 2.5 and discussed in example 15 on page 52. In this kind
of proxy based approach, the mobility is transparent for both end hosts. The in-
termediate nodes are authorized to update the routing path. Like the traditional
routing is transparent to the end hosts, in a similar way the intermediate proxy
nodes can make the mobility transparent for end hosts. A proxy node takes care of
the signalling on behalf of the end host.
Example 15. In Proxy Mobile IPv6 [164], a legacy host attaches to an in-
termediate node called Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). Once a MAG node
makes a hand-off also the attached legacy host changes its topological lo-
cation. The MAG node updates the legacy nodes location to a home agent
called Local Mobility Anchor (LMA). The mobility is hidden from both end
hosts.
Mobility Model 6. Finally, this thesis presents an approach for updating the
intermediate-to-host routing paths as illustrated in the last row in Figure 2.5. The
approach is based on delegation of signalling rights between end hosts and interme-
diate mobile nodes. The related network mobility solution is presented in publica-
tion [P9], and discussed later in section 6.4.
2.4.4 Analysis of Mobility Approaches
The evolution of the presented mobility models 1-6 can be analyzed from the
TCP/IP backward compatibility viewpoint. The oldest protocols updating the end-
to-intermediate routing path were designed to be backward compatible from the
peer host viewpoint. However, the approaches require changes at the mobile host
and intermediate nodes. The latest protocols updating intermediate-to-intermediate
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routing path provide TCP/IP backward compatibility at both end hosts. Thus,
more and more functionality is moved to the intermediate nodes. The rest of the
approaches increase the functionality both at the end hosts and intermediate nodes.
This breaks the backward compatibility with the existing TCP/IP stack bindings
at nodes.
The evolution of the dynamic routing path management can also be analyzed from
architectural requirements’ viewpoints, e.g., from security, robustness, bandwidth
consumption, latency and route optimization viewpoints. However, related analysis
is out of scope for this chapter.
2.4.5 Additional States at Intermediate Nodes
Several namespace problems at the network layer are related to the shortage of
32-bit long IPv4 addresses and size of routing tables [46]. The Classless Inter-
Domain Routing (CIDR), private address spaces and IPv6 were introduced to solve
the problems [183][103][163]. While CIDR reduced the bindings at the routers, the
private address spaces added new states at intermediate nodes called NAT devices.
The utilization of solutions (e.g. [76]) that solve the intercommunication between
IPv6 and IPv4 has been quite slow. Therefore, the larger 128-bit IPv6 address space
has not been fully utilized in the current Internet. Instead, usage of IPv4 address
space has been optimized at the cost of increasing tensions inside the TCP/IP stack.
The private address spaces add new kinds of bindings to the routing path. Some
intermediate nodes, like NAT devices and firewalls, define additional IP address
related bindings. As a result, IP address-pairs cannot always be used for defining
end-to-end routing paths in a unique way. Instead, the routing path may be identi-
fied with a set of IP address-pairs. Thus, other namespaces are needed to efficiently
identify a routing path. This has resulted in alternative overlay routing concepts
that use additional namespaces for path identification between end hosts.
As discussed earlier in section 2.2.2, a connection consists of different kinds of bind-
ings at intermediate nodes located on the routing path. In the basic form, the inter-
mediate nodes utilize the IP address space only for network layer routing. However,
the earlier mentioned shortage of global IPv4 addresses and privacy requirements
have led to multiplex IP addresses with other namespaces. Typically, the transport
layer identifiers, like port values, are used for this purpose. The network and trans-
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port layers are not only bound together at end hosts but also at the intermediate
nodes.
From the mobility viewpoint, it is not enough to manage IP related bindings at end
hosts but also at the intermediate nodes. However, the end-to-end binding update
signalling cannot be used to update the static bindings at the deployed NAT devices
as discussed in example 3, on page 38. To overcome the problem, some mobility
approaches use tunneling techniques and explicit protocols to initiate static bindings
per connection at intermediate nodes which is a clear architectural inefficiency. An
example of this are legacy NAT traversal protocols that use UDP tunnelling like
STUN [161], TURN [94] and TEREDO [23]. NUTSS [66] and NATBLASTER [20]
are proposals for establishing TCP connections through NAT devices. Many of these
proposals reuse techniques developed in the P2P file-sharing and gaming community.
The mentioned NAT traversal approaches do not require modifications to the exist-
ing and largely deployed NAT devices. However, without incorporating additional
logic into the intermediate nodes and support of third party entities, mobile pro-
tocol solutions become tricky when both end hosts are behind NAT devices. From
the protocol-design point of view the UDP tunneling violates the Saltzer’s layer-
ing principles, wastes bandwidth, and makes the protocol implementation gradually
more complex. To avoid the presented NAT related problems, the end host and new
intermediate nodes should use the same static identifiers for connection identifica-
tion. The used connection identifiers at intermediate nodes and end hosts should be
changed during host mobility only for privacy purposes.
2.5 Transport Layer Bindings
Transport layer is the fourth layer in the TCP/IP 5-layer model. The network layer
does not keep bindings between nodes and services but the bindings take place at
the transport layer. For example, the TCP pseudo header checksum is computed
over the IP addresses and port numbers carried in the packet.6 This kind of design
choice binds the network and transport layers to each other. The pseudo header
checksum cannot be changed during the TCP connection lifetime. If the identifiers
used at transport layer are changed, the packets cannot be delivered between the
6A pseudo-header checksum is a field carried in a TCP header that is used for error detection.
The TCP/IP checksum covers the TCP header and a pseudo header that contains the IP addresses,
the protocol value and the payload data length [93].
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communicating processes without mobility support.
The transport layer protocols can roughly be divided into connectionless (e.g. UDP)
and connected (e.g. TCP) protocols (see [185]). Connected transport layer protocols
create static bindings between IP addresses and port values, unlike connectionless
transport layer protocols. The intermediate nodes, like firewalls, benefit from the
connected and stateful transport layer protocols because it is hard for attackers
that are not on the routing path to guess the IP addresses, port values and se-
quence numbers carried in the packet and required to bypass a firewall. While
connected transport layer protocols are able to provide some security protection
against identifier spoofing, the bindings at different nodes need to be in synchrony.
The synchronization is required to handle time out and state loss events at the end
hosts and intermediate nodes.
2.5.1 Decoupling Network Layer from Transport Layer
The initial transport layer protocol machines, like TCP, were not designed to dy-
namically update their states as a result of host mobility. Therefore, static identi-
fier bindings at the transport layer has resulted in defining logical mobility related
namespaces that hide location updates from the transport and upper layers. The
bindings between the IP addresses and the mobility related identifiers are logically
located between the network and transport layers. An example of such a mobility
namespace at the transport layer is the Mobile IP’s home address namespace [26].
Another example is the identifier-locator split approach in HIP [P3] where an IP
address works as a locator at the network layer while the host is identified with a
separate public-key based identifier at upper layers. This differs from the current
identification practice at the Internet where the IP address also works an identifier
for the host above the network layer. However, decoupling the network layer from
the transport layer can be done in alternative ways. For backward compatibility
reasons, the identifiers of the mobility namespace must have similar semantics as
the legacy IP addresses from the transport layer’s viewpoint.
The locations of the mobility related namespaces in the TCP/IP stack has araised
argumentation in the research community. It seems that the Saltzer’s principle of
providing the minimal common functionality at each layer is a good argument for
defining a logical macro mobility layer below the transport layer. In practice, the
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protocol machines of the logical layer are typically implemented (hooked) at the
network layer.
Depending on the mobility approach, the mobility related identifier namespace may
be flat or structured. The name resolution and connection bootstrapping procedures
depend on the semantics of the static identifiers used above the network layer (see
example 16, on page 16). Name resolution means binding an application layer name
to a peer host’s identifier. In addition, the network layer security protocols (like
IPsec [166]) define security related namespaces that logically are also located above
the networking layer but below the transport layer. However, most of the mobility
protocols do not utilize the security namespaces for mobility management (unlike
HIP [P3]).
Example 16. In Mobile IP [26], a DNS query returns a home address
of a mobile host for an application that wants to contact the mobile host.
The home address is used at the transport and network layers to initiate a
connection. However, in the HIP [P3] case, a DNS query returns a non-
routable host identity tag (HIT) to the application and to the transport layer
and an IP address to the network layer. HIT is a hash of a public key that
is computed using a one-way hash function [14]. The host must bind the
HIT and IP address together below the transport layer. If either the HIT or
IP addresses is not available for the application it is not able to initiate a
connection with the mobile host.
While the network layer provides a routing path between IP addresses, the logical
mobility layer provides overlay routing path between mobility layer identifiers above
the network layer. In a way, the overlay routing functionality (e.g. in i3 [174])
implements the IP address translation without causing tensions in the TCP/IP
stack unlike legacy NAT devices.
2.5.2 Mobility Approaches at Transport Layer
The mobility-management can also be implemented per transport layer protocol.
Some new transport layer protocols support dynamic identifier binding updates
(like [116]). The trade-off resulting from the transport layer related mobility ap-
proaches is that each of the protocols need to implement its own mobility-management
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functionality, unlike the mobility approaches that support dynamic bindings below
the transport layer.
When dynamic IP address bindings are supported both at the transport layer and be-
low the transport layer, the protocol-design becomes complex. For example, combin-
ing Mobile IP [26] and mobile Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [116].
The alternative locations for dynamic IP address mappings has led to incompatibil-
ity between different mobility protocols. One reason for this is that the protocols are
designed to solve different subsets of a larger mobility, multi-homing and security
problem field.
2.6 Application Layer Bindings
The applications communicate with the transport layer via the socket Application
Programming Interface (API) library that is called libc. From the socket API point
of view, mobility identifiers provided for applications must be as long as legacy IP
addresses in bits for backward compatibility reasons. Therefore, the current mobility
proposals use 32-bit and 128-bit long identifiers for IPv4 and IPv6 socket APIs at the
application layer. The design of backward compatible mobility protocols depends
on the legacy socket APIs. Some protocols break the backward compatibility and
define new socket APIs, like DONA [109] and SCTP [149]. A typical problem with
the deployment is that most of the current applications support only legacy socket
APIs. Deployment refers to an issue of getting a new protocol or identifier integrated
into a code-base at those nodes that are already located in the Internet.
2.6.1 Socket Interface Bindings
The socket binding ties the application, transport and network layers together. A
socket was initially defined to allow multiple processes at a host to use multiple
instances of transport layer protocol machines simultaneously [93]. A socket asso-
ciates an IP address pair, a port value pair and a protocol value together. A pair of
sockets uniquely identifies a transport layer connection.
While the socket functionality (see [190]) does not have its own layer from the
TCP/IP layering viewpoint, it has one from the implementation point of view (see
e.g. [63]). Logically, the socket layer is located above the transport layer. A socket
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Figure 2.6: IP address bindings for end-to-end data-plane traffic in the current
TCP/IP stack.
is bound to a Transport Layer Identifier (TLI) pair that defines a routing path, e.g.,
for a TCP connection. Each TLI consists of an IP address, a protocol number, and
a port value triplet. This causes tensions in the TCP/IP stack because IP addresses
are bound both to Saltzer’s network attachment points and services as illustrated
in Figure 2.6. This differs from the Saltzer’s viewpoint of having own bindings
between services and nodes, and nodes and attachment points. Some mobility ap-
proaches solve the problem by defining an additional binding above the transport
layer (like [82][197][170]).
It is also good to notice that each binding requires a state. Therefore, the socket
can be seen as a state between the application and the transport layer that provides
the binding between the identifiers. The sockets are bound to the same protocol
and address-family, e.g. IPv4 and IPv6, during their lifetime. This kind of static
binding sets limits on interprocess communication between sockets that are bound
to different address and protocol families.
Basically, the socket binding would probably be different if the current port number
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namespace were larger (above 16-bits) or the IPv6 address space (128-bits) were
directly used to identify services. The current socket structure makes the evolution
towards next generation communication schemes difficult. With a large enough
global port, i.e. service, number namespace it would be possible to combine the
semantics of the node and service namespaces together (see DONA [109]).
2.6.2 Service-to-Node Binding
The interface above the application layer is towards a human being. It differs from
the other interfaces in the TCP/IP stack. The human readable Fully Qualified Do-
main Name (FQDN) [2] offers a way for persons to interact with the TCP/IP stack
in a convenient way. FQDNs given to applications are mapped to IP addresses. The
bindings are stored at intermediate nodes, i.e. at Domain Name System (DNS)[2]
servers. The local resolver library at the application layer takes care of the commu-
nication between the processes and the DNS servers. During the name resolution
procedure an application makes an FQDN query to the DNS server. The DNS server
maps the FQDN to the IP addresses stored in its database and sends them back to
the application.
The basic reachability of a host is implemented with the FQDN-to-IP address bind-
ing. A user needs to know only a name of the host, not the location of the host.
However, the DNS does not support fast binding updates between the identifiers.
Therefore, the FQDN is often mapped to identifiers of mobility namespace at a
DNS, like to Mobile IP’s [26] home addresses. Typically, the weak authentication
of the peer host is based on the FQDNn→mIP-address bindings that is received
from the DNS. To strongly authenticate the service, security APIs can be used to
define security policies for sockets based on the transport layer identifiers. Here,
security policy denotes a set of rules that determine the integrity and confidentiality
protection mechanism applied for the packets sent and received via a socket [148].
2.6.3 Service-to-Service Binding
Some protocols implement bindings between sockets at the application layer, like
P2P applications (see [108]). In this kind of approach, the intermediate nodes
forward packets between sockets. Although, the processes at the intermediate nodes
act as connection end points, payload data is forwarded between processes located
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at end hosts. The approach requires an additional namespace to be used above
the socket layer. Different P2P protocols define this kind of new namespaces for
socket bindings. As discussed earlier, overlay routing can be based on alternative
namespaces above the network layer. The logical mobility layer below the transport
layer, and the application layer namespaces are alternatives to implement that.
2.7 Summary
The initial set of TCP/IP identifier bindings and the socket concept have been
good choices for several reasons. The Internet architecture has not suffered from
additional namespace management problems. The initial set of namespaces has
been easy to deploy. The basic TCP/IP identifier bindings have fulfilled the needs
of most nodes in the Internet.
If the mobility aspect and mobility namespaces had initially been part of the ar-
chitecture the mentioned issues would probably have scattered the Internet. The
trade-off has been that the initial set of identifier bindings is not enough for the
current mobility and multi-homing requirements. The Internet community is facing
the challenges in the architectural design.
The current TCP/IP namespaces are mixed with each other resulting in identifier
binding update problems as illustrated in Figure 2.6, on page 58. Tunneling based
approaches are used to minimize additional states at end hosts and to move part of
the state management to intermediate nodes. Some other solutions compensate the
small namespace sizes by multiplexing existing TCP/IP identifiers at intermediate
nodes. All of these cause tensions between network-stack layers.
Currently the transport layer identifiers used with the sockets bind the network,
transport and application layers to each other. The initial static bindings between
the layers do not support granularity in mobility approaches. It seems that dynamic
bindings between identifiers of any adjacent layers increase the flexibility of the
TCP/IP stack. In addition, the location of the dynamic bindings, at end hosts
and intermediate nodes, defines the granularity level of the mobility approach as
discussed in the following solution chapters 5 and 6.
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3 Research Problem
One of the main problems with the existing mobility and multi-homing approaches
is that they do not offer integrated authentication and mobility-management mech-
anisms for different granularity levels of mobility. The main goal in this thesis is to
define an efficient and flexible mobility and multi-homing architecture that integrates
authentication, key-management, privacy protection, and mobility-management sig-
nalling between nodes in a seamless way. The research field is related to finding
alternative ways to secure dynamic bindings in the TCP/IP stack.
3.1 Research Goals
The author has been looking for a solution that integrates different granularity
levels of mobility. The studied granularity levels have been flow mobility [P1],
address-family agility [P8], local mobility [P4] and network mobility [P9]. The
problem field connects to securing the mobility state establishment and update
signalling between end hosts and intermediate nodes [P3][P2][P6][P4][P5][P9]. An
additional requirement has been backward compatibility with existing, i.e. legacy,
applications [P3][P8].
One of the main research goals concerns supporting mobility and multi-homing in
parallel [P3][P2][P1]. Basically, the mobility functionality implies that an end point
is serially reachable via different locations. The multi-homing functionality makes
the end point reachable via multiple locations in parallel. Supporting simultaneous
communication through different access technologies [P3][P1] is part of the multi-
homing problem field. The focus on the mobility and multi-homing research has
been above the link layer.
The multiple access networks may support different IP versions, IPv4 and/or IPv6.
This has resulted in a study of hand-offs and inter-communication between different
IP versions from the perspective of applications and network layers [P8][P7]. From
the application viewpoint, the main goals are socket-API backward compatibility
and transparent address-family hand-offs [P8]. For intermediate nodes, the most
interesting problem is identifier-based locator translation [P7].
All the research goals mentioned above are bound to secure and efficient mobil-
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ity state management at end hosts and intermediate nodes. The author has also
studied the problem field of identity privacy related to the mobility state manage-
ment [P6][P4][P5].
3.2 Side Requirements
Determining a balance between security and mobility-management signalling over-
heads has resulted in a set of side requirements. Some essential goals have been to
minimize signalling and to provide optimal packet forwarding paths between end
hosts. To reduce mobility-management signalling and latency, lightweight state es-
tablishment and update procedures at end hosts and intermediate have been stud-
ied [P5][P4]. An end-host related goal has been to achieve an alternative to a
public-key-based mobility state establishment and update [P5]. Another goal has
been to provide transparent security-association establishment and update between
mobile hosts and intermediate nodes [P4].
One of the research goals has been avoiding a signalling explosion in densely-
populated moving-networks [P9]. This has also led to a study of optimal packet
forwarding paths originated from and destined to moving networks [P9]. Further-
more, optimization of forwarding paths depends on IP-address allocation inside mov-
ing networks [P7][P9]. The focus in studies has been on authorization of a mobile
router and how it can signal on behalf of its clients [P9].
3.3 Initial Set-up and Environment
Working with the existing Internet architecture sets limits on what we can do,
compared to defining a new architecture from the beginning. The guiding principle
has been making minimal architectural changes and supporting legacy applications
and transport protocols. The research goals together with these constraints led the
author to study identifier-locator split solutions and cryptographic host-identifier
namespaces. The results are different solutions for dynamic identifier bindings.
Throughout, the aim has been the right engineering balance between the existing
Internet architecture and the presented new changes. Chapters 4-6 explain the most
essential architectural changes. Some design choices have generated a set of benefi-
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cial side effects, while others have caused trade-offs and drawbacks. An example of
a side effect is the strong authentication requirement and identity privacy problem
created by cryptographic identifiers. Some of the requirements in the publications
are contradict each other. This thesis presents a solution that provides one possible
balance between the conflicting requirements.
3.4 Non-Goals
This section explains which problems and solutions are not covered by the current
research. The author has focused on the identifier bindings between the networking
and transport layers, and between the transport and application layers. Dynamic
bindings at other layers, like link-layer mobility and process migration are beyond
the scope of this thesis.
Adaption of the transport layer protocols (like [16][27]) and applications to a dy-
namically changing network environment has also been out of the scope. Instead,
the goal has been on the application backwards compatibility, in other words, to
keep the old APIs and semantics for applications.
Legacy intermediate nodes, like access points, legacy NAT devices and firewalls,
are beyond the scope of this thesis. The related traversal issues are discussed,
e.g., at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Internet Research Task
Force (IRTF) HIP working groups. In this thesis, the author assumes that each end
host implements the new namespace bindings. The alternative proxy approaches
that support legacy end hosts are out of scope for this thesis.
Regardless of these exclusions, the presented solutions and results in this thesis are
also meaningful in many contexts that are not discussed in this thesis.
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4 Architectural Overview
In this section, the author presents an architectural overview that combines the
author’s publications together in a seamless way. The author briefly discusses the
identifier-locator split approach in section 4.1. In the following sections 4.2-4.4,
the architecture is discussed from the component, functionality, and implementation
viewpoints. The components work as building blocks for the architecture. The au-
thor has divided the components roughly into end hosts, intermediate nodes, and
protocols. The end hosts and intermediate nodes interact with each other using a
set of mobility state management protocols. Each component implements a set of
functionalities. Furthermore, the logical functionalities can be divided into imple-
mentation modules. Figure 4.1 (page 65) illustrates a rough example topology of
the new architecture.
The presented functionality can be divided into three groups. The groups define
functionality for 1) default Internet routing, 2) common mobility state management
and 3) granular mobility state management. The first and second group of function-
ality work as a foundation for the third group. The default Internet routing function-
ality refers to the existing Internet infrastructure and to its IP routing functionality.
The common mobility state management denotes the common functionality that
is used in all the different granular mobility approaches (chapter 6). The common
functionality for the basic state-establishment is presented in sections 5.1-5.3 and
for the state update in section 5.4. The state update includes both the location
update and rekeying functionality.
4.1 Identifier-locator Split
This thesis defines a secure architecture for multiple granularity-levels of mobility.
The architecture is based on an identifier-locator split approach where static and
globally-unique host-identifiers are dynamically bound to locators [P3]. The identi-
fier and name concepts were earlier discussed in section 1.4, on page 23. A locator
is a non-cryptographic and structured name that is defined at the network layer and
used for routing packets between network interfaces. From the semantics point of
view, the locators are used for identifying a locatorn→1MAC-address bindings while
they are not associated with other identifiers above the network layer. However,
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Figure 4.1: A rough example network structure of the architecture.
in the current Internet, IP addresses are used both for locators at network layer
and host identifiers above the network layer. This is called semantic overloading
of IP addresses. Non-cryptographic names like IP addresses cannot strongly be
associated to hosts making it difficult to verify that a specific host is authorized
to update a binding. Therefore, this thesis presents alternative ways for host au-
thentication using different kinds of host identifiers. Depending on the presented
mobility solution, public keys [P3][P2][P4][P6][P7][P8][P9], Lamport’s one-way hash-
chains [P4][P6][P5] and structured home addresses [P1] are used for host identifica-
tion. The solutions are extensions to the basic Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [45] and Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) [146] protocols.
4.1.1 OPODIS’02 Paper: Research Problem
The semantic overloading and non-cryptographic nature of IP addresses makes it
impossible to use them for strong authentication. The problem becomes even worse
with mobile and multi-homed host. This kind of hosts have several network inter-
faces bound to dynamically changing IP addresses. When a host changes its point
of attachment to the network or it reroutes traffic from one interface to another,
the identifiers associated with a TCP connection are changed. The main problem
is that the peer host cannot verify that the new connection identifiers belong to the
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same mobile-host. Basically, the peer must have evidence that an identifier belongs
to a specific host. An essential problem is that a host using traditional IP-addresses
cannot prove that it is authorized to use a specific IP-address at a specific location.
A resulting goal is to define the actual identity that is the target of the identification
process.
4.1.2 OPODIS’02 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P2], the author analyzes the separation between verifiable host-
identifiers and non-verifiable location names. The main result of the paper is the
relationship between non-cryptographic and cryptographic association-mechanisms.
The author argues that a host-identity must consist of a secret that is known only
by the authentic host. From the cryptographic association-mechanism point of
view, the host must be able to prove to its peers that it knows the secret with-
out revealing it. Therefore, public-key cryptography and Lamport one-way Hash
chains are suitable for decoupling the private identity and public identifier from
each other [14][110]. It is good to notice that a normal IP address is associated
using a non-cryptographic mechanism to a host and it cannot be used for strong
authentication. The author also defines a socket association structure for cryp-
tographic identifiers, location names and hand-off related policy identifiers. The
dynamic binding between the cryptographic host-identifiers and non-cryptographic
location names makes it possible to secure location update messages between hosts.
The main limitation of the paper is that it does not contain formal evaluation of the
defined bindings.
4.1.3 OPODIS’02 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
The identifier-locator split is discussed earlier, e.g, by Chiappa, Bellowin, Lear and
Moskowitz [101][162][53][146]. The author of this thesis analyzes the same problem
field from the security point of view in publication [P2]. The analysis has a close rela-
tion to the previous multi-homing and mobility work that use non-cryptographic pri-
mary identifiers for host identification but depend on TLS or IPsec for host authenti-
cation purposes like SCTP, Mobile IPv6, LIN6 and TCP Migrate [149][45][115][173].
As a result, the decoupled security protocols provide secondary cryptographic iden-
tifiers for the hosts. The main problem in these kinds of approaches is the separation
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Figure 4.2: Some components in the architecture.
between mobility and security protocols from each other. To increase the flexibility
in the mentioned mobility and multi-homing protocols it may be possible to refac-
tor some of them to use the cryptographic identifiers as primary host-identifiers like
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) in Mobile IPv6 [85].
4.2 Components
The host stack required for interprocess communication is constructed based on
the earlier mentioned identifier-locator split approach. The hosts can be named
according to their roles, namely, mobile hosts and peer hosts. In the following
context, a mobile host initiates a communication with a peer host. In other words,
the mobile host can be called an initiator and the peer host a responder from the
protocol-exchange viewpoint [121]. The intermediate nodes support communication
between mobile hosts and peer hosts. It is good to notice that the peer host may
also dynamically change its topological attachment to the network and play the role
of the mobile host. The nodes discussed in this section are illustrated in Figure 4.2,
on page 67.
The hosts require intermediate nodes to communicate with each other (section 4.2.4).
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From the host viewpoint, the intermediate nodes can be divided (like in [97]) into
local-domain nodes, transit-domain nodes and global-domain nodes (sections 4.2.1-
4.2.3). The scope of a locator associated to a network interface defines the scope of
the node. The local-domain nodes are attached to the same link with the host. The
host can negotiate with them using link-local locators. The transit-domain nodes
provide a private, not globally routable, locator space for their clients. The network
interfaces of the global-domain nodes are directly attached to the Internet. In other
words, the nodes are reachable via globally-routable locators.
4.2.1 Local Domain Nodes
The local domain nodes may support different kinds of wireless and wired access
technologies. The most essential local domain nodes are the access points and access
routers. An access point is an intermediate node that operates at the link layer in the
local domain and offers an attachment for nodes to the link [118]. An access point
may be decoupled from an access router or it may be integrated with the access
router. An access router is an intermediate node that operates at the network
layer providing IP connectivity to the nodes in the local domain [118]. An access
router may be connected to multiple access points. A node runs an attachment
exchange with an access point to attach to the local domain (see [87][167][100][11]).
Typically, the attachment exchange consists at least of authentication and optionally
of authorization.
During (or after) the attachment procedure the node communicates with an access
router to allocate locators for its NIC. The node may simultaneously be attached
to multiple access points via different network-interfaces. A multi-homed node has
several locators associated to its network interfaces. Each of the network interfaces
may have multiple locatorn→1MAC-address bindings.7
4.2.2 Transit Domain Nodes
The same node may work as a local-domain node and a transit-domain node for
the hosts. The transit-domain nodes have multiple roles that are 1) local mobility-
anchor-points [P4], 2) mobile routers [P9] and 3) static signalling-proxies [P9]. In
7The binding between network interfaces and locators is based on Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) and Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocols [47][180][86].
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this thesis, all transit-domain nodes implement the Security Parameter Index multi-
plexed Network Address Translation (SPINAT) functionality [P7][P6]. The SPINAT
functionality provides overlay routing for host identifiers and identifier-based locator-
translation for IPsec ESP protected payload traffic. The SPINAT nodes are located
on the end-to-end routing-path, like legacy NAT devices.
The local mobility-anchor-points hide the node mobility from the peer hosts and
optimize the end-to-end state update signalling. The mobile routers dynamically
change their topological attachment to the network, like mobile hosts. Nodes at-
tached to mobile routers move together with the routers. The mobile routers can
be attached to other mobile routers, thus creating nested moving networks. It is
good to notice that a mobile node can be either a mobile host or a mobile router.
In this thesis, the mobile routers implement the signalling-proxy and access-router
functionality. A node may authorize a mobile router or a static signalling-proxy to
run a mobility state-update-exchange on behalf of it [P9][125].
4.2.3 Global Domain Nodes
The end hosts, local-domain nodes, and transit-domain nodes need support from
the global-domain nodes. The global-domain nodes can roughly be divided into the
directory services and rendezvous nodes [P3]. The directory services provide a name-
lookup service and certificate storage. The nodes use the name-lookup service, like
DNS, to bind a FQDN to a locator set and to an Host Identity (HI). HI consists
of a public-key-based identifier-identity pair. Host Identity Tag (HIT) is a hash
value that is computed over a public key of the HI using a one-way hash-function
[14][121][P3]. It is typically also stored in the directory service together with the
HI [132]. The certificate storage provides a way for the nodes to store and retrieve
certificates [P9].
The rendezvous nodes work as static reachability-points for nodes. The functionality
is presented in publication [P3] where the rendezvous nodes are called forwarding
agents. Typically, the nodes store their static locators bound to a rendezvous node
at the directory service. The rendezvous nodes keep a binding 8 between the HI and
the current locator of the node.
8See section 5.1.3 for a rendezvous-state initialization for the HIn↔1 locator binding.
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Figure 4.3: Example interactions between components.
4.2.4 Communication Protocols
The communication protocols between nodes can be divided into 1) bootstrapping
protocols, 2) control-plane protocols and 3) data-plane protocols. The bootstrapping
exchanges take places before a node can initiate a control-plane exchange. Fur-
thermore, the control-plane exchanges establish and update states for data-plane
protocols.
The control-plane protocols can be divided into 1) registration and authorization
exchange, 2) mobility state-establishment-exchange and 3) mobility state-update-
exchange. The data-plane protocols can be divided into 1) integrity and confiden-
tiality protection protocols and 2) network protocols. In the new architecture, the
author has focused on IPsec ESP, IPv4 and IPv6 protocols [166][81][163]. However,
it is possible to replace the applied protocols with other protocol families. Figure 4.3
illustrates example interactions between the different components.
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Figure 4.4: Visualizing some parts of the functional architecture.
4.3 Functional Architecture
The previous sections presented the main components in the architecture. The fol-
lowing sections discuss the functional architecture. As described earlier, the archi-
tecture is based on the default Internet routing, and on the common and granular
mobility state management. The author assumes that the routing functionality
forwards the IPv4 and IPv6 packets between nodes in the Internet. Figure 4.4
illustrates some parts of the functional architecture.
The bootstrapping procedure contains the attachment exchange, locator assignment
and name resolution (section 2.5.1) required to initialize state establishment and
update exchanges (section 4.3.2) with peer hosts. The mobility state establish-
ment results in identifier translation at the nodes (section 4.3.1). The authenti-
cation, authorization, and delegation are part of the mobility state management
(section 4.3.3). Authorization denotes that one identity approves rights to access
its resource to another identity [148]. Here, delegation refers to the ability of an
identity to reassociate its granted authorization with another identity [148].
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Figure 4.5: Double Namespace Binding at Hosts.
4.3.1 Identifier Translation
An application invokes name resolution to bind a FQDN to an HI and to a related
locator-set. The name resolution returns an Application Layer Identifier (AID) to
the application, and a HI and a locator set to the local mobility protocol machine.
AID can be a cryptographic identifier or a non-cryptographic name. The scope of
the namespace and the size of the AID defines its collision probability. Depending
on the size of AIDs they may be used locally at a host scope or globally in the
Internet. From the socket API viewpoint, AID may be structured or flat as long as
its size is suitable with the socket API system calls. AIDs replace the IP addresses
in the socket bindings at the socket layer. In the scope of this thesis, an AIDn↔1HIT
binding is created at the socket layer.
The translations between AIDs, HIs, and locators are implemented at two different
locations in the kernel. The AIDn↔1HI translation takes place at the socket layer.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 4.5. The translation provides a way to decouple
the socket APIs from the transport layer. The second HIn↔m locator binding is
implemented at the IPsec Bound End-to-End Tunnel mode (BEET) [134][P3] and
at the new BEET intermediate node [P7][P9] modes (sections 7.2.2-7.2.4).9 For
9At this point of the thesis it is sufficient to focus on a coarse AIDn↔1HI and HIn↔m locator
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the purpose of the following sections, the author will use the ’Bound End-to-End
Tunnel mode for Intermediate Nodes (BEETIN)’ term to refer to the new IPsec
intermediate node mode. The new mode differs semantically from the end-to-end
BEET mode [134] (see section 5.3.5).
The BEET mode implements the HIn↔m locator translation at end hosts, while the
BEETIN mode implements the translation at intermediate nodes. The BEET and
BEETIN modes implement HIn↔m locator translation between locator families. The
related IPsec [166] policies and Security Associations (SAs) are created during state
establishment.
4.3.2 State Establishment and Update
The state establishment can be divided into 1) local state-establishment (section 5.1),
2) peer state-establishment (section 5.2) and 3) intermediate state-establishment
(section 5.3). The local and peer state-establishment create BEET SAs at the
hosts. The intermediate state-establishment creates new BEETIN SAs at interme-
diate nodes. The nodes also generate shared keying material during the state es-
tablishment. The keying material is used by BEET SAs and optionally by BEETIN
SAs to provide integrity and confidentiality protection[14] for payload packets [P7].
The received local and network events trigger a state update exchange [P1]. An
event denotes an occurrence at a host or in a network that is relevant to a mobility
or security mechanism [148]. The exchange updates or creates new IPsec policies
and SAs. In the following context, the author will use “SA update” to describe a
situation where the keying material remains the same but the locators bound to the
SA are replaced with new ones.
A hand-off event results in a locator update, while the rekeying event updates the
packet integrity and confidentiality protection keying material. The state update
procedure (section 5.4) can be divided into 1) local state-update, 2) peer state-update
and 3) intermediate state-update depending on where the corresponding protocol-
machine is located. The architecture also provides functionality for surviving from
a state loss. A protocol machine may loss its state at hosts or participating inter-
mediate nodes.
binding granularity. In practice, the logical HIn↔m locator binding is divided into HI1↔nVIID,
VIIDn↔1SPI and SPIn↔1 locator bindings that are discussed later in section 7.
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4.3.3 Authentication, Authorization, and Delegation
The nodes authenticate each other during state-establishment and state-update
exchanges. The authentication functionality presented in this thesis can be di-
vided into weak authentication and strong authentication (section 5.2.2). A weak-
authentication solution for hosts is presented in publication [P5] and for intermedi-
ate nodes in publication [P4]. A strong authentication solution supporting identity
protection is presented in publication [P6].
Weak authentication uses computationally more lightweight algorithms compared to
strong authentication. Weak authentication is open for certain Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) attacks but protects the nodes from some CPU related DoS attacks. A
MitM attacker that is located on the routing path between hosts intercepts or
selectively modifies packets to masquerade as an end host or some intermediate-
node that is involved with the connection [148]. The strong authentication is based
on public-key cryptography [14]. The presented weak and strong authentication
techniques are self-identifying and do not require Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Self-identifying denotes that each host generates an identity for itself. The authen-
tication is based on proving the ownership of the specific identity with Lamport
one-way hash chain [110] and public-key [14] techniques. PKI denotes a system of
Certificate Authorities (CAs) that form a set of certificate based authentication and
authorization mechanisms [148]. CA is an identity that issues certificates. A certifi-
cate is a formal binding between data and identifiers that are associated together
using CA’s signature. A signature is created by a cryptographic mechanism that
associates a public-key pair and some data together [14].
The authentication functionality is extended to support identity protection. Identity
protection mechanism allows a host to determine which other nodes are able to verify
its identity. The strong authentication and related public-key cryptography are used
for delegating binding update rights [P9] between nodes (section 6.4).
4.4 Implementation Architecture
The previous sections discussed the components and the functional architecture. In
this section, the author will briefly describe the architecture from the implementation
point of view. The functionalities can be divided into implementation-modules.
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Figure 4.6: Some essential implementation modules.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the most essential implementation modules at the nodes. The
implementation is roughly divided into user-space and kernel parts. Hosts and
intermediate nodes use the same code-base. Thus, nodes can dynamically take new
roles in the architecture. The author and his colleagues have adopted parts of the
extreme programming [102] methods during the implementation process.
4.4.1 AID↔HI Translation
To initialize a connection, an application typically makes a DNS query using the
resolver-library function-calls. The DNS library returns an HIT and a locator set
for each peer-host. The library returns the Local Scope Identifier (LSI) and/or HIT
to the application. A globally unique HIT is used with the IPv6 socket API, while
a local LSI replaces the IP address in the IPv4 socket API. The resolver library
also sends the HI and the received locator set to the HIP daemon. The daemon
initializes the AIDn↔1HI binding at the socket layer (section 7.2.1). In addition,
the daemon initializes an outgoing IPsec policy for the peer’s HI.
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4.4.2 HI↔Locator Translation
The HIn↔m locator translation is implemented at the BEET and BEETIN modules
in the kernel. The corresponding two, new IPsec SA types identify the required
translation for each packet. In the outgoing BEET SA case, an outgoing packet
carrying HITs matches with an IPsec policy. The policy is bound to a corresponding
SA that implements the translation from HITs to locators. In the incoming case, a
received ESP packet is decrypted and the locators translated to HITs. The resulting
plain-text packet is sent back to ’ip6 input’ processing without the ESP header.
Hereafter the message is processed as a basic incoming IPv6-packet.
In an incoming BEETIN SA case, the locators in the incoming ESP packet are
translated to HITs in the same way as in the BEET mode. However, the ESP
packet is not decrypted but it is sent to ’ip6 output’ processing. The same outgoing
ESP packet matches with an IPsec policy. The policy is mapped with an outgoing
BEETIN SA that does not encrypt the packet in the basic case but only translates
the HITs to locators. The IPsec policies and SAs are also used for traffic flow
management at multi-homed nodes (section 6.1).
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5 Common Mobility and Multi-Homing
Functionality
This chapter covers the common mobility and multi-homing functionality for four
granularity levels of mobility discussed later in chapter 6. The following discussion
is based on the components and functionality presented in the previous chapter 4.
The different stages of the mobility-management are presented in chronological or-
der. Initially, a node joins a network (section 5.1) before initiating communication
(section 5.2) with peer nodes. The intermediate nodes on the packet forwarding
path establish states (section 5.3) during the communication initialization. Later
on, the node dynamically updates the related states (section 5.4) before destroying
or losing them.
5.1 Joining the Network
The bootstrapping exchanges take place before a node can initiate communication
with its peer hosts. The bootstrapping can be divided into host-identity generation,
network attachment, service discovery and registration at local and transit domains
and rendezvous state initialization at a global domain. These different phases of the
bootstrapping procedure are discussed in the following sections 5.1.1-5.1.3.
The exact role of a node does not need to be fixed during the local-state initialization.
Instead, each node may dynamically change and take new roles in the architecture.
A node may simultaneously act, e.g., as a mobile router, a rendezvous node and
a local mobility anchor point for other nodes (sections 4.2.2-4.2.3). However, the
applied security models, like pre-defined Access Control List (ACL) and public-
key sharing [14], set limitations to the dynamics in the architecture. ACL is a
mechanism that authorize nodes to access a system resource based on enumerated
identifiers [148].
5.1.1 Host Identity Generation
Before a node joins a network it generates a set of identities for itself. The semantics
of identities are discussed in publications [P2] and [P3]. In the following context, the
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author will assume that an identity is a private key, while the identifier is the corre-
sponding public-key or any cryptographic derivate of it, e.g., a hash chain [14][110].
Values in one-way hash chains can work as identifiers for the identity. Publica-
tion [P6] uses public keys, while publication [P5] is an example of using one-way
hash chains to identify a host.
The identities can be divided into long term and temporary identities based on their
lifetime. Furthermore, the long term identities can be classified into public and pri-
vate identities. An identity protection mechanism presented in publication [P6] de-
fines a solution for supporting private identities in the Internet. A node may store
its long term identifier in a directory service but hide the same identifier from the in-
termediate nodes during the state-establishment and state-update exchanges. Thus,
the classification of identities is bound to the location and time. The public iden-
tities can be used, e.g., with ACLs, while temporary identities provide anonymity
for the nodes. The private and anonymous identities differ mainly in that lifetime
of the anonymous identities is typically shorter than lifetime of private identities.
Anonymous identifiers are not stored in a directory service, and they are typically
used per purpose [P6].
An essential benefit of the public-key-based Host Identities used in this thesis is
that they can be applied to authorization and delegation mechanisms (see [131]).
In addition, the HIs are bound to application layer identifiers and locators using
policies. Here, a policy denotes a set of rules used by a mobility mechanism to
determine a binding between identifiers. The policy-based bindings makes it possible
to support different granularity levels of mobility. The applied policies may be locally
defined, or they may be initially defined by other nodes, e.g., by operators [P1].
5.1.2 Network Attachment, Local Service Discovery and Registration
Once a node has initialized a local state, it is able to attach to an access network and
to assign locators from the access routers. The attachment, service-discovery and
service registration exchanges are logically separate protocols. From the protocol-
design point of view it is possible to integrate them into a single protocol exchange
at the local domain (like in [87]).
The service discovery is related to the moving-network approach presented later in
section 6.4. The mobile routers work as access routers for mobile nodes. When the
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mobile routers work as access points for their clients, they may use beacons to adver-
tise their services. Beacon is a small data frame that is broadcast by a wireless access
point to inform mobile nodes about its existence. In this case, the service registra-
tion exchange can directly be integrated with the attachment exchange. However,
when the mobile router is located in the transit domain, several hops away from the
access point, the attachment exchange cannot be used for the service registration.
Instead, the mobile host may use a network layer service discovery protocol to locate
the mobile router and the provided services.
A mobile node runs a registration exchange with mobile routers and optionally
with some rendezvous nodes when it joins the network. The node registers its
current location on the rendezvous nodes. During the registration exchange the
node may also establish transparently a rendezvous state at on-the-path SPINAT
nodes. A transparent state establish denotes that the mobile node does not run an
explicit exchange with the SPINAT node but the SPINAT node creates a state by
intercepting the end-to-end traffic (discussed later in section 5.3). After running
the registration exchanges the node is able to initialize communication and receive
connection attempts from other hosts.
5.1.3 Rendezvous State Initialization
A node may have prior knowledge of its global-domain rendezvous nodes or it may
dynamically discover the rendezvous service located in the Internet. In the former
case, the identifiers of the mobile nodes are pre-configured at the rendezvous node.
Moreover, the latter case is out of scope for this thesis and is analyzed, e.g., by Yen
et al. in [195]. The dynamic service discovery and registration to rendezvous nodes
located in the transit domain are discussed later in section 5.3.7.
The author assumes here that the node has prior knowledge of the locations and
the identities of the global domain rendezvous nodes. The information is stored in
the local state during initialization. The node also stores the static locators bound
to the rendezvous nodes on a directory service, e.g., in the basic case on the DNS.
Correspondingly, the static rendezvous nodes may store the host identifiers for au-
thentication purposes. The basic authentication model in the architecture is based
on self-identification that does require PKI. The security associations between the
mobile hosts and the rendezvous nodes are established with the authenticated state
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establishment exchanges (section 5.2.2). It is still good to notice that PKI and ACLs
can be applied with the identifiers [P9].
5.2 Initiating End-to-End Communication
The previous section discussed events that take place before a node can initiate
communication with its peer hosts. This section discusses name resolution and
the mobility state establishment exchanges in sections 5.2.1-5.2.2. Typically, the
name resolution is used to bootstrap the state establishment exchange between
hosts. The author describes alternative state establishment exchanges in publica-
tions [P6][P3][P5]. The corresponding strong and weak authentication exchanges
are discussed in sections 5.2.3-5.2.11.
5.2.1 Name Resolution and Global Service Discovery
In this thesis, global service discovery is based on name resolution and on the DNS in-
frastructure. However, it is possible to replace DNS with DHT (e.g. [158][174][191])
and P2P based (like [151]) directory services. Name resolution maps FQDNs to
HIs and locators. The HIs identify peer hosts running a requested service. The
locators may be bound to NICs of rendezvous nodes or peer hosts. FQDN is not
mapped to a location of a host running a required service but to an HI that imple-
ments the required service. This thesis is based on the many-to-one FQDNn↔1HI
binding [132].
It is also possible to have one-to-many FQDN1↔nHI bindings. As a result, the
semantics of FQDNs is changed. A FQDN may be mapped to multiple HIs that
are running the same service. In this case, name resolution provides backwards
compatible representations of the HIs to applications running in a semantically
old environment (see section 4.4.1). The applications assume that all the received
representation of the HIs are mapped to the same peer host. Although, the different
HIs may identify end points that are not reachable at the same topological-location.
Name resolution may also return a pre-signed state establishment message of the
peer host to optimize the state establishment latency (e.g. [126]). In that kind of
approach, the directory service logically runs a part 10 of the state establishment
10The part of the exchange where the responder remains stateless.
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exchange on behalf of the peer host. However, using the DNS for this purpose may
be controversial and is out of scope for this thesis.11
5.2.2 Alternative State Establishment Exchanges
The name resolution works as an initial step to reach the peer host. The resulting
mobility state establishment exchange can be triggered either right after the first
datagram has been sent to the socket or after the transport-layer state has been
established. The latter approach is called a delayed state establishment (like the
SHIM approach [49]) and it is out of scope for this thesis.
Publications [P3][P6] present alternative state establishment exchanges that are trig-
gered by the first outgoing payload message. The benefit of this approach is that the
hosts are able to authenticate each other before the payload traffic starts flowing. In
addition, the control-plane exchanges can be used to establish states at intermediate
nodes. The trade-off with this kind of an approach is that the state establishment
causes delay for the transport layer connection establishment.
The state establishment exchanges can be divided into strong [P3][P6] and weak [P5] au-
thentication exchanges based on the used cryptographic techniques. The state estab-
lishment exchanges can be negotiated directly between the hosts, or via rendezvous
nodes, called forwarding agents in [P3]. Optional bidirectional routing via ren-
dezvous nodes can be used to provide location privacy for hosts [P6]. The resulting
location privacy is strongly bound to identity protection.
The state establishment exchange based on strong authentication refers here to the
HIP base exchange presented in [P3] and to its privacy enhanced version BLIND
presented in [P6].12 HIP is explained in the following sections 5.2.3-5.2.5 and BLIND
in sections 5.2.6-5.2.8. Both of the protocols are two-round-trip authenticated key
exchanges providing some DoS protection for the responder [189]. The key exchanges
are used to authenticate the hosts to each other and to create IPsec BEET SAs at end
11The response messages stored at a DNS are updated frequently. The dynamic DNS [138] does
not solve the message update problem because DNS proxies typically cache the earlier made query
for some period of time.
12It is good to notice the one-to-one relation between the BLIND messages in Figure 1 in [P6] and
the HIP base-exchange messages in Figure 13 in [P3]. Basically, the ’Trigger’ message is mapped
to I1, the ’Challenge’ message is mapped to R1, the ’Response’ message is mapped to I2, and the
’Conf’ message is mapped to R2.
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hosts and BEETIN SAs at SPINAT nodes (section 5.3.2).13 The public-key-based
authentication is also used for authorizing intermediate nodes and for delegating
state update rights between the nodes (section 6.4).
It is good to notice that in all the three state establishment exchanges presented
in [P3][P6][P5], the responder remains stateless during the first protocol round-
trip. All the protocols implement a similar message structure, making it easy for
the intermediate nodes to establish states. Each message in the exchanges carries
the host identifiers of both end hosts. However, the weak authentication protocol
in [P5] differs from the two others in that it uses Lamport one-way hash chains
instead of public-key technology to authenticate hosts to each other.14 To keep the
exchange lightweight, it does not implement the Diffie-Hellman key exchange either.
Thus, the weak authentication exchange cannot be used to share symmetric IPsec
keying material between hosts. The weak authentication mechanism provides an
alternative for the public-key-based authentication. Basically, the hash-chain-based
state establishment exchange, presented in [P5] and discussed later in sections 5.2.9-
5.2.11, cannot be used for key-sharing and authorization in the architecture.
5.2.3 NDSS’03 Paper: Research Problem
In the current Internet architecture, an IP address represents both a host’s identity
and the host’s topological location. The processes at the application layer are bound
to sockets and the sockets are identified with IP addresses and port values. This kind
of structure binds the processes to a specific topological location, thereby making
host mobility, and multi-homing difficult. This has led to several security problems,
including the so-called address-ownership problem [123]. The address-ownership
problem denotes the non-cryptographic association mechanism between IP addresses
and devices attached to the network that makes it difficult to authenticate hosts
during hand-offs. The main problem is to define an IP mobility and multi-homing
protocol that is both efficient and is not vulnerable for re-direction and related
DoS attacks (section 1.6.2). Here, efficiency denotes the minimal amount of control
signalling during hand-offs and topologically shortest routing paths.
13The BEET and BEETIN SA modes were earlier explained in section 4.3.1 and SPINAT in
section 4.2.2.
14It is good to notice the one-to-one relation between the HIP base exchange messages in Figure 3
in publication [P3] and the weak authentication messages in Figure 1 in Publication [P5]. Basically,
the FLoTI message is mapped to I1, the FLoT message is mapped to R1, the SLoTI message is
mapped to I2, and the SLoT message is mapped to R2.
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5.2.4 NDSS’03 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P3], the authors analyze how mobility, multi-homing and security
are integrated in the HIP protocol. Logically, HIP introduces a new protocol layer
between the transport and network layers. The sockets are no longer named with
IP addresses but with separate derivatives of public-key-based host identifiers. The
endpoint which holds a particular private key is typically a device, but can basically
be a smaller entity, like an application, or a larger entity, like a computer cluster. The
logical layer is used for managing the HI-to-locator bindings. The dynamic binding
between HIs and locators make it easy to implement host mobility and multi-homing.
Due to the public-key-based host identifiers, it is possible to secure the HIP signalling
with cryptographic signatures. This kind of cryptographic association mechanism
between HIs and locators solves the earlier mentioned address ownership problem
because the hosts are not identified with non-cryptographic IP addresses but with
public-key cryptography.
From the signalling point of view, HIP consists of the base and update exchanges.
Basically, the base-exchange is an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange pro-
tocol that uses the public-key based host-identifiers for authenticating hosts to each
other. Additionally, the exchange establishes a set of security associations between
the hosts. The established IPsec ESP security associations are used for protecting
the integrity and confidentiality of the payload packets. In addition, some keying
material is used for protecting the mobility and key management messages between
the hosts. After the security association are established, a mobile host may run
the update exchange to inform the peer hosts about the location of the mobile host
during hand-offs. The same packet format is also used for rekeying purposes. In
the mobility case, the three-way update-exchange is used for verifying the mobile
host’s location. Basically, the peer verifies that the mobile host is reachable at the
claimed location. The reachability needs to be checked to prevent re-direction and
related DoS attacks. To overcome the reachability problems, the authors present a
forwarding agent concept in the paper. The forwarding agents are denoted here as
rendezvous nodes.
From the payload traffic point of view, HIP uses a new kind of IPsec mode. In
standard IPsec, the transport mode is used for establishing a secure communication
channel directly between any two communication endpoints. Moreover, in the tunnel
mode, the endpoints of a tunnel are typically not the same as the communication
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endpoints. In other words, the tunnel-mode related security associations are bound
to different IP addresses than the sockets. For the purposes of HIP, Nikander et al.
have proposed a new IPsec mode, denoted as Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET)
mode[134]. The new mode is a combination of the tunnel and transport mode, using
the transport mode packet format but providing limited tunnel mode semantics.
In practice, the BEET mode represents the logical HIP layer in the TCP/IP stack
and processes the required HI-to-locator mappings in the host stack. The solution
does not change the header structures in IP packets but just the details of the packet
handling at the hosts. The HI namespace imposes changes only to the logical packet
structure. That is, each packet must logically include the pair of host identifiers.
To optimize the payload header size, the IPsec Security Parameter Index (SPI) is
used to replace the host identifiers in the ESP protected packets.
From this thesis point of view, the main result of publication [P3] is the identified
set of bindings required for implementing mobility and multi-homing in a secure and
scalable way. The analysis of bindings is presented through this thesis, especially
in chapter 7. The main limitation of the approach is that it requires changes to
both communicating end hosts. In addition, some applications that transmit the
application-layer identifiers as referrals in the payload data does not work in all
cases.
5.2.5 NDSS’03 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
In the following, the author briefly analyzes different mobility and multi-homing
protocols that are essential from publication [P3] point of view. Stream Control
Transport Protocol (SCTP) is a multi-homing approach at the transport layer where
each process is associated with a set of IP addresses [149]. In addition to host
multi-homing, some mobility-extension have been presented to support dynamic IP
address updates in SCTP [116]. Since basic SCTP [149] does not support static
host identifiers like home addresses are used in Mobile IPv6, solving the security
issues in a scalable way may be even harder than with Mobile IPv6 [45]. TCP
migrate [173] is another transport layer solution allowing the TCP endpoints to
migrate from one IP address to another. The main limitation with the transport-
layer oriented solutions is that each transport layer protocol must define its own
mobility and multi-homing mechanism. Thus, network-layer approaches are more
85
flexible from the backwards compatibility point of view, because most of them can
be used together with the current transport layer protocols. For example, Mobile
IPv6 [45] can be used together with the existing TCP and UDP protocols.
In Mobile IPv6 [45], each mobile host is identified with a static home address. The
mobile host’s home agent assigns the home address to the mobile host. Whenever the
mobile host changes its topological attachment to the Internet, the binding between
its actual location (care-of address) and the home address is updated at the home
agent and at the peer hosts. When the HIP related mobility and multi-homing
ideas were published in [P3], some proposals presented the usage of multiple home
addresses and multiple care-of-addresses in the Mobile IPv6 context [P1]. One of
the experimentation was Homeless Mobile IPv6 that replaces static home agents in
Mobile IPv6 with a dynamic set of IP addresses. However, the work did not properly
address the involved security problems; instead, the security considerations lead to
the definition of the address ownership problem [123] and thereby paved the road
for the Mobile IPv6 security solution [45].
One essential difference between HIP and Mobile IPv6 approaches is the authen-
tication model used with location updates. In Mobile IPv6, the security is largely
based on the so-called Return-Routability (RR) test where challenge packets are
routed via two different paths between end hosts after each hand-off. In addition, to
increase the security in binding updates, there have been proposals to use Crypto-
graphically Generated Addresses for home addresses in Mobile IPv6 [175]. Basically,
the public-key based CGAs correspond the host identifiers in HIP.
LIN6 [115] is another IPv6 based approach for host mobility and multi-homing. At
the time when the author was working with publication [P3] the largest unsolved
problems in LIN6 were related to the scalability aspects on the security side. The
address update messages were protected with IPsec, thereby requiring some kind of
global infrastructure in order to establish the required security associations. The
author believes that it is possible to use principles of CGA to generate host identifiers
also in LIN6 and therefore apply the security principles presented in [P3] also to
LIN6.
Basically, the main difference between the HIP approach and the most essential
related work is the seamless integration of the strong authentication mechanism
into host-mobility and multi-homing in the HIP solution.
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5.2.6 Security Workshop’04 Paper: Research Problem
To provide location privacy for hosts it is possible to route packets via a rendezvous
node that hides the actual location of the endpoints. When locators are decoupled
from HIs, location translation at the rendezvous nodes alone does not provide iden-
tity protection for hosts that are identified using the fixed HIs. As a result, the
focus is moved to protection of public-key-based HIs and HITs during end-to-end
signalling.
The identity protection problem is essentially related to two-round-trip Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocols that use public-keys for mutual authentication [14]. More
precisely, the basic problem is related to the order of messages that carry the Diffie-
Hellman parameters and public-keys used for verifying the signed Diffie-Hellman
parameters. To avoid message spoofing, the end hosts must authenticate the Diffie-
Hellman parameters with signatures. However, the signatures cannot be authenti-
cated without knowing the public key.
Another problem is to keep the responder stateless during the first round-trip of the
key exchange without opening the protocol for MitM attacks. The main reason for
this is to force the initiator to do computationally more work than the responder
before the responder generates shared keying material with the initiator. To achieve
this kind of situation, the initiator cannot send the Diffie-Hellman [14] parameters
in the first message. Instead, the responder sends its Diffie-Hellman parameters to
the initiator in the response message and waits until the initiator has generated
a shared Diffie-Hellman secret. However, this kind of approach causes a trade-off
between message authentication and identity privacy.
To achieve identity privacy, the responder’s public-key cannot be transmitted in a
clear form together with the Diffie-Hellman parameters to the initiator. However,
without the responder’s public-key the initiator cannot verify the signature received
in the second message of the key exchange. From the identity protection point
of view, it is possible to send the responder’s public-key in an encrypted form in
the final (fourth) message. However, from the authentication point of view, it is
a problem because the initiator cannot authenticate the second message and the
Diffie-Hellman parameters in the message may be generated by a MitM attacker.
This kind of MitM attacker is able to reveal the initiator’s public-key sent in the
third message. In other words, an active attacker can easily find out the initiator’s
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public key because the second message cannot be fully authenticated.
5.2.7 Security Workshop’04 Paper: Basic Idea
To mitigate identity leaks during connection establishment, the author presents a
two-round-trip Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in publication [P6] that pro-
tects the identities of the hosts from passive and active Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attacks and polling attacks under certain assumptions. The limitations of the pro-
tocol are discussed later in this section. In a passive wiretapping attack, a MitM
attacker intercepts packets without the knowledge of the end hosts and without
altering the packets [148]. An active MitM attacker may even alter messages to
analyze the behavior of the target hosts. In this kind of polling attack, the attacker
sends spoofed messages to the target host to reveal its identity.
The solution is based on a two-round-trip authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol that authenticates the end hosts to each other and creates a security as-
sociation between the hosts. The author has focused on HI protection during the
end-to-end key exchange. The privacy of payload data is based on the ESP confi-
dentiality and integrity protection [165].
The basic idea of the protocol is to use a nonce to compute additional hashes
(’blinded’ HITs) of the HITs at the initiating end host. The blinded HITs act
as pseudonyms. Here, a pseudonym denotes an identifier that cannot be linked to-
gether with the original identity by a MitM. The original HITs are replaced with a
puzzle in the first key exchange message. The puzzle consist of the ’blinded’ HITs
and the nonce. The responder uses a brute force method to solve the puzzle. The
result of the puzzle is the responder’s original HIT. From the responder’s point of
view, the time that is consumed for finding a solution to the puzzle directly correlates
with the number of HIs of the responder.
It is good to notice that the original HITs and HIs are not carried in plain text
in the key exchange messages. Thus, the responder’s HIT can be used as part of
the key-material generation. This property is applied with a delayed authentica-
tion mechanism to protect both the HIs. Here, delayed authentication denotes a
mechanism that buffers a message until the required authentication information is
received in later messages. The delayed authentication provides a way for encrypt-
ing the HIs between the end hosts without revealing the original public key material
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to the MitM.
The novel part of the presented protocol is that it does not require the end hosts to
initially know the public keys of each other. It is sufficient that only the initiator
knows a hash of the public key of its peer. The actual public keys are transmitted
in an encrypted form as a part of the protocol. For the author’s best understanding,
the presented protocol is the first end-to-end DoS resistant two-round-trip Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol that offers identity protection for both communicat-
ing peers and protects hosts from passive and polling attacks based on the following
limitations.
The strength of identity protection is directly bound to the strength of the puzzle.
The strength depends on the difficulty of finding the responder’s original HIT or
HI. The first assumption is that an attacker is not able to find the responder’s
identifier with help of the location information. The relationship between identity
and location privacy is analyzed in [P6][119]. Secondly, an attacker is not able
to make an educated guess of the responder’s public key; e.g., based on traffic
analysis [106]. The difficulty of making an educated guess is related to the location
of the initiator and to the moment of the BLIND exchange run. An attacker may use
social engineering to figure out that the initiator visits a certain host at a specific
time. Thus, the on-the-path attacker can listen to the BLIND exchange and use
prior knowledge of a public server’s identity to verify the educated guess made.
To increase the strength of privacy protection it is possible to distribute the iden-
tifiers of the peer hosts to initiators using an out-of-band mechanism. This can be
achieved in the following steps. Firstly, the peer host does not publish its public
keys, or derivatives of them, in a public directory service. Secondly, the peer host
shares the public keys via a protected channel with the initiators. However, this
kind of initial public-key sharing can be implemented only in closed networks. The
problems in the Internet are related to publishing the identifier and retrieving the
identifier from a public directory service. A MitM attacker may be located between
the initiator and the directory service. To protect the identifiers from this kind of
attackers, the initiator must establish a protected communication channel with the
directory service, e.g., using the same BLIND protocol. However, bootstrapping the
public-key sharing between the host and the directory service is out of scope for this
thesis. In addition, making the brute force attacks harder by ’blinding’ the HITs
already at the DNS is for further study.
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It is good to notice that non-malicious intermediate nodes are not able to learn the
public keys of the end hosts either because the BLIND exchange hides the public
keys (HIs) from them. There is a trade-off between identity protection and signature
verification at intermediate nodes. To overcome the problem in the local mobility
context, a weak authentication mechanism is discussed later in section 6.3.
5.2.8 Security Workshop’04 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
In the current Internet, the NAT devices and dynamically allocated IP addresses
provide some identity protection for the end hosts [136][143]. However, in the IPv6
case, the situation is worse because the host part of the IPv6 address is not typically
translated on the routing path making it difficult to provide identity protection. To
overcome the identity and location privacy problems it is possible to use privacy
proxies [157]. Such usage necessitates that the proxy is trusted to keep the end
host’s identity secret. However, this kind of privacy proxies fall beyond the scope
of publication [P6]. As long it is possible to use random IP and link layer addresses
the problems related to IP address tracking more or less disappear [25]. Therefore,
the author uses the forwarding agent to hide the actual location of the end hosts.
As earlier mentioned, it is not enough to focus on the location privacy when hosts
are identified with public-keys during end-to-end key exchanges.
Basically, it is possible to achieve identity protection for both end-hosts using public-
key encryption [4][69]. However, such approaches are vulnerable to CPU related DoS
attacks where attackers bomb the responder with pre-generated messages. There-
fore, public-key-encryption-based approaches are out of scope for publication [P6].
From the related work point of view, the Internet Key-Exchange protocol (IKE) [44]
and the early version of JFK [7] are more close to the author’s work. However, IKE
does not provide DoS or identity protection against active and passive attacks for
both end hosts [44]. To overcome the limitations of IKE, Aiello et al. presented
JFK. However, they argue that “it is essentially impossible under current technolog-
ical assumptions to have a two-round-trip protocol that provides DoS protection for
the responder, passive identity protection for both parties, and active identity pro-
tection for the initiator.” [7]. Contrary to their argument, the author of this thesis
managed to define a key exchange protocol (BLIND) that fulfills those requirements
under the presented set of limitations.
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5.2.9 CMS’04 Paper: Research Problem
Security in Mobile IP and Mobile IPv6 based solutions is based on security associa-
tions between the mobile host and its home agent. While a single mobile host may
establish an IPsec security association with its home agent it is difficult to achieve a
scalable key-sharing solution with local mobility approaches (section 1.6.4). Many
mobility and multi-homing protocol proposals assume the presence of some secu-
rity infrastructure, e.g., PKI or pre-shared secret. However, the usage of PKI and
IPsec based authentication mechanisms in the Internet scale results in key-sharing
and scalability problems. In some cases, public-key computation requires too much
CPU processing power from small mobile-devices. The main research problem is
to overcome the scalability and processing-power limitations and to find a security
solutions that can be used to verify a location of a mobile and multi-homed host in
a secure way.
5.2.10 CMS’04 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P5], the authors introduce a mobility and multi-homing state-establishment
exchange that utilizes Lamport one-way hash chains and does not require pre-
existing security information between hosts. The procedure is known to be vulner-
able to an active Man-in-the-Middle attack in the first message exchange. However,
the procedure is efficient, and does not have inherent scalability problems.
The presented approach is based on delayed authentication like TESLA [3] where
each message is buffered until the related HMAC-key is received in the subsequent
message. The difference between TESLA and [P5] is that the presented approach
is not intended for broadcast messages and does not depend on global synchronized
clocks. Instead, the protocol in [P5] replaces the clocks with the interlocked release
of hash-chain values from the end hosts. Similar to the clock ticks in TESLA,
this can be used to enforce a causal order on the events, which is required for
delayed authentication. In other words, both end hosts use hash chains for message
authentication where the values of the hash chain are used for HMAC-keys.
The two-round-trip state establishment exchange can be divided into two phases.
During the first round-trip the mobile host informs the peer host about its two
locations. In addition to locators, the message contains the host identifiers and a
nonce that are protected with HMAC. Once the responder receives the first message,
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it generates a temporary hash chain based on the values received in the first message
together with a locally generated secret. The same secret is used with multiple
initiators for some period of time. Thus, the responder does not need to create
a state per initiator during the first round-trip. Using a value of the temporary
hash chain, the responder computes HMAC over the initiator’s HMAC and the host
identifiers. In other words, the responder’s HMAC protects the initiator’s HMAC
in the second message.
The second round-trip of the exchange is routed via the second attachment point
of the mobile host. Basically, the third message carries the information of the
first and second messages and additionally the anchor value of the mobile host’s
hash chain. The responder uses the received host identifiers, locators and nonce for
reconstructing its hash chain and verifying the two HMACs. After validating the
message, the responder’s replies with its anchor value to the initiator. The main
purpose of the protocol is to exchange the anchor values between the hosts.
The protocol is based on opportunistic authentication denoting that the hosts do not
have prior knowledge of each other. The first round-trip of the exchange is vulnerable
to an MitM attack where an attacker can replace the responder’s message with its
own. To mitigate this kind of MitM attacks, it is possible to include a public-key of
a host as part of the hash chain generation. The same public-key or hash of it can
be used as host identifiers. As a result, each host may sign the first message and
associate an anchor value to its identity in a strong-cryptographic way.
Publication [P5] presents also a three-way exchange that uses the initially boot-
strapped hash values for updating locator information. The exchange is based on
the same delayed authentication mechanism as the two-round-trip state establish-
ment protocol. The first message of the locator binding update exchange updates
or destroys a locator at the responder’s context. The second and third messages are
used for making a reachability test for the new locators.
Publication [P5] illustrates two different use cases where the presented protocol can
be applied to. In the first use-case, the protocol is used for managing a multi-homing
situation directly between end hosts. The second use-case illustrates an approach
for establishing a security context between the mobile host and a local-mobility
anchor host via a Mobile IPv6’s home agent. The main result of the approach
in [P5] is the presented weak authentication mechanism that uses hash chains for
mutual authentication. The novel part of the solution is the delayed authentication
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that provides causal order on state establishment and update events in the mobility
and multi-homing context.
The presented approach [P5] contains certain limitations that are analyzed by Heer
in [177]. The most essential limitation of the author’s protocol are related using
the same hash chain for sending locator-update messages and for acknowledging
messages. This kind of approach opens the solution for a MitM attack. When both
end hosts move at the same time the causal order of the events may be broken by
a MitM. Basically, a MitM can delay the messages in both directions and generate
a spoofed location-update messages that are protected with authentic hash values.
In addition, the Lamport one-way hash-chains used in [P5] do not offer an efficient
authorization mechanism like public-keys used in [P9]. This is a limitation from
the network mobility point of view because a mobile host cannot use the presented
exchange for authorizing a mobile router for sending location update messages to
the peer hosts on behalf of the mobile host (section 6.4).
5.2.11 CMS’04 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
Publication [P5] is based on the author’s earlier Weak Identifier Multi-homing Pro-
tocol (WIMP) work [98]. The recovery procedure from a state loss event defined
in [98] can also be applied to the presented protocol in [P5]. The original idea of
delayed authentication was presented in Interlock Protocol by Rivest and Shamir
but the protocol was broken by Bellowin and Merritt in [19]. The close relation with
TESLA [3] was analyzed briefly in the previous section. In addition, Anderson et al.
present a stream authentication protocol called Guy Fawkes in [8] that uses short
hash chains for authenticating and integrity protecting subsequent messages. How-
ever, the protocol is not analyzed in the mobility and multi-homing context. Heer
has done independent work called Lightweight Authentication for the Host Identity
Protocol (LHIP) in [177]. From the author’s work point of view, Heer analyzes and
elaborates the ideas of [P5] and [98]. The LHIP work contains clever observation
about using dedicated hash chain for location update exchanges and for acknowl-
edgement messages [177]. In addition, Heer proposes usage of multiple pairs of hash
chains to support parallel exchanges. Another excellent observation is an idea of
sending HMAC values of the protected data in the first message before sending the
actual data in a subsequent message. This is also called pre-signing procedure in
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the Heer’s work. As a result, it is possible to send multiple location updates parallel
between peers.
5.3 State Establishment at Intermediate Nodes
The previous sections discussed communication initiation between end hosts. In this
section, the author describes the SPINAT solution presented in publication [P7].
The basic idea of the solution and its relation to the previous work is presented
briefly in sections 5.3.1-5.3.3. The author analyzes and elaborates the approach in
sections 5.3.4-5.3.7 to show how it works together with the rest of the solutions
presented in this thesis. In addition, the author discusses the SPINAT state estab-
lishment from the address-family-agility point of view in Appendix A.
5.3.1 SecureComm’05 Paper: Research Problem
The different overlay routing approaches decouple the endpoint identifiers from lo-
cators using new namespaces above the network layer. Overlay routing is based
on the dynamic binding between the endpoint identifiers and locators at interme-
diate nodes called overlay routers. It is possible to find an analogy between the
overlay routers and Network Address Translation (NAT) devices. All of them trans-
late locators using additional namespaces above the network layer. From the host
identification point of view, the identity (IP address) of the endpoint appears to be
changed at NAT traversal. In other words, the current NAT practice does not only
translate locators, but it also changes the apparent identity of the communicating
parties. To overcome the authentication related problems in the overlay routing,
the hosts should be associated to identifiers that can be used for authenticating the
end hosts to each other. For example, IPsec provides a cryptographic namespace
for that purpose.
From the overlay routing point of view, the IPsec security associations (SAs) uniquely
identify the endpoints. Therefore, the SPI values carried in the ESP packets can
be used for endpoint identifiers. From the IPsec ESP viewpoint, the main prob-
lem is the dynamic binding between the SPI values and locators at the intermediate
nodes. One essential problem is that the SPI values in the ESP headers are integrity
protected with keying material that is only known to end-hosts. However, due to
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the 32-bit long SPI-namespace the overlay routers must translate the SPI values on
the routing path to avoid collisions. Another problem is that the receiver defines
the SPI value that the sender uses towards the peer host. This is different from
the legacy NAT approach where the source port values, used for multiplexing IP
addresses, are defined by the senders. Basically, the author focuses on a solution
that is independent of the transport layer protocols like UDP header format.
5.3.2 SecureComm’05 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P7], the author integrates IPsec into overlay routing using new
kinds of intermediate nodes, called SPINAT nodes. The author proposes that
the IPsec control-plane signalling is used to create and update HIn↔m locator and
SPIn↔1 locator bindings at SPINAT nodes. Basically, the control-plane signalling
can be divided into key exchange and rekeying exchanges. The HIn↔m locator bind-
ings are also called triggers and the SPIn↔1 locator bindings are part of the com-
munication context in [P7]. Each receiver registers HI1↔1 locator binding at one or
more SPINAT nodes to be reachable from the Internet.
The registration can be divided into transparent and explicit HIn↔m locator binding
establishment at SPINAT nodes. In the former case, the mobile host runs an key
exchange with the peer host while the on-the-path SPINAT nodes establish bindings
based on the intercepted messages. In the explicit registration case, a mobile host
knows the locator of the SPINAT node and runs a key exchange with it. In both
cases, the SPINAT learns also the required SPIn↔1 locator binding during the key
exchange procedure.
In the presented approach, the SA update exchange is integrated with the locator
update exchange. Basically, the SPI value is changed when a mobile node creates
a new SA. On the other hand, the locator is changed when a mobile host changes
its topological location. It is good to notice that the two events, rekeying and read-
dressing, are not required to take place simultaneously. The only static information
related to a communication context at each SPINAT node is the end-to-end host-
identifier pair. The SPINAT nodes must authenticate each SPI-to-locator binding
update to avoid re-direction and DoS related attacks. The dynamic SPIn↔1 locator
bindings at SPINAT nodes makes it possible to translate address realms and even
address families. For this purpose, the author defines a new IPsec mode called SEET
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mode in [P7](here called BEETIN mode). By decoupling host identifiers from lo-
cators at end-hosts it is possible to dynamically update SPIn↔1 locator bindings at
SPINAT nodes without breaking the transport-layer connections at the end hosts.
The locator translation at SPINAT nodes is based on the destination locator and
on the SPI value carried in the ESP packets.
In a basic scenario, a mobile node that is located in the local domain initiates
a key exchange with a peer host that is located in the global domain. In a more
sophisticated scenario both of the hosts are located in local domains behind SPINAT
nodes. Basically, the hosts establish transparently states at the on-the-path SPINAT
nodes during end-to-end key or rekeying exchanges. The HI-to-locator binding is
used for routing IPsec control-plane messages between end hosts. The SPI-to-locator
binding is required for routing ESP payload packets between end hosts. Basically,
the control-plane messages initiate a set of bindings at SPINAT nodes that are
required for overlay routing ESP protected payload packets between end hosts.
The main result of the solution in [P7] is the novel way of using SPI values for
multiplexing locators at SPINAT nodes and for identifying end hosts using the
same SPI values. An essential limitation of the solution is that it requires some
changes to the existing key exchange protocols and optionally also to IPsec ESP
integrity protection computation. However, the author believes that the required
changes in IPsec can gradually be applied in new overlay network infrastructures.
On the other hand, the solution does not work with the already deployed legacy
NAT devices without additional UDP tunneling support [136]. In addition, access
control at SPINAT nodes is out of scope for this thesis.
5.3.3 SecureComm’05 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
It is good to notice that the presented transparent registration is used, e.g., by local
mobility anchor points in publication [P4] while the explicit registration is required
by mobile routers and signalling proxies in publication [P9]. In the following, the
author briefly presents some essential related work.
From the locator translation point of view, there is a clear analogy between the
overlay routers and legacy NAT devices [136] . Both of them translate IP addresses,
but using different namespaces for the connection identifiers. From the endpoint
identifier point of view, overlay routers, e.g. in IPNL [62] and DataRouter [182],
96
use new namespaces for locator translation. One frequently cited overlay routing
architecture is the Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3 )[174]. i3 defines an over-
lay routing mechanism for multicast, anycast, and mobile communication. Packets
are always routed from the sender to the receiver via rendezvous servers, called i3
nodes. Overlay routing is based on a new endpoint identifier namespace. The i3
architecture uses the existing Internet routing infrastructure for delivering packets
between the i3 nodes. i3 suffers from the basic security vulnerabilities that are
related to location updates and confidentiality protection of the traffic. However,
Stoica et.al. propose that the host identifiers can be generated from public keys,
and public key cryptography can be used to secure the i3 architecture [174]. That
is very similar to what the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) offers [P3]. Adkins et.al.
solve several security vulnerabilities related to i3 in their security enhanced ap-
proach, called Secure-i3 [5]. Secure-i3 is a framework that does not go into protocol
level details. Nikander et.al. have continued the work by defining Host Identity
Indirection Infrastructure (Hi3) [126]. The author of this thesis has continued that
work in [P7] and presents a solution that can used for integrating confidentiality
and integrity protection of payload packets into different kinds of overlay routing
infrastructures like i3, Hi3, DOA, Layered Naming Architecture, FARA, PeerNet,
and UIP [174][126][188][17][39][55][60].
5.3.4 Transparent State Establishment and Identity Theft
The presented transparent state establishment mechanism in [P7] is vulnerable to
an identity theft. The problem occurs in a situation where an attacker tries to use
the victim host’s host identifier to establish inconsistent states at SPINAT nodes.
However, the SPINAT node is designed to discard an inconsistent soft state when
the peer host does not reply to a spoofed message. Here, a soft state denotes that
a performed state transition can be discarded if a specific event (e.g. a message) is
not received. In such a case, the instance of the protocol machine is not destroyed
but the state machine returns to the previous state. The creation of soft-states at
the SPINAT nodes may still result in a DoS situation from the mobile host’s point
of view. The attacker may try to bomb a SPINAT node with spoofed packets to
establish inconsistent states before the authentic mobile host manages to establish
states at SPINAT nodes. Publication [P4] presents different mechanisms to protect
from this kind of identity theft attacks. The author will briefly analyze the essential
problem field in the following.
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Public key signatures [14] do not directly provide a solution to the problem. An
attacker may implement a replay attack, and establish a soft state at the SPINAT
node. In a replay attack, an attacker intercepts, records and retransmits the mes-
sage [148]. An increasing sequence number does not help either if the mobile host
loses its mobility state between the packet recording moment and the replay attack.
When time-stamps are used together with signatures they provide a way to protect
from replay attacks. In that case, the SPINAT nodes accept the UPDATE messages
containing the latest time stamp. Publication [P4] presents an alternative protocol
that does not use public-key cryptography for message authentication.
One solution is to use randomly changing binding identifiers in the binding update
messages. Publication [P6] describes a way to implement dynamically changing
HITs in the control-plane exchanges. In that approach, the HITs are changed dur-
ing each control-plane exchange even if the identities at the end hosts remain the
same. As a result, it is difficult for an attacker to implement identity theft be-
cause the mobile host changes the visible identifiers during each update exchange.
The transparent SPINAT state establishment and identity protection problems are
related to local mobility discussed later in section 6.3
5.3.5 BEET Intermediate Node (BEETIN) Functionality
After the hosts and the on-the-path SPINAT nodes have established communi-
cation states, the ESP[165] protected payload traffic starts flowing between the
hosts. This section discusses the ESP protected payload traffic translation from the
SPINAT’s point of view. The rough functionality of the BEETIN mode is presented
in [P7] (there called SEET mode).
The end hosts create the initial BEET SAs during the state establishment exchange.
The HIP mobility and multi-homing mechanism presented in [135] defines a way for
creating SAs between multi-homed hosts. An incoming and an outgoing SA form
a so-called SA pair in HIP. The end points may have multiple SA pairs between
them. The SAs in the SA pair are bound to the same locators. In other words, they
define the end points for a routing path. The SPI value in each SA is selected by
the ESP packet receiver.
The SPINAT nodes handle SAs also in pairs. To keep the discussion clear, the
author has named the SA pairs as a private SA pair and a public SA pair. This
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Figure 5.1: Private and public side SAs at SPINAT nodes.
is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The SAs in the pair share the same locators. The
destination and source locators in the incoming private SA are in reverse order in
the outgoing private SA. The same analogy applies also to the public SA pair.
In the present approach, each outgoing SA has also a corresponding IPsec policy.
The author and his colleagues Mele´n and Salminen have extended the policy mecha-
nism to support SPI based IPsec policy identification. Each BEETIN related IPsec
policy is identified with a HIT pair and an SPI value to have an unique mapping
between IPsec policies and SAs. This is discussed later in section 5.5.5.
The SPINAT node creates an incoming public SA using the mobile node’s incoming
SPI value. That is, the peer node’s outgoing SPI value. The source and destination
locators are the same that were verified with the last outgoing translated control
message. The same SPI value is also used with the outgoing private SA.
The incoming private and outgoing public SAs use the peer host’s incoming SPI
value. That is, the mobile host’s outgoing SPI value. The destination and source
locators in the private side SAs are bound to the same locators that were carried in
the first control message sent by the mobile node. The SPINAT node creates the
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SAs after forwarding the last message of the state establishment or update exchange.
The incoming ESP packets are destined to incoming SA processing and forwarded
to the outgoing SA processing as presented in section 4.4.2. The locator family
translation for ESP protected packets is discussed in Appendix A.4.
5.3.6 SPI Collisions During Locator Translation
Publication [P7] presents alternatives to implement SPI based locator multiplexing
and tackles the SPI collisions at the SPINAT node. In addition to presented solu-
tions, the SPINAT node can add a parameter to the control-plane messages carrying
SPI information. The parameter contains a translated SPI value that the peer host
must use towards the SPINAT node. The SPINAT node may sign the parameter
with its private key of the HI pair. However, the peer host does not typically know
the HI of the SPINAT node. The result of using this kind of self-signed SPI trans-
lation parameter is similar to using User Datagram Protocol (UDP) tunneling [P7].
Any on-the-path attacker can translate a UDP port value and therefore cause an
ESP packet misidentification at NAT devices. To overcome the problem, the host
inside a private domain may authorize the SPINAT nodes like mobile routers to
implement SPI translation (section 5.3.7).
5.3.7 State Establishment at Signalling Proxies
In this thesis, mobile routers and static SPINAT nodes that are located in the
fixed network implement signalling-proxy functionality. In the presented moving
network approach [P9], the mobile node locates the signalling proxy and registers
at signalling proxy to use the provided signalling proxy services. To initiate an
authorization exchange with a signalling proxy, a mobile node needs to locate the
proxy. During the exchange the signalling proxy is authorized to signal on behalf
of the mobile node (section 6.4). In the moving network case, the mobile nodes
delegate the location update signalling rights to the mobile routers. The mobile
routers can delegate the rights further to signalling proxies in the fixed network.
The mobile nodes may use alternative service discovery mechanisms. In this thesis,
the main purpose of the service discovery is to locate an intermediate node providing
a specific service. Basically, the solutions can be divided into solicited, advertised,
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unicast and multicast methods. The common thing with the beacon and router-
advertisement based approaches is that they work at the link layer. The mobile
host may also send solicited requests to unicast and multicast locators to get a
response from a service provider.
The service discovery and registration exchange can be implemented either at the
link or network layer as earlier discussed in section 5.1.2. The benefit of the network
layer approach is that the exchanges are independent of the link-layer protocols.
Therefore, they can be applied with any link technology. The trade-off is the in-
creased amount of signalling. Each protocol-round-trip increases the hand-off time.
One alternative is to use the network layer exchange as a fall-back mode if the access
technology does not support link-layer service discovery and registration.
In this thesis, the author assumes that all the transit domain nodes implement
SPINAT functionality and are located on the end-to-end packet forwarding path.
Therefore, the definition, evaluation and analysis of different service discovery pro-
tocols is out of scope for this thesis.
5.4 Re-keying and Locator Updates
The previous sections presented the state establishment at hosts and intermediate
nodes. This section discusses dynamic, mobility related state update events from
the locator update and rekeying points of view [P1][P3][P4]. The goal of this section
is to bring up the dependency between the HI, SPI and locator bindings.
5.4.1 Binding between HIs, SPIs and Locators
Traditionally, static IPsec policies, stored at the Security Policy Database (SDP),
are not dynamically updated. In such an approach, a single policy rule may cause
the instantiation of multiple Security Associations (SAs). However, for the purpose
of this thesis the IPsec policies in the SDP are dynamically updated. In addition,
policies have a one-to-one relation with SAs. Compared to the traditional policies
the new policies contain also SPI values that is discussed in the following.
In the new approach, each IPsec SA is bound to an HIT pair, to a locator pair, and
to an SPI value. Furthermore, an IPsec policy is bound to an SPI value, to an HIT
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pair and optionally to other transport layer identifiers, like port and protocol values.
The SPI bound IPsec policies are discussed later in section 5.5.5. Each IPsec policy
has one-to-one binding with an SA that can also be expressed with a Policyn→1SA
binding. The policy and the corresponding SA share the same HIT pair and SPI
value. The SAs are also bound to groups. A group consists of an incoming and an
outgoing SA between an HI pair, and locator sets that are bound to the SAs.
When a multi-homed host is reachable via multiple paths, each path is identified
with an SA between end hosts. In this thesis, each SA is bound to a network
interface (per HI pair). As a result, each SA identifies one interface, making it easy
to bind QoS information to the SA. In addition, the hosts can be made aware of
the peer’s network interface situation.
A host may dynamically create new, update, and destroy existing SAs. The main
issues are related to keeping the local, intermediate and peer states in synchrony in
the various multi-homing and locator family scenarios.
5.4.2 Dynamic Policy-to-SA Binding
The mapping between the IPsec policy and the SA defines the binding between the
HIs and locators. A policy update event updates the mapping by creating a new
policy or by replacing the SPI value in the current policy. A node may dynamically
change the SPI value in the policy to renew the policyn→1SA binding. All the
connections protected with the same SA can be considered to belong to the same
flow. Thus, the IPsec policy defines the flow granularity. This is discussed in more
detail in the flow mobility context in section 6.1.
It is good to notice that an SA may have a one-to-many binding with IPsec policies.
This may happen in a flow based mobility scenario when several policies are mapped
to the same locator pair [P1] that is in the HIP case to the same SA. The HITs
may remain the same in the policies and SAs between two hosts but the SPIs in the
policies and the locators in the SAs are dynamically changed.
5.4.3 Re-keying and Locator Update from SA Viewpoint
In the HIP approach, the mobility state update exchange consists of three mes-
sages [P3][121][135]. The first UPDATE message is sent by the mobile node to the
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peer host to inform about the new locator update or rekeying event. The peer host
verifies the location update event by sending a challenge message back to one of the
mobile node’s unverified locations [121][135]. The challenge message verifies that
the first message was really initiated by the mobile node and that the mobile node
is in the location that was stated in the first message. The challenge message may
also contain the peer host’s new SPI value in the rekeying event. The mobile node
finalizes the exchange by echoing challenge information back to the peer host.
The rekeying procedure replaces the ESP keying material with new material at each
end host. As a result, a new SPI value per SA is also created. From a semantic point
of view, the rekeying procedure creates a new SA at each node. When the HIT pair
and the locator pair remain the same in the current and new SA, the new SA can
be said to replace the current SA. In this case, there is a series of SAs associated
with the path between two nodes.
A locator update event replaces the locators in an existing SA. The locator update
can be separated from the rekeying procedure. A mobile host may change its topo-
logical attachment to the network without rekeying. The used locator is replaced
with a new one but the keying material and the SPI value remain the same. The
SA is updated because the SPI uniquely identifies the SA.
5.4.4 Triggering Re-keying and Locator Update Exchanges
A change in the communication environment [P2] may trigger a rekeying or location
update exchange [P1]. Triggering events are pieces of information that originate
from different event sources, like from network, from users or from applications. In
practise, this information is collected from the different parts of the TCP/IP stack.
The approach taken in this thesis is based on the location update and rekeying
related events originating from the link and network layers. Figure 9 in [P1] de-
scribes an implementation architecture that handles events received from a variety
of sources.
In this thesis, different event sources are registered on a policy driver. The policy
driver collects information from the different parts of the TCP/IP stack, relevant to
the connections associated with the flow control policies, and compares the events
against information stored in the policies. The rules in the policies are here called
actions according to KeyNote Trust-Management System[114]. Basically, a policy
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is a certificate that consists of a list of actions signed by one HI. An action is
an operation that is defined by some HI and is controlled by the local mobility-
management mechanism. Actions specify a set of network interfaces to be used for
connections based on the requirements of the HI. The connections are identified
with transport layer identifies in the associated actions. The mobility-management
mechanism evaluates actions against received events and decides which interface is
to be used with a specific connection. The selection between network interfaces can
be based on conditional statements. For example, “use Wireless LAN if it is cheaper
than GPRS”.
It is also possible to divide a policy into source and destination policies based on the
source and destination TLIs expressed in the actions. In the HIP case, a TLI 3-tuple
consists of an HIT, a port number and a protocol value. A good design choice is
to let an HI that is reachable via a specific locator also to define an action for its
locators. However, the actions can be defined locally, remotely by an operator or
by a peer host [P1]. The policy based flow mobility is later discussed in section 6.1.
The policies can be stored in a user-space policy database in certificate format. The
applied policies are also stored in a policy cache in the kernel in a format that allows
fast database access. Whenever a received event matches a policy rule in the policy
cache, the policy driver forwards the event to a mobility-protocol state machine.
Changes in the experienced QoS level at the used link, SA time-outs, or changes in
the default routers are examples of events that may result in a mobility state up-
date exchange. However, unauthenticated event sources may be a problem. Spoofed
events may result in subsequent state update signalling. This may further gener-
ate extra control-plane signalling, and cause signalling bursts, e.g., in the moving
network case (section 6.4).
5.5 Design Issues in Re-keying and Locator Updates
In the following sections, the author has collected a group of design issues that
are related to the rekeying and locator update events. The rekeying problems are
bound to SA identification, namely, to frequent rekeying (section 5.5.1), to frequent
network leaving and joining events (section 5.5.3) and to locator multiplexing at
SPINAT nodes (section 5.5.5). The locator update problems are related to locator
selection at multi-homed nodes (section 5.5.7) and at mobile routers (section 5.5.8).
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5.5.1 Problem: SA Identification during Frequent Rekeying
This section illustrates a problem related to the current three-way rekeying hand-
shake. A handshake denotes an agreement between two hosts that is based on a
set of exchanged messages. In the basic scenario, a mobile node initiates a rekeying
exchange with a peer node. The peer node replies with a challenge message, and
starts waiting for the final acknowledgement message from the mobile node. From
the protocol machine’s point of view, the final acknowledgement message denotes
the event that completes a soft state to a hard state.
However, it is possible that the mobile node sends out a valid acknowledgement
message to the peer host but the message never reaches the peer host. There can
be different reasons why the final acknowledgement message does not reach the peer
node. A link-layer connection may be lost right after the mobile node has sent out
the acknowledgement message, or an intermediate node may drop the message. This
may result in SA synchronization problems, when a fast moving mobile node creates
new SAs during each hand-off. Typically this may happen when the mobile node
makes subsequent hand-offs before it receives a resubmitted challenge message from
the peer node.
The mobile node’s mobility state machine is in a state where the final acknowl-
edgement message was delivered correctly to the peer node but the peer node never
received it. After the final re-submission, the peer node removes the created soft
state for the update exchange and ignores the exchange. Thus, the peer node does
not create new SAs because it does not get the final acknowledge message from the
mobile node. As a result, the mobile node uses the new SAs, and the peer node
still uses the old SAs. This results in a problem when the mobile node sends an
UPDATE message from the new location to the peer node.
The UPDATE message contains the SPI of the current SA and an SPI for the new
SA. However, the peer node is not able to identify the current SPI because it is
still using the old SAs. The peer node drops the received UPDATE message, which
results in a DoS situation. In addition, the mobile node uses the current SA towards
the peer node. Therefore, the peer host is not able to identify the payload packets
either.
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5.5.2 Solution: SA Identification during Frequent Rekeying
To overcome the presented problem in section 5.5.1, it is possible to update the
SA pair after receiving the first valid ESP packet at the mobile node. However,
the solution works with end-to-end mobility but has certain trade-offs with the
intermediate nodes as discussed later in section 5.5.3.
In this thesis, the author presents a new Virtual Interface Identifier (VIID) names-
pace. Basically, a VIID pair is used to identify a set of connections between hosts.
Just like with physical network interfaces, multiple locators can be associated with
a VIID. VIID is an abstraction that combines of set of locators together that are
associated with a common set of characteristics. For example, a VIID may collect
together all locators that are associated with different physical Wireless LAN net-
work interfaces. The VIID concept is discussed later in section 6.1 from the flow
mobility point of view. The additional VIID namespace provides also a solution for
the earlier presented frequent rekeying problem.
A VIID-pair identifies a path between two NICs like an SPI-pair but VIIDs have
longer lifetime than SPI values. It is good to notice that SPI values are changed
frequently during each rekeying exchange. Therefore, VIIDs can be used to identify
a set of connections that are dynamically associated with different SPIs. In other
words, a VIID-pair binds together a set of subsequent SAs used to protect the
same set of connections. Basically, the VIIDn→1SPI binding is required for SPI
agility reasons like HITn→m locator binding is required for locator agility reasons.
The VIIDn↔1SPI binding is illustrated in Figure 6.1, on page 115. In this kind
of approach each rekeying and locator update message contains a binding with
a static VIID and a corresponding SPI value. When the peer node suffers from
the SA synchronization problems it can replace an old SA with a new SA if they
are associated with the same VIID. A previously unknown VIID results in new
association between the received VIID and the SPI value.
There is an obvious trade-off between the connection identification and privacy
requirements with the VIID concept. It is possible to trace a mobile node based on
the VIID value. Albeit, an attacker is able to trace an identity using VIID values,
it is not able to reveal the original identity of the host when the BLIND approach
presented in sections 5.2.6-5.2.8 is used. It is still good to notice that a mobile host
may use the same VIID value just for a short period of time to verify that the peer
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host remains in synchrony during frequent rekeying and use a new VIID in the later
exchanges. In other words, the host may generate multiple VIIDs that point to the
identical set of locators.
5.5.3 Problem: SA Identification after Rejoining SPINAT
Another problem may appear when a mobile node causes churn by leaving and
rejoining the same local network. Churn denotes numerous independent arrivals
and departures by nodes in a network [64]. This may cause SA synchronization
problems at the SPINAT nodes.
In this kind of a scenario, the SPINAT node has established a state and the related
BEETIN SA pairs for the mobile host. After leaving the local domain, the mobile
node runs mobility state update exchange at the new location before rejoining the
initial local network. A problem arises when the mobile node also rekeys and replaces
the old SA pairs with new ones during each mobility state update. The SPI values
in the SA pairs are updated after each rekeying procedure.
Later on, when the mobile node rejoins the initial local network, it runs a state
update exchange through the same SPINAT node. The exchange contains infor-
mation about the mobile host’s current (to be replaced) and new SPI values. It is
possible that the initially created SAs are still alive at the SPINAT node. The SPI
values are old and out of synchrony. The latest UPDATE message does not contain
a known SPI value from the SPINAT viewpoint. Thus, the SPINAT node is not
able to replace the existing SA pair with a new one. The problem is similar to the
problem presented earlier at the peer node side (section 5.5.1) but takes place here
at an intermediate node (see also Figure 2.3, on page 42).
5.5.4 Solution: SA Identification after Rejoining SPINAT
To solve the presented problem in section 5.5.3, the SAs should be bound to static
VIIDs as described earlier in section 5.5.2. Based on the binding between the VIIDs
and SAs, the SPINAT nodes can stay in synchrony with the moving hosts. An un-
known VIID carried in the end-to-end UPDATE message results in a new BEETIN
SA at the SPINAT node. In addition, the hosts should send keep-alive messages at
pre-defined intervals for each VIID. In this way, the SPINAT nodes know when to
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release the states.
The SPINAT nodes are able to recover from internal state loss and from the state
loss events at end hosts. In the former case, the stateless SPINAT node sends an
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [92][1] destination unreachable message
back to the ESP packet sender. As a result, the ESP packet sender initiates a new
UPDATE exchange with its peer node. However, if the peer node does not reply to
the UPDATE message, the ESP packet sender should start a new base exchange.
In the latter case, the end host that recovers from a crash situation initiates a new
end-to-end state establishment exchange with its peer hosts. During the recovery
procedure, the state machines of the SPINAT node replace the earlier created states
with the newly created soft states at the end of the successful end-to-end exchanges.
5.5.5 Problem: SA Identification and Locator Multiplexing
SA identification results in a problem at the SPINAT nodes when multi-homed hosts
establish multiple SA pairs between each other (section 5.4.2). Each SA pair is used
to identify a traffic flow. The initial SA pair between the hosts is created during the
mobility context establishment exchange (section 5.2.2). Later on, the hosts may
create additional BEET SA pairs using the state update exchange. The on-the-path
SPINAT nodes transparently create new BEETIN SA pairs according to the locator
and SPI information carried in the end-to-end update exchange messages.
From the SPINAT’s point of view, the host identifier pair gets bound to multiple SA
pairs. The multiple traffic flows between hosts may result in SA misidentification if
the SPI values only are used to identify IPsec ESP packets at SPINAT nodes. This
kind of a situation may happen when a multi-homed mobile host is attached to the
same local domain via multiple locators. The situation is illustrated in Figure 5.2,
on page 108.
The problem is related to the multiplexed locators at SPINAT nodes. The mobile
host’s multi-homing situation results in several outgoing SAs at the SPINAT node,
each of the outgoing SAs having a corresponding IPsec policy. If the policies are
only identified with an HIT pair, the outgoing ESP packets may match with several
policies.
The single-homed peer in Figure 5.2 suffers from a similar kind of problem as the
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Figure 5.2: An example of having multiple SA pairs between hosts.
SPINAT node, when the multi-homed mobile host creates multiple SAs through the
SPINAT node. The result is that the different SA pairs contain the same source
and destination locators but different SPI values. It is not enough to use HIT and
locator information to bind IPsec policies to SAs.
5.5.6 Solution: SA Identification and Locator Multiplexing
To identify the SAs in the multi-plexed locator case, the approach taken in this thesis
uses the SPI value together with the HITs to identify IPsec policies for outgoing
packets. The outgoing IPsec policies must contain the same SPI value that is stored
in the corresponding outgoing SA at end hosts and SPINAT nodes.
5.5.7 Problem: Direct Route Overrides Locator Selection
The locator selection at nodes can be implemented in various ways. However, study-
ing different locator selection policies and mechanisms is out of scope for this thesis.
The locator selection implementation used in this thesis at hosts and intermediate
nodes is based on a Longest Prefix Matching (LPM) algorithm. In this thesis, an
LPM compares the prefixes of source and destination locators with each other. The
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compared source and destination locators must belong to the same locator family.
The output of the algorithm is a locator pair containing the most common part of
the prefix in bits. An efficient way to implement such an algorithm is presented
e.g. in [51]. This kind of locator selection approach results in selfish routing deci-
sions at intermediate nodes that are analyzed by Qiu et al. in [142]. In addition,
IPv6 [163] locators easily result in better prefix matches than the shorter IPv4 [81]
locators. Thus, the algorithm prefers Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) locators to
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) locators. Each locator is also marked with status
information. 15
However, in some cases the kernel routing table overrides the source locator and
route selected by the mobility protocol machine. This may happen for a multi-
homed mobile node having two or more network interfaces. One of the network
interfaces is attached to the same link with the peer node, while another interface
is connected via a SPINAT to the peer node.
When the kernel consults the routing table to select router for the outgoing packet,
it finds out that there is a direct link local route to the peer node. Instead of sending
the packet via the SPINAT, i.e. the default router, the kernel replaces the source
locator with the locator bound to the interface that is attached to the same link as
the peer node. The packet is sent out via a different interface than what was defined
by the initial source locator selection.
It is still good to notice that this kind of source locator overrule situation happens
only when a multi-homed node is on the same link as the peer node. This causes
problems for locator update exchange and transparent SPINAT state establishment.
5.5.8 Problem: Private Locator Selection at Mobile Routers
A SPINAT node provides a private locator space for nodes inside the local network.
In the IPv4 case, the solution uses locators defined in [194]. For the purpose of
the private IPv6 locator space, the present approach uses a pre-defined prefix that
is not globally routable. The SPINAT node assigns a static and private locator
for its private side interfaces. The public side interfaces are bound to dynamically
15A locator may be in UNVERIFIED, TENTATIVE, VALID, DETACHED states. The al-
gorithm prefers locators in VALID state but may also select a locator pair in state UNVERI-
FIED/TENTATIVE if none of the locators are in the VALID state.
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allocated locators. This causes location selection problems at mobile routers that
implement the SPINAT functionality. As a result of a hand-off, a mobile router does
not have a globally routable locator for a short period of time. However, the loss of
locator triggers an event at the mobility state machine (section 5.4.4). The mobility
state machine tries to move all the connections bound to the public interface to
another interface that has a valid attachment to the network. In other words, the
multi-homed mobile router uses its other interfaces to survive from the temporary
link loss. As a result, the used LPM algorithm tries to find out a valid locator pair
bound to the private interface. Without additional routing logic, the algorithm may
provide a private source locator to be used with the peer’s destination locator.
5.5.9 Solution: Private Locator Selection at Mobile Routers
To overcome the private locator selection problem presented in section 5.5.8, the
LPM algorithm must contain the following extension defined by the author’s col-
league Mele´n. Statically allocated private locators should never be used with locator
selection at mobile nodes. The rule prevents the mobile router from using private
side locators with packets that are sent out via the public side interfaces. How-
ever, dynamically allocated private locators are used in a normal way with globally
routable destination locators. Otherwise, the mobile nodes inside private locator
spaces could not send out packets. In other words, the locators must be tagged with
a flag telling whether they are dynamically or statically allocated.
5.6 Summary
Figure 5.3, on page 111, illustrates the different stages of the common mobility-
management functionality presented earlier in this chapter. The initial bootstrap-
ping procedures are required to initiate the end-to-end communication. The pre-
sented local service discovery, service registration, and authorization exchanges are
used with the local and network mobility solutions later in chapter 6.
During the mobility state establishment the nodes authenticate each other either
with weak or strong authentication mechanisms. Identity protection depends on the
applied authentication mechanism and whether the routing path goes via rendezvous
nodes. It is not enough to protect the identities during end-to-end communication
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Figure 5.3: The different stages of the common mobility-management functionality.
but also during name resolution and rendezvous state initialization. Later on, the
IPsec policies and BEET SAs at hosts are updated during the rekeying and locator
update exchanges. In addition, the SPINAT nodes transparently update the IPsec
policies and BEETIN SAs during the end-to-end exchanges.
The implementation experiences indicate that an additional VIID namespace is
required to identify traffic flows during frequent hand-offs to avoid synchronization
problems at end hosts and intermediate nodes. The results also imply that IPsec
policies must be identified using both the host identifiers and SPI values when
multi-homed end hosts are communicating via intermediate nodes that are using
multiplexed locators. Another important observation is to distinguish static and
dynamically allocated locators from each other at mobile routers to avoid locator
selection problems during moving network hand-offs.
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6 Four Granularity Levels of Mobility
This chapter presents four granularity levels of mobility that are flow mobility (sec-
tion 6.1), address family agility (section 6.2), local mobility (section 6.3), and net-
work mobility (section 6.4). The different granularity levels are based on the earlier
presented common mobility state management in chapter 5. The analysis of the
solutions is presented later in chapter 7.
A multi-homed host that is able to simultaneously use multiple access technologies
can be better reached in the Internet and can better sustain its connections than
single-homed hosts [P1][P3]. This requires that the mobility protocol machine is able
to dynamically divide connections between different access networks. This kind of
flow based mobility [P1] is strongly bound to the compatibility with different IP
versions. The existing applications must work regardless of the different IP versions
supported in the access networks. The cross communication between different IP
versions [P8] is here called address-family agility.
When a group of multi-homed hosts are moving in the same geographical direction
they may be attached to the same subnetwork. The benefit of this kind of network
mobility [P9] is related to an efficient bandwidth consumption and to lower end-to-
end latency during subnetwork-wide hand-offs.
When the hosts are moving inside a subnetwork they can benefit from local mobil-
ity [P4]. The local mobility hides the regional movement from the peer nodes. It
optimizes the signalling between end hosts which increases location privacy [P6] and
minimizes the hand-off related latency.
6.1 Flow Mobility
Here, a flow consists of one or more connections that are routed via the same path.
In this section, the author describes the flow-mobility solution presented in publi-
cation [P1]. The basic idea of the solution and its relation to the previous work is
briefly presented in Sections 6.1.1-6.1.3. The main results of [P1] are the identified
bindings between static and dynamic identifiers in the host stack. The author dis-
cusses the results in more detail from the bindings viewpoint in sections 6.1.4-6.1.10.
The discussion elaborates and generalizes the solution to show how it works together
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with the rest of the solutions presented in this thesis.
6.1.1 HICSS-36 Paper: Research Problem
A variety of mobility-management protocols support hand-offs between network in-
terfaces. Some of the protocols move all traffic from one network interface to another
at once, while some protocols allow simultaneous communication over different net-
work interfaces. However, the solutions presented before [P1] do not propose any
means for users or applications to be able to dynamically influence the interface
selection during the operation of a mobile node. The earlier solutions combine
the hand-off policy and mechanism together where the interface selection has been
mostly based on static rules.
6.1.2 HICSS-36 Paper: Basic Idea
Mobile nodes are often equipped with several network interfaces supporting different
kinds of wireless and fixed link technologies. The main idea in publication [P1] is to
offer the best possible network interface for each connection based on requirements
of the different kinds of applications. Changes in the availability or characteristics
of an access network behind a network interface may result in a situation where
already established connections should be moved from one network interface to
another. Publication [P1] presents a network interface selection mechanism for
multi-homed and mobile hosts. The mechanism supports hand-offs even on a per
connection basis. The local routing is controlled by user-defined rules. The rules
define which interface is used for a certain set of connections. The routing decisions
are based on the adaptation of the rules into availability and characteristics of the
network interfaces and access networks at any given time.
The main result of the solution [P1] is the specific set of identifier bindings that result
in the presented policy based flow-mobility mechanism supporting legacy IPv6 peer
nodes. For the author’s best understanding, publication [P1] presents a novel IP
layer solution for flow based hand-offs in a simultaneous multi-access environment.
However, the solution has also some limitations. When the authors in [P1] defined
the Mobile IPv6 based flow mobility approach, Mobile IPv6 did not support multiple
care-of address bindings per home address at the peer node. To overcome the
problem, the authors bound multiple home addresses to the same mobile host. From
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the peer node’s point of view, the home addresses were considered to belong to
different mobile hosts. Sockets were bound to home addresses according to the
source policy. In other words, the number of home addresses defined the granularity
of flows. As a result, an essential limitation of the solution is that the flows are
identified with home addresses. In other words, the mobile host must allocate an
home address per flow.
6.1.3 HICSS-36 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
In the following, the author briefly presents some essential related work. Since
the publication [P1] has been published, a set of flow-mobility proposals have been
presented [10][59][169][178]. However, at the time the results in [P1] were pub-
lished other promising solutions, like LIN6[115], Multi-homed TCP[22] and Stream
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)[149], did not provide such a flexible policy
based flow-mobility mechanism. For example, a mobility and multi-homing protocol
LIN6[115] did not provide any means to explicitly select interfaces for different con-
nection in a multi-homed host. Multi-homed TCP[22] did not support fast moving
end-hosts or allowed user-defined local routing policies. Basically, SCTP[149] was
the only protocol that described a socket API that could be used for implementing
interface selection policy at the application layer. However, purely application layer
based policy mechanism would result in inefficient implementation. An essential
problem with the transport-layer based multi-homing solutions is that the existing
TCP and UDP cannot use them. At that time, the Multi6 Working-Group (WG)
at IETF was mainly focusing on router based site-multi-homing solutions that in-
creased the amount of required signalling for mobile hosts. Later on, the principles
presented in [P1] have been applied to the HIP architecture in [169]. In addition,
Monami6 WG at IETF has focused on the same problem field related to Mobile
IPv6 [178].
6.1.4 Flow Mobility related Bindings
Figure 6.1, on 115, illustrates a set of bindings from the flow mobility viewpoint. A
flow is identified with a VIID pair where each VIID is bound to a locator set and
to one SPI value. The SPI identifies an SA that is bound to one of the locators in
the locator set and used with outgoing packets.
115
Figure 6.1: The essential identifier bindings in flow mobility.
It is good to notice that in the author’s approach SPIs are associated with physical
network interfaces. Therefore, the VIIDn↔1SPI binding depends on the SPIn↔1 locator
binding. Based on this observation, it is possible to define vertical and horizontal
hand-offs in the following way. Vertical hand-off denotes that the SPI is updated in
the VIIDn↔1SPI binding. Horizontal hand-off denotes that the locator is updated
in the SPIn↔1 locator binding. In addition, flow mobility associates a set of connec-
tions with a set of VIIDs using the dynamic TLIm→nVIID binding. When the user
wants to change a hand-off policy for connections it updates a specific TLIn→1VIID
binding. The number of TLI-pairs associated with a single VIID-pair, consisting of
a source and destination VIID, defines the granularity of a flow.
The basic idea of flow mobility is to define a hand-off rule set for a node to move
a set of connections between alternative paths if the current access networks do
not fulfill the needs. A change in the experienced QoS level, e.g., the loss of a
connection, is a typical reason for a flow based hand-off. The main principle in the
policy expressions is to use identifiers that have longer lifetime than the mobility
state machine that uses them. The VIIDs make it possible to dynamically update
paths between end hosts without having to update the policies after each hand-off
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or rekeying procedure.
In most cases, the policies have longer lifetimes than the locators and SPI values.
The locators are changed during each hand-off, and SPIs are bound to SA lifetimes.
The short SA lifetimes result in regular SPI updates. Thus, the locators and SPI
values cannot be used to identify network interfaces in the policies.
6.1.5 Connection Identifiers at Upper Layers
The flow mobility solution presented in publication [P1] is based on the following 5-
tuple that identifies a connection at the socket layer: {source identifier, source port,
destination identifier, destination port, protocol}. A source denotes the service that
sends a packet and the destination refers to the service that receives a packet. It is
good to notice that the 5-tuple can be divided into source and destination TLIs. A
TLI 3-tuple consists of {identifier, port, protocol}. The connection identifiers that
are used in the legacy socket APIs are also stored in flow policies (discussed later
in section 6.1.7). The coarser the granularity level, the fewer the parameters of the
5-tuple that are defined in a policy. An example of a policy entry is illustrated in
Figure 4 in publication [P1].
It is good to notice, that LPM algorithm does not work with flat identifier names-
paces. Basically, it would be possible to increase the flow granularity using parame-
ters carried in the upper layer protocol headers, or even in payload data. However,
to provide a generic enough flow control for UDP and TCP traffic the solution pre-
sented in [P1] is restricted to use the connection identifiers of the 5-tuple. From the
policy mechanism point of view, additional protocol namespaces do not change the
presented solution.
6.1.6 Expressing Applications in Policies
The global source and destination identifiers of the previously presented 5-tuple
remain the same between connections. However, the source ports are dynamically
allocated during socket creation. A source port of the 5-tuple can be used to identify
a local application. Therefore, the policy engine should keep a table of the bindings
between applications and the source ports bound to the applications (see [144]). In
that way, users can define the policies before the local application is started, instead
117
of dynamically updating the source port information to the policy action afterwards.
A policy consists of actions where each action defines the preference order of VIIDs
that is illustrated in binding (1) in Figure 6.1, on page 115 [P2][24].
For service reachability reasons, the destination port typically remains the same
after each application restart. Therefore, the destination port information does not
require dynamic mapping at the policy driver (section 5.4.4). However, for human
readability reasons both the source and destination port values can be presented as
service names like in some firewall rules.
6.1.7 Source and Destination Policies
A header of a payload packet contains the earlier mentioned 5-tuple of connection
identifiers when traversing through the host stack. If a match between the connec-
tion identifiers carried in the packet and the identifiers stored in a policy is found
an action defined in the policy takes place (see also [24]).
As discussed earlier in section 5.4.4, a policy can be divided into source and des-
tination policies based on the source and destination TLIs. Source-policy actions
are used for finding suitable source locators. Correspondingly, the destination-policy
actions work for destination locator selection. In practice, the source and destina-
tion policy actions can be merged together and expressed in a single policy action.
However, it is good to logically differentiate the two kinds of policies. The benefit
of having source and destination policies is visible in a distributed flow mobility-
management context (section 6.1.10).
6.1.8 VIID-to-Locator and VIID-to-SPI Bindings
In the MIPv6 approach, a source VIID is directly bound to a source-locator set and
a destination VIID to a destination locator set. In the HIP case, the VIIDs are
bound to a set of locators via SPI values that are further bound to physical network
interfaces (like in [24]). The locator set bound to a VIID is typically a subset of all
the locators bound to a host. The binding between the VIID and the locator set
is dynamic. Basically, a VIID provides a way to bound locators together that have
common QoS properties as illustrated in binding (7) in Figure 6.1, on page 115. A
host may dynamically create and destroy existing VIIDs. Policies that are bound
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to different HIs can use colliding VIIDs.
Each outgoing payload packet is subject to source and destination policy processing.
An action in a policy rule defines a priority order for multiple VIIDs. Once matching
policy rules are found, the mechanism selects valid source and destination VIIDs, i.e.
a VIID pair. The LPM algorithm is used to select the best source and destination
locator pair of the associated locator sets that is illustrated in bindings (3)-(6) in
Figure 6.1. The resulting locator pair identifies a routing path for a traffic flow.
Each destination VIID is bound to exactly one destination SA per time that is
binding (2) in Figure 6.1. Thus, when the binding (6) between the destination VIID
and its locator set is updated, the host may need to update also the related binding
(2) with SA. It is good to notice that in some cases different destination VIIDs may
use the same SA. There is no need to define multiple SAs between the same locators.
Thus, in this thesis, the number of destination VIIDs define the maximum number
of SAs.
It is possible that the selected source and destination VIIDs may be bound to loca-
tors that belong to different locator families. In that case, the sender can prioritize
either the source or the destination VIID. In other words, the sender must select
the next highest VIID in the priority list to find a valid locator pair for outgoing
packets.
Example 17. For example, a sender may have a source policy saying that
all Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic should be sent via the VIID
offering the highest available bandwidth. Currently, that VIID is associated
to an IPv4 locator. The destination policy defines that the HTTP traffic
should be sent to the cheapest destination VIID that is currently bound to
an IPv6 locator. Now, the sender must select the next highest VIID in either
of the policy rules to find out a common locator family. However, defining
alternative VIID selection algorithms is out of scope for this thesis.
6.1.9 VIIDs in Payload Packets
The home address information carried in each payload packet provides a way to
identify a flow at the receiver side. However, using endpoint identifiers for flow
identifiers can be called semantic overloading. A flow identifier does not need to
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be a locator. Instead, using the local namespace for flow identifiers makes the
mechanism more flexible. The hosts can more easily create new and delete old flow
identifiers without having to allocate the identifiers from a third party; i.e., a home
agent in the MIPv6 case. The author’s colleagues Kauppinen et al. have presented
an approach in [178] to support multiple care-of-addresses at the peer host (see also
[73]). The approach makes it possible to use a single home address with multiple
traffic flows.
In the HIP case, the SPI namespace can be used for flow identification purposes
(like in [169]) in the same way as the home addresses are used in Mobile-IPv6-based
flow mobility solution [P1]. The SPI value defines a path between end hosts, and
it is carried in each ESP-protected payload packet. Thus, the SPI value works as
a perfect flow identifier. However, as described earlier, each SA pair is bound to at
least one VIID pair. The VIIDs work as stubs for flow end points. They are tagged
with the QoS information of the flows. Furthermore, the SAs bound to these stubs
can be seen as realizations of the flow end points.
6.1.10 Expressing Policy Rules with Authorization Certificates
The source and destination policy actions can be expressed with authorization cer-
tificates (e.g. [21][114][54]). An authorization certificate is a signed document defin-
ing a set of rights that one identity approves to another identity. This is illustrated
in Figure 6.1, on page 115. Publication [P1] describes how the interface selection
rules can be presented with the KeyNote Trust System [114] certificates. Still, the
rules can be expressed with any authorization certificate system, such as Simple
Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [54] certificates. Publication [P9] presents a way
to apply the authorization certificates in a moving network architecture. The same
delegation principles can also be applied with the policy based flow control mecha-
nism.
It is good to logically distinguish the policy rule certificates from the IPsec policy ex-
pressions. The IPsec policies and SAs are just one way to implement the policy-based
flow mobility-management. Publication [P1] presents the flow mobility-management
in the MIPv6 context. The presented principles have also been applied to HIP by
the author’s colleague Pierrel [169].
The issuer and the subject in the policy rule certificate can be represented with
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public-key-based HIs. The issuer authorizes the subject to act according to the
policy rules. The issuer of a certificate acts as a policy decision point, while the
subject of the certificate is considered to be the policy enforcement point. There are
two basic design choices when defining the policy decision point for the destination
policies. Either the packet sender or the receiver can define the destination policy.
From the security point of view, the host that is bound to a specific location should
be able to define the policy rule concerning that locator.
In practice, the receiver may want to restrict incoming traffic and use different kinds
of firewall rules for different interfaces. In most cases, the sender cannot affect the
receiver’s firewall rules, and thus the receiver would not be able to adhere to the
destination policy defined by the sender. The author has ended up with a solution
where the host that is reachable in a location also defines the corresponding source
and destination policy actions related to that locator.
The main purpose of carrying the policy rule information in authorization certificates
is to support distributed flow control management. As a result, the policy decision,
and the policy enforcement points can be separated from each other. The policy
decision point can be located at an end user’s, an administrator’s, an operator’s or
a peer host’s domain [P1]. Furthermore, the policy enforcement point can be moved
from an end host to multi-homed intermediate nodes which is part of future work
(see also [37][150]).
6.2 Address-Family Agility
This section describes an address-family agility mechanism that is based on the so-
lutions presented in publications [P8][P7]. Address family agility provides a mech-
anism for communicating between different versions of socket APIs over different
IP versions. The overloaded ’address’ term has different semantics at different
TCP/IP layers. In the following context, the author will make a difference between
application-layer identifier agility and locator-family agility as earlier illustrated in
Figure 4.5, on page 72. The AID concept was presented earlier in section 4.3.1.
The rough idea of the address-family agility solution and its relation with the previ-
ous work is presented briefly in Sections 6.2.1-6.2.4. The author discusses the results
in more detail from the bindings point of view in sections 6.2.5-6.2.10. The discus-
sion elaborates and generalizes the solution to show how it works together with the
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rest of the solutions presented in this thesis.
6.2.1 EW’04 Paper: Research Problem
In the current Internet, an IP address is used both for identifying a host and its
topological location. In other words, IP addresses of the same family are used at the
application, transport and network layers to identify connections and route packets.
As a result, IPv4 applications cannot establish connections with IPv6 applications.
6.2.2 EW’04 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P8] , the author decouples the application layer from the transport
layer, and the transport layer from the network layer using two kinds of names-
paces. The author uses 32-bit long, local scope identifiers with the IPv4 socket
API and 128-bit long identifiers with the IPv6 socket API at the application layer.
The application-layer identifiers are bound to global, 128-bit long transport-layer
identifiers. Further, the transport layer identifiers are dynamically bound to IPv4
or IPv6 locators at the network layer. As a result, the HIP based solution provides
end-host mobility and multi-homing between IPv4 and IPv6 based applications.
For the author’s best understanding, publication [P8] presents the first solution
for inter-communication between legacy IPv4 and IPv6 socket APIs for end-to-end
connections over IPv4 or IPv6 networks.
The main result of the solution [P8] is the specific set of identifier bindings that
result in the presented address-family agility mechanism supporting legacy IPv6
and IPv4 applications. The identified bindings are discussed later in sections 6.2.5-
6.2.10. However, an essential limitation of the solution [P8] is that the hosts must
be reachable via the same IP version. In other words, the hosts cannot communicate
with each other if other is attached to an IPv4 network and the other to an IPv6
network. Another limitation is that application cannot use the application layer
identifiers as referrals between each other.
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6.2.3 SecureComm’05 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P7], the author presents a new variant of IPsec ESP transport mode,
denoted as Stripped End-to-End Tunnel (SEET) mode. SEET mode is here called
as BEETIN mode at the intermediate nodes. It is based on the initial Bound End-
to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode proposed by Nikander et al. [134]. The BEET and
SEET modes are a combination of IPsec tunnel and transport modes, using the
transport mode packet format but providing limited tunnel mode semantics. In
particular, the modes takes care of the translation between locators and the host
identifiers. In addition, the SEET mode supports SPI and locator translation at the
SPINAT nodes. Because of the connections are identified with SPIs at end hosts, it
is easy to replace IPv4 locators with IPv6 locators and vice versa at intermediate
nodes.
The approach has also some limitations. The presented SEET mode is not backward
compatible with the legacy ESP transport mode used at end hosts [165]. In addition,
publication [P7] does not discuss SPINAT functionality from the address-family
agility point of view, albeit the locator translation functionality is implicitly included
in the solution. However, from the address-family agility point of view, the main
result of the publication [P7] is the novel IP-version independent, SPI-based locator
translation. The scalable solution translates SPI and locator values carried in the
ESP protected packet header.
6.2.4 EW’04 and SecureComm’05 Papers: Relation to Previous Work
The legacy socket creation system call requires that an application defines the used
address-family. When the peer host is reachable both at IPv4 and IPv6 locators, the
application may open a socket per address-family. As a result, the application may
establish a transport layer connection per socket. In the basic case, each socket call
defines implicitly the used IP mobility protocol family (like [45][26]). The address-
family dependence at the application layer may result both in a mobility control
channel and a data channel per address-family. That kind of approach does not
offer address-family agility for the applications.
One approach is to implement the address-family agility mechanism at the appli-
cation layer. An application implements a socket selection related functionality.
The trade-off is that the approach is not transparent to the application and thus is
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difficult to deploy with legacy applications.
The address agility functionality can also be implemented between application and
transport layers in the user-space. One approach (like [197]) is to compile an ap-
plication with an enhanced socket library that offers a virtual socket layer for the
legacy socket API. The virtual socket layer provides a legacy socket API to the
application. However, the wrapper function at the virtual socket layer maps the
socket API calls to legacy socket system calls. In other words, the virtual socket
layer multiplexes legacy sockets with virtual sockets. One problem is that the virtual
socket layer must open a socket per address-family. In addition, each network-layer
hand-off closes the legacy sockets and the legacy socket must be recreated at the
logical socket layer. It is possible to depend on the network-layer mobility solutions
to keep the connections alive. In that case, the host may implement a network layer
based mobility management protocol. Another possibility is to implement a control-
plane protocol for mobility purposes at the virtual socket layer, which breaks the
transport layer connections.
Network layer tunneling techniques can also be used to implement address-family
agility functionality. In the tunneling approach, IPv4 traffic is tunneled over IPv6
or vice versa (like [71]). Each host is simultaneously reachable via IPv4 and IPv6
locators that are bound to intermediate rendezvous nodes. The approach makes it
possible to bind an application to an address family different from that used at the
network layer. The trade-off is that in several cases the triangular routing does not
provide an optimal packet forwarding path for the payload traffic. In addition, the
peer host must be reachable all the time from the same locator family that was used
in the initial socket binding (see section 2.6.1).
The network-layer tunneling techniques can be used to decouple the used socket
API version from the IP version used at the network layer. However, the tunneling
techniques do not alone solve inter-communicating between different kinds of socket
APIs. On the other hand, the virtual socket layer based approaches require applica-
tion level gateways, like in P2P overlay networks, to support communication between
different addressing domains. A fundamental difference between the virtual socket
layer based approaches and the approach in this thesis is the transport-layer connec-
tion management during hand-offs. When the solutions in publications [P8][P7] are
combined together they are able to overcome the presented restrictions of the other
address-family agility solutions.
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Figure 6.2: Hosts may use different kinds of socket APIs but they are connected
to the same locator family domain in this example.
6.2.5 Address Family Agility Solution
In the AID agility case, the identifiers used at the socket APIs (see [190]) can carry
the semantics of different IP address families. Two communicating applications
running at different hosts can support different kinds of socket APIs. To achieve
this kind of flexibility, the solution decouples the socket APIs from the transport
layer at the kernel.
In the locator family agility case, the payload packets may contain locators belong-
ing to a different family than the corresponding AIDs. Moreover, the end hosts
may be attached to access networks supporting different locator families. The host-
identifier-based overlay routing at intermediate nodes (see [P7]) is used to commu-
nicate over different locator family domains as discussed in section 5.3.5. The dif-
ferent forms of address-family agility can also take place simultaneously. Depending
on the host’s reachability situation, the SPIn→1 locator bindings (see section 7.2.4)
are created at the host and optionally also at the intermediate nodes.
In the basic case, the end hosts are directly attached to access networks supporting
the same locator family. However, the applications running at the hosts may still
support different socket APIs as illustrated in Figure 6.2, on page 124. The ap-
plications implicitly authorize their local environments (see [P2]) to implement the
required AIDn↔1HI bindings (see section 7.2.1).
In a more advanced case, the end hosts are attached to access networks supporting
different locator families as illustrated in Figure 7.3, on page 150. To support
communication between the end hosts, the peer host must be reachable from at
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least one locator leased from a rendezvous node that supports the same locator
family as the mobile host. The end hosts authorize the intermediate nodes to create
the required SPIn→1 locator bindings (see section 7.2.4).
The dynamic double binding between AIDs and HIs, HIs and locators makes the
solution flexible. It allows, e.g., that an IPv6 enabled application, located in an
IPv4 network, communicates with an IPv4 application, located in an IPv6 network.
From the application’s point of view, the identifier remains the same during the
lifetime of a created socket.
6.2.6 Routable Application Layer Identifier Considerations
In this section, the routable and non-routable AIDs are discussed from the appli-
cation’s viewpoint. In the routable AID approach, the resolver library returns a
routable identifier set to the application as a response to the DNS query. This case
results in opportunistic authentication [P3][121] because the sender does not know
the receivers HI.
The benefit of the routable AID approach is that the lifetime of the socket and
the lifetime of corresponding mobility states do not need to be in synchrony. The
mobility protocol may lose its mobility and security state. The first message sent
out from the open socket after state loss results in a new mobility state establish-
ment exchange. It is good to notice that in the current HIP approach [121], the
peer state must be kept alive until the last application closes its socket bound to
the corresponding HIT. There are also drawbacks in giving routable AIDs to the
application.
The applications should not depend on the IPv6 based routable identifiers because
the current networks are based mostly on IPv4 technology. Using purely IPv6 based
routable identifiers does not provide any benefit compared to a flat namespace in
the IPv4 networks. Moreover, to support legacy applications and cross IP version
communication, the solution has to be backward compatible with the IPv4 socket
API. However, IPv6 based identifiers cannot be used with the IPv4 socket API. Due
to the lack of global IPv4 locators, they cannot be used for fine-grained identification.
In addition, in pure IPv6 networks, the IPv4 based routable identifiers do not provide
any benefit. Therefore, the application layer identifiers can neither depend on the
existing IPv4 nor IPv6 address spaces to support address-family agility.
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6.2.7 Application Layer Identifier Independence
As presented in the previous section, routable application layer identifiers do not
provide address-family agility that is flexible enough. Based on that observation, it
is possible to remove the routability requirement for the application layer identifiers
and use flat namespaces instead of depending on structured identifiers.
HIP provides flat application-layer identifiers for IPv4 and IPv6 socket APIs [121],
namely, LSI for the IPv4 socket API, and HIT for the IPv6 socket API. A trade-off
is that the solution cannot directly support legacy applications that use identifiers
for referrals. It seems that DHTs offer a solution for the HITm↔n locator lookup
problem. However, several administrative and security related problems must be
solved before a global DHT infrastructure can be deployed in parallel with the
existing DNS infrastructure.
Using variable size identifiers at the application layer has an impact on the transport
layer pseudo-header computation [93]. The used transport-layer identifier must be
the same at both communicating end points. To support different socket APIs
and common pseudo header computation, the solution must implement a binding
between AIDs and transport layer identifiers (section 7.2.1).
According to the LSI naming convention, the LSI is unique only inside a host. The
host is responsible for taking care of the LSI collisions, and LSIs have only local
meaning inside a host. From the address-family agility viewpoint, the HITs are also
considered as local scope identifiers at the application layer. In this way, the binding
between the socket API and transport layer (section 7.2.1) provides a flexible way
to implement address agility between IPv4 and IPv6 applications as illustrated in
Figure 4.5, on page 72 [P8].
The problem with this approach is that the applications believe that their peers
belong to the same address-family. For example, if an IPv6 legacy application adds
its HIT to the payload, an IPv4 legacy peer application does not know how to handle
the received identifier. Applications using application layer identifiers as referrals
(see e.g. [77]) do not work with this kind of an approach. Still, most of the existing
applications work fine with the approach taken in this thesis.
127
6.2.8 Pseudo Header Computation Considerations
To support current transport layer protocols, the pseudo-header computation must
be computed over 32-bit or 128-bit identifiers. In the HIP approach, the pseudo-
header is computed using the HIT both in IPv4 and IPv6 socket API cases. In
the IPv6 case, the AIDs and HITs are logically bound together, even they are the
same at the application and transport layers. The only requirement is that both end
points know the same transport layer identifier that is used for the computation.
The reason to use HITs, instead of LSIs, is that the HITs are global identifiers that
are known by both end points.
Basically, it could be possible to use 32-bit long unique global identifiers for the
same purpose but the namespace could not then be flat for collision reasons. As
a result, the transport layer identifiers would be similar to MIP (or MIPv6) home
addresses. Thus, the home address would work as the transport-layer identifier. In
that case, all the nodes would need both a home address and an HI.
The benefit would be that the peer host would be reachable in the case when the
mobility-management state is lost before the socket is closed. In other words, the
peer’s locator information would be stored in multiple states having different life-
times in the stack. It is good to notice that in this kind of an approach the ap-
plication would still be either bound to an LSI or an HIT. However, the benefit of
the clean identifier-locator split would be partly lost. This is one reason to use the
flat HIT namespace for pseudo header computation. The approach does not require
allocating static locators for each host.
In this approach, the flat application-layer identifiers are dynamically bound to
HITs that are used for the transport-layer pseudo-header computation. The flat
AID namespace makes it possible to implement address-family agility between other
kinds of socket APIs than IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5
(page 72). As earlier mentioned, the solution has certain restrictions related to
referral problems but does not directly require that hosts allocate static locators
from the Internet.
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6.2.9 Connecting Locator Family Domains Together
The inter-communication between different socket API versions requires also network-
layer support when the hosts are connected to different locator spaces. In other
words, the network does not offer an end-to-end connectivity over the same IP ver-
sion.
In this approach, the author assumes that private networks are connected to each
other via Internet as illustrated in Figure 4.2, on page 67. SPINAT nodes connect
private networks to the Internet. Moreover, private networks supporting different
IP versions can be connected to each other via SPINAT nodes.16 The SPINAT
node configures IPv6 and/or IPv4 locators for its public side NICs using IPv6 auto-
configuration and DHCP leases [180][86][143]. It sends router advertisements and
runs a DHCP server for the hosts attached to same link with its private side NICs.
Thus, the SPINAT may offer IPv4 and/or IPv6 locator spaces for its clients. Several
SPINAT nodes can be nested together forming a routing tree hierarchy. In this way,
the architecture is more fault tolerant because it supports alternative upstream rout-
ing paths. When the SPINAT node has multiple public side NICs it uses LPM for
source locator selection (“LPM”was explained earlier in section 5.5.7, on page 108).
Multi-homed end hosts may simultaneously be attached to several private networks
and/or directly to the Internet. In the approach taken in this thesis, the Internet
provides global IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity between the private networks. It is
obvious that hosts belonging to private networks supporting different IP versions
cannot directly communicate with each other without support of an intermediate
node. Thus, the locator family agility is based on two kinds of intermediate nodes.
Namely, rendezvous nodes located in the Internet and SPINAT nodes located be-
tween the locator domains. To be reachable via different address families, the hosts
make locator leases from rendezvous nodes located in the Internet per IP version.
6.2.10 Locator Family Translation between Private Domains
To generalize the locator translation between locator family domains, this section
briefly describes how the approach works with nested locator domains. Basically,
each SPINAT node provides a private locator space for other nested SPINAT nodes
16BEETIN mode (section 5.3.5) can also be used to support cross communication with other
network layer protocols than IPv4 and IPv6.
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Figure 6.3: An example of initializing locator translation between nested private
domains using HIP base exchange.
behind it. It is possible that some private domains support only a single locator
family. When a mobile host at the leaf private domain wants to communicate with a
peer host, it retrieves the peer’s locator set from the directory service. The received
locator set should contain at least one locator per locator family. One solution
is that the initiator adds the received peer’s locator set to the first control-plane
message. Once a SPINAT receives the first message, it can use the received locator
set for destination locator translation. For example, a mobile host may send a
message from a private IPv4 domain via a private IPv6 domain to the Internet, as
illustrated in Figure 6.3, on page 129. The SPINAT nodes use LPM algorithm for
locator selection between the destination locator set in the control-plane message
and its multiplexed locator set. The corresponding state establishment and update
exchanges are presented in detail in Appendixes A.1-A.4.
6.3 Local Mobility
In this section, the author describes the local-mobility solution presented in publica-
tion [P4]. Local mobility hides regional movement from peer hosts and optimizes the
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amount of required hand-off related signalling [31]. The basic idea of the solution
and its relation to the previous work is briefly presented in sections 6.3.1-6.3.3. The
main results of solution are the identified cryptographic association mechanisms
used for authenticating locator update messages at the intermediate nodes. The
presented mechanisms make it possible to optimize the amount of security related
signalling during hand-offs. The author discusses the results in more detail from
the cryptographic association mechanism point of viewpoint in sections 6.3.4-6.3.5.
Section 6.3.6 elaborates the solution and presents a minor extension to the local
mobility protocol.
6.3.1 ISC’04 paper: Research Problem
A local-mobility anchor point must be able to verify that a mobile host sending
a locator update message is in the location claimed in the message. Unverified
locator updates open the local mobility protocol for re-direction and related DoS
attacks. The security association establishment between the mobile host and the
local-mobility anchor point is typically decoupled from the locating update exchange.
The problem is that the separate key exchange causes signalling overhead during
local-mobility related hand-offs. Another problem with the existing approaches is
that the mobile host and the local-mobility anchor point must have a pre-shared
secret or the mobile node must have prior knowledge of public-key of the local-
mobility anchor point.
6.3.2 ISC’04 Paper: Basic Idea
Publication [P4] defines a secure local-mobility solution that scales well between ad-
ministrative domains. The solution integrates key-sharing between the mobile node
and the local-mobility anchor point into the three-way location update exchange.
The security association between the mobile node and the local-mobility anchor
point is established using Lamport one-way hash chains and a technique known as
secret splitting [110][14]. Secret splitting denotes a mechanism that divides a key
into multiple pieces. The original key cannot be reassembled without possessing all
the pieces. The one-way hash chain and secret splitting techniques provide weaker
security than public key cryptography. However, the solution protects the anchor
points from traffic re-direction and related DoS attacks. The mobility anchor points
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can be located in a tree hierarchy in the administrative domain. The hierarchical
model makes it easy for the mobile nodes to locate the mobility anchor points. The
HIP based solution optimizes the amount of signalling during hand-offs because it
does not require a pre-shared secret or public-key based mechanism between the
mobile host and the local-mobility anchor point.
The local-mobility solution is integrated with the SPINAT functionality. The trans-
parent service discovery and registration does not require explicit signalling between
the mobile host and the SPINAT node. Therefore, local mobility-management does
not cause additional signalling latency to the protocol (see [75]). Once the mobile
host is attached to a local network it runs a macro-mobility exchange with each
peer host through SPINAT nodes. The SPINAT nodes on the routing path estab-
lish states per each end-to-end IPsec SA. Later on, when the mobile host changes
its location inside a SPINAT node’s region, the SPINAT node hides the movement
from the peer hosts. It is still good to notice that each rekeying procedure results
in an end-to-end mobility state update exchange [P4].
The local-mobility protocol uses the same message structure both for local and macro
mobility signalling. The messages in publication [P4] follow the early HIP mobility
exchange terminology. Later on, the messages in the HIP three-way handshake
have been renamed and are called ’UPDATE’ messages. Currently, the parameters
carried in the UPDATE messages define the semantics of the different messages in
the handshake [121][135]. Therefore, the message structures presented in [P4] can
be seen as extensions to the current HIP-mobility proposal [135].
The main result of the publication [P4] is the scalable return routability test that can
be used with a local-mobility protocol. The author believes that solution may turn
out be as important thing as the return routability protocol has been for macro-
mobility protocols. The presented local-mobility solution is a novel one-and-half
round-trip protocol that establishes simultaneously a security association between a
mobile node and an anchor point, and updates the locator at the anchor point and
at a peer node in a secure way.
However, the main limitation of the protocol is its vulnerability for certain MitM
attacks where the attackers are located at both sides of the local-mobility anchor
point. In addition, the combination of weak and strong authentication mechanisms
results in a trade-off between identity protection and signalling optimizations. Al-
beit, temporary hash chains provide anonymous identifiers for the hosts, the binding
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between subsequent hash chain values makes it difficult to protect from identifier
tracking.
6.3.3 ISC’04 Paper: Relation to Previous Work
Several local-mobility schemes, including Cellular IP[31], HAWAII[153], TIMIP[65]
and HMIP[34], are integrated with Mobile IP [26] and Mobile IPv6 [45] macro-
mobility protocols. The main scalability and hand-off latency related issues with
the mentioned protocols are related to preconfigured security associations or heavy
authentication related signalling between mobile hosts and the local-mobility anchor
points.
The HMIPv6 [72] approach was earlier presented in section 1.6.4. It was under
development at IETF at the same time when publication [P4] was published. In
HMIPv6, the establishment of an IPsec SA between a mobile host and a Mobility
Anchor Point (MAP) requires at least four messages with IKE. The local binding
update exchange between the mobile host and the MAP requires two messages. The
MAP must also make Double Address Detection (DAD) for the RCoA in its link
before replying back to mobile host. In addition, the mobile host must run RR
test with its peer host before sending the binding update that requires another five
messages. As a consequence, the mobile host must sent eleven (11) messages when
it changes securely the MAP region. To reduce the amount of signalling the author
of this thesis presents an approach in [P4] that requires three messages together to
achieve a secure locator-binding simultaneously at anchor points and at the peer
hosts when the mobile node moves between regions of local mobility anchor points.
Many of the problems with the HMIP protocol are related to inefficient security
and configuration mechanisms. Whenever a mobile node changes a MAP region
and uses IPsec, it must create a new security association with the new MAP. In
addition, the operators are assumed to make a careful analysis of their network
topology and configure the router advertisement policies according to the locations
of MAPs. Moreover, the mobile node has to have a sophisticated algorithm for
making an optimal selection between different MAPs.
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6.3.4 Authentication between Mobile Hosts and Intermediate Nodes
The presented local mobility solution uses delayed authentication with the location
update exchange. The messages are authenticated using hash chain value protected
HMACs. The idea is similar to TESLA[3] but applied in a new context. The end
hosts reveal the hash chain values in subsequent messages to the SPINAT node.
Together, the different cryptographic methods provide a mechanism for a SPINAT
node to authenticate the end-to-end update exchange messages and to create shared
keying material with the mobile host. Basically, the mobile host indirectly uses the
existing end-to-end SA to share keying and hash chain material with a SPINAT
node. The weak authentication mechanism is useful in situations where the mobile
host does not have prior knowledge of a SPINAT node’s identity. Basically, the
mobile host could use opportunistic HIP authentication for an explicit registration
exchange. However, the approach in [P4] provides better security against MitM
attackers than an opportunistic HIP base exchange with the SPINAT node.
Figure 6.4, on page 134, presents a scenario that consists of an end-to-end macro-
mobility exchange and a local-mobility exchange. In the figure, the mobile host
moves inside the SPINAT node hierarchy. It changes its attachment from the pre-
vious SPINAT node’s region to a new region. The mobile host initiates an update
exchange towards the peer host. Instead of forwarding the messages to the peer
host, the SPINAT node uses overlay routing [P7] to forward the update messages
to the previous SPINAT node. The previous SPINAT node takes the peer role in
the update signalling and replies on behalf of the peer host to the mobile host. The
cryptographic association between the mobile host and the SPINAT node is based
on the split keying material shared earlier. Each subsequent update exchange up-
dates the shared keying material. From the mobile host point of view, the local and
macro mobility update exchanges are similar. However, in the local mobility case,
the mobile host does not run the update exchange with the peer host but with the
previous SPINAT node.
Whenever the mobile host bootstraps a new hash chain or rekeys, the SPINAT
nodes must forward the update messages to the peer host. The same applies when a
SPINAT node is out of synchrony with the hash chain material with the mobile host.
In this way, the SPINAT nodes in the hierarchy can update their states according
to the latest hash chain anchor value and keep in synchrony with the mobile host.
The SPINAT node updates its private side SAs during the local update exchange
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Figure 6.4: An example scenario of local mobility between locator domains.
(see Figure 5.1, on page 98). The SPI values remain the same but the locators in
BEETIN SAs are updated.
It is difficult to protect from identity tracking when subsequent update exchanges are
bound together using the hash chain values. The SPINAT nodes use the hash chain
values to identify the mobile host even when the HITs are changed dynamically. To
achieve a balance between local-mobility support and identity tracking, the mobile
host may bootstrap new hash chains frequently in order to support local mobility
in a restricted area. On the other hand, the mobile host benefits from long hash
chains. The shorter hash chains are used for authentication the more frequent macro
mobility exchanges are required for synchronizing the on-the-path SPINAT nodes.
Finally, the benefit of using dynamically changing HITs [P6] in UPDATE messages
makes it possible to protect against temporary identity thefts at SPINAT nodes.
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6.3.5 Re-direction Attacks
In the presented local mobility approach, the SPINAT node does not have prior
knowledge of the mobile host. Basically, the SPINAT node does not care who the
mobile host is as long as the host remains the same during lifetime of the state.
The cryptographic association between the mobile host and the SPINAT node is
derived from the cryptographic association between the mobile host and the peer
host. The SPINAT node assumes that if the peer host is willing to communicate
with the mobile host, it has also established an SA with the mobile host. The mobile
host uses the end-to-end SA to deliver an encrypted hash chain and splitted secret
keying material to the peer host. Only the authentic peer host is able to decrypt
the data and send it back in plain text to the mobile host. The SPINAT node is
able to bind the update exchange messages together using the Lamport one-way
hash chain properties. However, an on-the-path attacker may try to re-direct traffic
by intercepting update messages and replacing the locator information with the
victim’s location. Such an attacker must be located on both sides of the SPINAT
node to be able to change parameters carried in the message as discussed in [P4].
6.3.6 Signalling Optimization during Local Hand-offs
The following optimization presented in this section is not included in publica-
tion [P4]. In the basic case, the mobile host initiates an update exchange for each
of its peer hosts. To minimize the amount of local update signalling during regional
hand-off, the mobile host can learn the closest SPINAT node’s identifier during the
network attachment exchange. When the mobile host finds out that it has moved
inside the same SPINAT node’s region, it may run a single update exchange with
that SPINAT node. This is based on the assumption that the SPINAT node has
earlier established states for each end-to-end SA pair. Thus, it is enough that the
SPINAT updates the locators of all the private side SAs bound to the mobile host.
The mobile host may replace the SPI information, carried normally in the message,
with a piece of information that notifies the SPINAT to update all the related SAs.
In the case that the mobile host does not get a reply from the SPINAT node, it
initiates normal update exchanges with each of its peer nodes.
It is good to notice that the update exchanges are used for creating states and
related SAs for end hosts at SPINAT nodes. When the mobile host moves into a
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new SPINAT node’s region, the new SPINAT node must create a state for each
peer host. Because the keying material between the mobile host and the SPINAT
node is shared using the end-to-end security association, optimizing the signalling
during regional hand-offs is difficult. The authentication mechanism provides a way
for the SPINAT node to verify that the peer host really exists. Thus, the mobile
host cannot create inconsistent states at SPINAT nodes alone.
6.4 Network Mobility
In this section, the author describes the network-mobility solution presented in pub-
lication [P9]. The basic idea of the solution is presented briefly in sections 6.4.1-
6.4.2 while the comparison with related work is discussed in more detail in publica-
tion [P9]. The main results in publication [P9] are the identified scalability related
problems and the resulted signalling proxy based improvements. The author dis-
cusses the results in more detail from the authorization viewpoint in sections 6.4.3-
6.4.7. The discussion also elaborates the solution to show how it works together
with the rest of the solutions presented in this thesis.
6.4.1 WWIC’08 Paper: Research Problem
One problem with the basic Mobile IPv6 NEMO [50] solution is related to the end-
to-end signalling latency. In other words, all packets are triangular routed via the
mobile router’s home agent. To overcome the problem, a couple of optimizations
have been presented for the problem [187][105][128][181][99][141]. However, all the
solutions depend either on the home agent of the mobile route or home agent of the
mobile host. Basically, they use triangular routing for locator update signalling. The
main problem is to find a solution where the location updates are sent to the peer
hosts via the topologically shortest path without opening the existing solution for re-
direction attacks. In addition, the solutions do not present how to integrate integrity
and confidentiality protection of payload traffic into the system in an efficient way.
6.4.2 WWIC’08 Paper: Basic Idea
In publication [P9], the authors present and evaluate a network mobility scheme
based on HIP. The work is based on the author’s earlier work in [196]. It is good to
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notice that a related approach by Nova´czki et al. [127] that is published after the
submission of the author’s work in [P9] represents a piece of independent work.
The cryptographic host identifiers are combined with an authorization mechanism
and used for delegating the mobility-management signalling rights between nodes.
While the delegation of the signalling rights scheme itself is a known concept, the way
of establishing security associations in [P9] differs from the Mobile IPv6 NEMO [50]
based solutions. In the approach presented in [P9], the mobile routers are authorized
to send location update messages directly to peer hosts on behalf of the mobile hosts
without opening the solution for re-direction attacks. The authorization model
makes it possible to support route optimization and minimize over-the-air signalling
and renumbering events during hand-offs of mobile routers. Basically, the moving
network solution presented in publication [P9] provides a mechanism for delegating
signalling rights between public-key-based HIs. The delegation primitive and locator
translation together hide the network mobility from hosts attached to the moving
network. This minimizes the amount of over-the-air signalling inside the moving
network and between the moving network and the Internet.
The delegation may take place between mobile routers but also between mobile
routers and signalling proxies located in the fixed network. The rough idea is to
aggregate the signalling from the moving network to the fixed network that offers
higher bandwidth. In addition, the delegation of signalling rights makes it possible to
optimize the packet forwarding paths between the end hosts. The payload packets
can be sent directly to the peer hosts instead of tunneling them via rendezvous
points. From the payload size point of view, the presented solution is more efficient
than the tunneling based solutions (like [50]) because additional tunneling headers
are not required.
The required signalling can roughly be divided into network attachment, service dis-
covery, registration, authorization, and location update exchanges (see section 5.1.2).
Once a node joins a moving network, it runs an attachment exchange with an access
point that is typically managed by the mobile router. The approach integrates the
service discovery protocol to the existing end-to-end mobility state establishment
and update exchanges (see [130]) to minimize the amount of control signalling.
The novel part of publication [P9] is that it presents and analyzes the characteris-
tics of the new authorization scheme in the HIP network-mobility context using a
real implementation. The results in [P9] indicate that it is important to distribute
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the location update signalling between multiple signalling proxies to minimize the
dependencies between the parallel update exchanges at a single mobile router and to
increase parallelism during mobile-router hand-offs. However, the solution contains
also some limitations. The same results indicate that the current implementation
does not scale well in terms of hundreds of parallel communication sessions.
6.4.3 Signalling Proxy Functionality
The mobile router works as a signalling proxy for the mobile node. During the
service registration exchange the mobile node requests the signalling proxy service,
and authorizes the mobile router to signal on behalf of the mobile node. The autho-
rization is expressed using public-key-based HIs in authorization certificates. The
certificates can also contain flow policy rules as discussed earlier in section 6.1.10.
The end-to-end mobility signalling also establishes BEETIN SAs for the end hosts at
the mobile router. The main difference between static SPINAT nodes and the mo-
bile routers is that the mobile routers dynamically update the locators of the public
side BEETIN SAs during hand-offs (section 5.3.5). The private side BEETIN SAs
are updated when the mobile router works as a mobility anchor point and supports
local mobility for the mobile nodes as described in section 6.3.
6.4.4 Nested Moving Networks
When a mobile router is attached to another mobile router, they form a nested
moving network. In this kind of situation, the registered mobile nodes in the moving
network authorize the closest, i.e. leaf, mobile router to register themselves to other
upstream mobile routers. In other words, each mobile router registers its clients
to the next mobile router in the hierarchy to receive traffic from the Internet (see
[196]).
The upstream mobile routers are also authorized to signal on behalf of the mobile
hosts. This results in signalling aggregation for the mobile routers attached to the
Internet, and further for the signalling proxies located in the fixed network. The
nested moving networks may also result in a routing loop situation if the mobile
routers cannot distinguish downstream and upstream access points from each other.
To overcome the problem it is possible to include routing tree related information
to the link-layer messages (like [137]).
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6.4.5 Delegating Signalling to the Fixed Network
The mobile router may delegate the signalling rights further to a signalling proxy
located in the global domain. A signalling proxy is a fixed node that is authorized
to send location updates to the peer hosts, and optionally to reply to the peer hosts.
This requires that the mobile host has initially delegated the rights to the mobile
router. Later on, when the mobile router makes a hand-off, it runs the update
exchange with the static signalling proxy, not with the peer hosts.
Basically, the signalling proxy may either forward the update exchange to the peer
hosts, or run a reachability test itself with the mobile router. In the former case,
the peer hosts authorizes the signalling proxy to verify the location of the mobile
router. In other words, the signalling proxy runs the reachability test of behalf of
the peer hosts. The peer hosts can start sending packets to the new location right
after receiving the update message from the signalling proxy. The end hosts benefit
from the approach when the static signalling proxy is close to the mobile router,
and the latency between the mobile router and the peer host is long. The situation
is illustrated in Figure 6.5, on page 140.
Typically, the peer host initiates the reachability test with the mobile router after
receiving the update message from the signalling proxy. The situation is illustrated
in Figure 6.6, on page 141. It is good to notice that the reachability test is made for
the multiplexed locator of the mobile router. The mobile router replies on behalf
of the mobile host to the peer host. The payload traffic continues flowing directly
between the peer host and the mobile host via the mobile router after the mobile
router updates the BEETIN SAs bound to its multiplexed locator.
6.4.6 Integrating Local Mobility into Network Mobility
To minimize the signalling that takes place over the wireless interface, the signalling
proxy can be located on the packet forwarding path between the mobile router
and the peer hosts. The situation is illustrated in Figure 6.7, on page 142. The
signalling proxy works as a local anchor point for the moving network as presented
in section 6.3. When the mobile router makes a hand-off, it runs a single update
exchange with the proxy. The signalling proxy verifies the mobile router’s location.
The signalling proxy runs update exchanges with the peer hosts if the mobile router
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Figure 6.5: Peer hosts authorize the signalling proxy to implement a reachability
test.
attaches for the first time to the proxy’s domain. The proxy hides the burst of
update exchanges from the nodes inside its region. When the local and network
mobility-management are integrated together, it is possible to implement a mobile
router hand-off with a single update exchange. Therefore, the population in the
moving network does not affect the amount of signalling during hand-offs.
Logically, the SPINAT node works as a signalling proxy in the local and network
mobility cases. In the former case, the SPINAT node takes the peer role, and runs
the mobility update exchange on behalf of the peer node as discussed earlier in
section 6.3. In the latter case, the SPINAT node runs the mobility update exchange
on behalf of the mobile host. Basically, the mobile node authorizes the SPINAT
node to act as a signalling proxy in both cases.
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Figure 6.6: Peer hosts run the reachability test.
6.4.7 Leaving a Moving Network
The lifetime of authorization between mobile nodes and signalling proxies is ex-
pressed in the authorization certificates. In the basic case, the lifetime is the mobile
node’s estimated stay at the moving network. If the mobile node stays longer than
the lifetime of the approved certificate, it generates a new authorization certifi-
cate for the mobile router. The same applies also to the authorization between
nested mobile routers and signalling proxies. However, when the mobile host leaves
the moving network before the lifetime of the certificate ends, it revokes the valid
certificate. Revocation denotes a call back mechanism that is typically based on
revocation certificates. A revocation certificate identifies another certificate that is
inactivated.
The mobile host may include a hash of the revoked certificate to the update mes-
sages. The approach requires that the mobile host stores a hash of all active cer-
tificates. In other words, it stores certificates who’s lifetime has not run out. The
revocation of certificates prevents the earlier mobile routers from sending location
updates on behalf of the mobile node when the mobile node has left the moving
network. The peer host stores the revocation list of the certificates. Basically, the
mobile host acts as a Certificate Authority (CA) for itself.
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Figure 6.7: The on-the-path signalling proxy acts as a regional anchor point.
The mobile node also unregisters its states from the earlier mobile router. Depending
on the situation, the unregistration may take place before or after the mobile node
makes a hand-off. In the latter case, the unregistration exchange is run via the
previous mobile router’s rendezvous node. This requires that the mobile router
sends its locator set to the mobile host during the initial registration exchange.
6.5 Summary of Four Granularity Levels of Mobility
This chapter presented four different granularity levels of mobility that are flow
mobility, address-family agility, local mobility and network mobility.
Section 6.1 described a flow policy rule based mechanism for managing simultaneous
traffic flows. It seems that the presented IP layer based approach was the first
end host solution that provided simultaneous multi-access and per flow mobility
functionality. The TLIs carried in each payload packet work as triggers for the
policy rules. The policy rules define mappings between TLIs and VIIDs. The VIIDs
are dynamically bound to locators sharing the same QoS properties. Moreover, the
policies are divided into source and destination policies. The source policies are
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used for finding a suitable source locator, while the destination policies are applied
to destination locator selection. The flow policy rules can be expressed with an
authorization certificate. The authorization certificates provide a way for moving
the policy decision and enforcement points between nodes.
Section 6.2 presented a solution for AID agility and locator family agility. Together
the presented approaches provide a way to support intercommunication between
different kinds of socket APIs over locator domains supporting different network
protocols. It seems that the presented approach is the first transparent solution
for providing inter-communication between different kinds of legacy socket APIs for
end-to-end connections over different IP version domains.
The address-family agility approach taken in this thesis is based on two bindings.
The first binding takes place between application-layer identifiers and transport-
layer identifiers. The second binding between transport-layer identifiers and loca-
tors is implemented using the BEET and BEETIN modes. The BEET mode pro-
vides dynamic binding between different locator families at the end hosts, while the
BEETIN mode supports locator family translation at SPINAT nodes. The SPINAT
nodes transparently establish and update the related states based on end-to-end
control-plane signalling.
Section 6.3 presented a local mobility-management solution. It is possible to use
the local mobility approach together with the other presented mobility approaches.
The local mobility solution does not require explicit service discovery or registration
exchanges. The on-the-path SPINAT nodes transparently establish states for the
end hosts during the initial end-to-end communication.
The local mobility approach uses weak authentication techniques instead of public
key cryptography to protect the location update signalling. The weak authentication
mechanisms allow optimizing the amount of signalling. The trade-off is that the
protocol became vulnerable for certain on-the-path attacks.
Section 6.4 presented a moving network solution that extends the earlier described
SPINAT functionality. The mobile routers and static SPINAT nodes work as sig-
nalling proxies for the mobile nodes. The solution makes it possible to aggregate the
mobility signalling to intermediate nodes located in the fixed network. In addition,
the network mobility is hidden from the nodes inside the moving network.
The signalling delegation and the combined locator translation optimize the amount
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of over-the-air signalling between the end hosts. The approach provides optimized
routing between end hosts without additional tunneling headers. The solution is
possible to integrate into local mobility. The nested moving networks can even
belong to different locator domains.
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7 Analysis
In this thesis, a limited set of authentication and authorization techniques has been
applied to different reachability and security problems. This has lead to a flexible
and compact mobility solution, even at the implementation level, which will be
discussed later in section 7.5. The essential parts of the integrated architecture
are illustrated from the bindings point of view in sections 7.1-7.2 and from the
authentication and authorization point of view in section 7.3. The results indicate
that the added indirection, backwards compatibility and the integrated mobility
levels provide signalling efficiency and flexibility in heterogeneous datacom networks
(see section 1.1).
Basically, a heterogeneous network environment consists of parallel namespaces at
different TCP/IP layers. The author has focused on mobility and multi-homing
related bindings in IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The bindings are analyzed from the
control-plane and data-plane points of view. The bindings are implemented above
the link layer, making the solution independent of the link-layer namespace. The
analysis also contains topics for future work.
7.1 Bindings for Control Plane Signalling
The bindings that are created for end-to-end control-plane signalling that traverses
rendezvous nodes are described in section 7.1.1 and those for SPINAT nodes in
section 7.1.2. The three columns in the following Figures 7.1-7.3 define which of the
nodes have generated the identifiers used in the bindings. A binding is illustrated
with a line between the identifiers in the figures. The row headers in the figures
name the nodes that create, store and depend on the bindings. Binding updates
are based on authorization between nodes. Depending on the mobility solution,
the authorization is based on different sets of cryptographic and non-cryptographic
association mechanisms, as discussed later in section 7.3.
7.1.1 Via Rendezvous Node
Figure 7.1, on page 146, presents the bindings that are required for sending a control-
plane message from a peer host to a mobile host via a rendezvous node. The bindings
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Figure 7.1: Bindings for end-to-end control-plane traffic via Rendezvous node.
between identifiers are numbered from (1) to (9). The stateless locator1→1 locator
binding (4) associates a locator carried in a packet header to a specific topological
location on the Internet. The stateless binding depends on the Internet’s routing
infrastructure also in the following Figure 7.2 (binding 6, on page 148) and Figure 7.3
(binding 8, on page 150).
The peer host generates locally the source HI while the source locator is defined by
the topological location of the host. The destination HI and the destination locator
are received from DNS. The mobile host has stored its HI and the rendezvous node’s
destination locator at the DNS. Moreover, the rendezvous node has made a binding
between the destination HI and the locator of the mobile host during the registration
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exchange. The source HI may be dynamically bound to the rendezvous node’s source
location if the mobile host and the peer host belong to different IP version domains.
The source and destination HI pair are bound to a message protection key at the
hosts. The HI pair1↔nmessage-protection key bindings (1)(9) are created at the
end hosts during the authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The hosts may
dynamically update the integrity and confidentiality protection keying material.17
The source HI1→n locator binding (2) and destination HI1→n locator binding (3) de-
pend on each other. The current implementation uses LPM for source and des-
tination locator selection. The receiving host may be reachable directly at the
selected destination location, or the destination location may point to a rendezvous
node like in Figure 7.1, on page 146. In the mobile-router case, the destination
HI1→n locator binding (5) is dynamic and updated during each hand-off, like the des-
tination HI1→n locator binding (8) at the mobile host. The destination HI1→n locator
binding (3) depends on the bindings (5)(8). In other words, the mobile hosts and
the routers are authorized to update locators in the binding (3) at the peer host.
In the rendezvous-node case, the destination HI1→n locator binding (7) depends on
mobile host’s binding (8). In other words, the binding (7) is updated after each
mobile host’s hand-off.
The rendezvous node does not keep a state for the source HI1→n locator binding
(6). The binding (6) depends on the locator domains. When the receiving host and
the sending host belong to different locator domains, the rendezvous node binds the
source HI to one of the local source locators. Another reason to use local source
locators at the rendezvous node is to mitigate ingress-filtering problems. Ingress
filtering denotes a mechanism that verifies that an incoming packet at a router or
an intermediate node has a source address that matches the direction from which it
arrived.
7.1.2 Via SPINAT Node
Figure 7.2, on page 148, illustrates the bindings that are required for sending a
control-plane message from a mobile host to a peer host via a SPINAT node.
17Sharing symmetric message-protection keying material with intermediate nodes is for future
study. It would be an alternative way to implement signalling delegation compared to public key
based delegation.
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Figure 7.2: Bindings for end-to-end control-plane traffic via SPINAT node.
The bindings between identifiers are numbered from (1) to (13). The dynamic HI
pair1↔nmessage-protection key bindings (5)(13) at the end hosts are created during
a key exchange.
The mobile host generates a VIID and a SPI value that the peer host can later
use towards the mobile host with payload packets. This is illustrated in the source
HI1↔nVIID bindings (1)(7). Basically, the VIIDs are used for two purposes. Firstly,
the VIIDn→1SPI bindings (2)(8) provide a way to keep subsequent SPI values in
synchrony at hosts and intermediate nodes (section 5.5.1). The bindings (2)(8) are
updated during each rekeying exchange. Secondly, the VIID can be bound to QoS
information and it is used with flow policy rules as discussed earlier in section 6.1.
149
The source and destination locators must belong to the same scope and loca-
tor family. In other words the SPIn→1source-locator binding (3) and destination-
HIn→1destination-locator binding (4) depend on each other. When the receiver is
not directly reachable via the same locator family as the sender, the binding (4)
points to a locator of the receiver’s rendezvous node as discussed earlier in sec-
tion 6.2.
The SPI1→1SPI(#2) binding (9) at the SPINAT node is needed for SPI translation.
The binding is required if an SPI value collides with another one at the SPINAT
node. The SPINAT node can add a parameter to the end-to-end control-plane mes-
sage that contains information about the translation between the SPI and SPI(#2)
values. To mitigate MitM attacks, the mobile host may authorize the SPINAT node
to sign the parameter carrying the SPI value in the control message. (The binding
(6) in Figure 7.3, on page 150, at the peer host depends on this authorization.)
In addition, the SPINAT node translates a source locator for each message. The
SPIn→1source-locator binding (10) depends on the destination-HI1→ndestination-
locator binding (11). Furthermore, the binding (11) at the SPINAT node depends on
selected locator family in bindings (3)(4) at the mobile host. When the peer host is
also mobile, the destination-HI1→1destination-locator binding (12) is dynamic. The
bindings (4)(11) depend on the binding (12). The locators in bindings (4)(11)(12)
are updated after each peer host’s hand-off.
7.2 Bindings for Data Plane Traffic
Figure 7.3, on page 150, illustrates the bindings that are required for data-plane
communication between applications. It is good to notice that both end-hosts par-
ticipate in the generation of the flow protection keys. The payload packets flow
from a sending host to a receiving host via an intermediate node that implements
the SPINAT functionality. The bindings between identifiers are numbered from (1)
to (20).
7.2.1 AID-to-HI Binding
In Figure 7.3, on page 150, the size of the AIDs depend on the socket API. LSI is
used in the IPv4 case and HIT in the IPv6 case represents the AID in the AIDn→1HI
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Figure 7.3: Bindings for end-to-end data-plane traffic via SPINAT node.
bindings (1)(16).
The same global scope AIDs can be used at both communicating end hosts, while
each host generates its local scope AIDs. The main reason for this is to avoid
identifier collisions that may appear with flat namespaces, e.g., with 32-bit long
LSIs. The local scope AIDs make it also possible to support different socket APIs
at both end hosts. Therefore, the type of AIDs in the bindings (1)(16) can differ
from each other.
In this thesis, the one-to-one AID1↔1HI bindings (1)(16) are static. However, dy-
namic one-to-many AID1↔nHI bindings make it possible to support process mi-
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gration (like in [179]) and change the HIs during a communication session. The
one-to-many AID1↔nHI bindings are for further study.
7.2.2 HIT-to-TLI, TLI-to-VIID and VIID-to-SPI Bindings
In Figure 7.3, on page 150, the source VIID is generated by the peer host while
the destination VIID is generated by the mobile host. The destination VIID has
been communicated earlier to the peer host during the state establishment. The
TLI values are received from the socket at the peer side, and from the packet at the
mobile host side.
In Figure 7.3, on page 150, the static HI1↔nTLI bindings (2) illustrates the trans-
lation between application and transport layer identifiers. In the current approach,
all AIDs are translated to HITs that are processed like IPv6 addresses at the trans-
port layer. The TLI denotes the {HIT,port value, protocol value}-triplet. The
TLIn→1VIID binding (21) and VIIDn→1SPI binding (3) were analyzed earlier in sec-
tion 6.1.4 and illustrated also in Figure 6.1, on page 115. The dynamic TLIn↔1VIID
binding (21) is used for flow mobility as discussed earlier in section 6.1. The
SPIn↔1 locator binding (4) depends on the VIIDn↔m locator binding (22) that is
defined in a flow policy.
From the flow mobility point of view, the SPI value carried in the payload packet
tags a flow between hosts. The small header size provide efficient bandwidth usage.
The trade-off is that a small SPI size may result in collisions. Therefore, SPIs
are defined by the receiving nodes. The SPI based multiplexing requires that the
SPINAT must be able to translate the SPI.
Figure 7.3 can also be used to illustrate BEET and BEETIN mechanisms. The des-
tination TLIn→1VIID binding (21) and {SPI,source-HIT,destination-HIT}1↔1SPI
binding (11) implement the BEET and BEETIN modes for outgoing packets. Re-
spectively, the SPI1→nTLI-pair binding (15) and SPIn↔1HIT-pair binding (10) im-
plement the BEET and BEETIN modes for incoming payload packets. Policy based
{SPI,source-HIT,destination-HIT}1↔nVIID binding at intermediate nodes is for fu-
ture work.
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7.2.3 SPI-to-Key Binding
Each SPI is bound to flow protection keying material. In Figure 7.3, on page 150, the
static SPI1↔1Key bindings (17)(20) at end hosts and bindings (18)(19) at interme-
diate nodes are used to integrity and confidentiality protect the payload packets. In
the transparent SPINAT case, the keying material is not transferred to the SPINAT
node and the SPI1↔1Key bindings (18)(19) do not exist. In other words, the SPIs
are translated without applying any cryptographic operations (see section 5.3.5).
However, the receiver may explicitly transfer the key material to the SPINAT node.
The transparent SPINAT node cannot replace the integrity protected SPI(#2) with
SPI without additional SPI1↔1SPI(#2) binding (6) at the sending host. Otherwise,
the packet verification at the receiving host fails. This results in two translations
SPI1↔1SPI(#2) and SPI(#2)1↔1SPI on the packet forwarding path. It is good to
notice that both of the SPIs are bound to same the keying material at the sending
host, i.e. binding (17).
The mobile host may also run an explicit exchange with the SPINAT node to trans-
fer the end-to-end flow integrity and/or confidentiality keys to the SPINAT node.
If the integrity key is sent to the SPINAT node, the node can verify that each
payload packet is received from an authentic sender. If the confidentiality key is
transfered to the SPINAT node, it can also implement lawful interception with the
SPI1↔1Key binding (18). Lawful interception denotes interception of packets at
some intermediate nodes in accordance with local law.
When multiple hosts establish flows via the same SPINAT node, the key material
of the different flows may be transfered to the SPINAT node. In this case, the
SPINAT node may create a one-to-many {SPI,source-HIT,destination-HIT}1→nSPI
binding (11). In other words, the SPINAT node translates SPIs that are associated
with different flow protection keys. This kind of one-to-many binding (11) is useful
from the multicast point of view. A single incoming flow is decrypted once using
the SPI1↔1Key binding (18) and encrypted multiple times per SPI1↔1Key binding
(19) before forwarding the copies of the packet to the destinations. However, the
approach is for further study.
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7.2.4 SPI-to-Locator Binding
In Figure 7.3, on page 150, the dynamic SPIn→1Locator bindings (4)(5)(7)(14) at
end hosts and (9)(12)(13) at intermediate node define the granularity of mobility.
When the receiving host is directly reachable from the location of the sending host,
the SPIn→1Locator binding (5) at the peer host depends on the locator update
in the SPIn→1Locator binding (14) at the mobile host. This is also called host
mobility (section 5.4). When the peer host is located behind a SPINAT node,
the SPIn→1Locator binding (13) at the SPINAT node depends on the binding (14)
update at the mobile host. This is called local mobility (section 6.3).
When the receiving host is reachable via the mobile router, the SPIn→1Locator
binding (7) at the peer host depends on the SPIn→1Locator binding (9) at the
mobile router. This is called network mobility (section 6.4). It is good to notice that
the SPIn→1source-locator binding (12) depends on the SPIn→1destination-locator
binding (9) at the SPINAT node. If the SPIs are bound to different locator families
in the bindings (9)(13), the source locator is defined by the intermediate node in
binding (12). This is called address-family agility at the network layer (section 6.2).
7.3 Securing Bindings
This section analyzes the earlier discussed granularity levels of mobility (chapter 6)
from cryptographic association mechanisms point of view. The presented solutions
provide alternative ways to secure identifier-binding updates at the peer nodes. By
applying these mechanisms a receiver can verify that the sender is authorized to
send the binding update message. The solutions apply two forms of authorization,
namely, a cryptographic association between HIs and a non-cryptographic associa-
tion between HIs and the routing infrastructure. The former authorization mecha-
nism is integrated with (and optionally derived from) the end-to-end HI authentica-
tion mechanism. The explicit HI authorization is based on alternative combinations
of asymmetric, symmetric and one-way hash chain cryptography. The different cryp-
tographic techniques have reflections on identity privacy. Asymmetric cryptography
denotes public-key cryptography while symmetric cryptography denotes secret key
cryptography.
The non-cryptographic association between HIs and locators depends on the as-
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Figure 7.4: Security model for the host mobility and address-family agility solution.
sumption that the routing infrastructure delivers packets to the correct locations
according to information carried in the packet headers. Basically, the peer nodes
implicitly authorize the routing infrastructure to forward reachability test messages
correctly to the destination location that is illustrated in binding (8) in Figure 7.3, on
page 150. Vulnerabilities in the routing infrastructure may result in DoS situations
and identity leaks for the communicating end hosts. The security problems related
to the deployed Internet routing infrastructure are out of scope for this thesis.
7.3.1 Host Mobility and Address Family Agility
Figure 7.4, on page 154, illustrates the security associations that are required for
updating bindings in the host mobility and address agility solutions (section 5.4).
The model secures the dynamic bindings (3)-(7),(12)-(15) in Figure 7.3, on page 150.
The initial cryptographic association between the HIs of end hosts is established
using either asymmetric cryptography [P3][P6] or one-way hash chains [P5]. The
former case results also in symmetric-cryptography-based association. The author
has focused on identity protection with asymmetric cryptography. The identity
privacy solution presented in sections 5.2.6-5.2.8 protects also the identity of end
hosts during subsequent binding update signalling. It is good to notice that identity
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privacy is also directly bound to the symmetric-cryptography-based association. The
symmetric cryptography may result in an identity leak if an attacker is able to bind
subsequent SPIs together as a result of traffic analysis. Identity privacy analysis for
encrypted payload packets is out of scope for this thesis.
In a basic host mobility scenario (Figure 7.4), the symmetric keying material is
not transferred to the SPINAT node. The asymmetric-cryptography or hash-chain-
based associations between the SPINAT node and end hosts are derived from the
asymmetric-cryptography-based association between the end hosts. From the pri-
vacy protection point of view this a problem because the SPINAT node that is also
a MitM must be able to verify the identity of the mobile host. The local mobility so-
lution presented earlier in section 7.4 overcomes the key sharing and authentication
problems between mobile hosts and SPINAT nodes.
Both the peer host and SPINAT node depends on the routing infrastructure to for-
ward the packets faithfully between the end hosts. Based on the non-cryptographic
routing-based associations and the end-to-end cryptographic associations, the peer
hosts and the SPINAT nodes authorize the mobile host to update the locator re-
lated bindings. When the SPINAT node is not able to verify the identity of the
mobile host, a malicious mobile host may establish a cryptographic association with
the SPINAT node using spoofed identifiers (section 5.3.4). This requires that also
the peer node is malicious and participates the attack. From the identifier spoofing
point of view, the SPINAT nodes assume that the peer nodes do not establish cryp-
tographic associations with the mobile nodes sending spoofed messages. In other
words, the SPINAT nodes assume that at least one of the end hosts is not malicious.
7.3.2 Local Mobility
Figure 7.5, on page 156, illustrates the security associations that are required for
updating bindings in the local mobility solution (section 6.1). The model secures
the dynamic bindings (13)(14) in Figure 7.3, on page 150.
The initial asymmetric and symmetric-cryptography-based associations between HIs
of end hosts results in hash chain and symmetric-cryptography-based association
between the mobile host and the first SPINAT node. Furthermore, each subsequent
security association between different SPINAT nodes and the mobile host are derived
from the previous security association. The model is based on a chain of security
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Figure 7.5: Security model for the local mobility solution.
associations between the mobile hosts and SPINAT nodes. The SPINAT nodes reply
to the binding update messages on behalf of the peer nodes.
The hash chains provide an alternative authentication mechanism for asymmet-
ric cryptography at SPINAT nodes. The end hosts are able to keep secret their
asymmetric-cryptography-based identities. The trade-off is that the hash-chain-
based authentication becomes a potential source of identity leaks. The hash chain
values make it possible to bind subsequent binding updates together. As discussed
earlier in section 6.3.4, the trade-off between privacy protection and the local-
mobility-based signalling optimization is bound to the length of the hash chains.
It is good to notice that the scope of the binding update signalling in global and
local mobility scenarios is different. Although it is possible to trace a mobile host
to some extent in the local network, the solution protects the mobile host’s identity
from attackers located in the global domain. In addition, the local mobility solution
hides the accurate location of the mobile host inside the local domain from the peer
nodes.
The SPINAT nodes depend on the local routing infrastructure to faithfully forward
packets between them and the mobile hosts. The SPINAT node located in the
local network authorizes the mobile node to update the locator related bindings.
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Figure 7.6: Security model for the network mobility solution.
The authorization depends on the routing-based association and the hash chain and
symmetric-cryptography based associations.
7.3.3 Network Mobility
Figure 7.6, on page 157, illustrates the associations that are required for updating
bindings in the network mobility solution (section 6.4). The model secures the
dynamic bindings (7)(9) in Figure 7.3, on page 150.
The initial association between the mobile host and peer host is created using asym-
metric cryptography. The mobile host also establishes an asymmetric-cryptography-
based association with the closest mobile router. The nested mobile routers create
asymmetric-cryptography-based associations with each other. A certificate chain
provides a way to express the authorizations between the mobile host and the nested
mobile routers. This results in an asymmetric-cryptography-based association be-
tween the peer host and the mobile router attached to the global domain.
The security associations in the network mobility and the earlier presented local mo-
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bility (section 7.4) are kind of mirror images of each other. The main difference is
that the associations in the network mobility are based on asymmetric cryptography,
while the associations in the local mobility are based on hash chains and symmetric
cryptography. In the local mobility scenario the associations are established be-
tween mobile host and intermediate nodes. In the network mobility scenario, the
associations are established between the peer host and intermediate node. In the
local mobility case, the intermediate node replies on behalf of the peer host. In the
network mobility case, the intermediate nodes reply on behalf of the mobile node.
The mobile routers and the peer node do not run mobility state establishment ex-
changes between them. This makes it difficult to protect the mobile router’s identity
from attackers. The mobile routers’ identity protection and certificate encryption is
for further study and is out of scope for this thesis.
7.3.4 Flow Mobility
Figure 6.1, on 115, illustrates three bindings TLIm→nVIID, VIIDn↔1SPI and SPIn↔1 locator
bindings that must be secured in the flow mobility solution. The same bindings are
also illustrated in Figure 7.3, on page 150. The security associations required to up-
date the locator in the SPIn↔1 locator binding were presented earlier in section 7.3.1.
Moreover, the association between TLIm→nVIID is expressed with an authorization
certificate that is signed by the HI that generates the VIID in the binding (sec-
tion 6.1.10).
Finally, the cryptographic associations that are required to update the SPI in the
VIIDn↔1SPI binding is illustrated in Figure 7.7, on page 159. Figure 7.7 is based
on the assumption that the communication paths between the end hosts have been
established before the flow mobility takes place. In addition, the peer node has
made reachability tests for the locations, based on the cryptographic associations
presented in Figure 7.4, on page 154.
The mobile host establishes an asymmetric-cryptography based association with
the peer node to update the VIIDn→1SPI binding. However, the mobile host may
also establish an asymmetric-cryptography based association with the SPINAT node
and transfer encryption or integrity protection related end-to-end symmetric key-
ing material to the authenticated SPINAT node. This would requires additional
{SPI,source-HIT,destination-HIT}1↔1VIID binding and VIIDn→1SPI binding at a
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Figure 7.7: Security model for the flow mobility solution.
multi-homed SPINAT node to split flows similar to multi-homed end hosts (see
Figure 7.3, on page 150). However, the policy based flow mobility for encrypted
payload packets at SPINAT nodes is for further study. The basic approach, pre-
sented in Figure 7.2, on page 148, uses the VIIDs that are defined by the end hosts.
7.4 Integrated Authentication, Authorization, Key Sharing, and
Location Update Signalling
Figure 7.8, on page 160, illustrates the amount of signalling that is required to estab-
lish security associations between nodes and to update the location of a mobile host
in different mobility scenarios. The figure also describes the relationships between
the exchanges that is also illustrated in [P9].
The required amount of end-to-end state establishment signalling (1 in Figure 7.8)
depends on the number of peer hosts. The authenticated two round trip Diffie-
Hellman (HIP) exchange is faster than, e.g., a related IKE exchange [P4]. The
mobility state establishment must take place before the update exchange is run
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Figure 7.8: Relationships between the control-plane exchanges.
between nodes.
The mobile host runs once the end-to-end update exchange (1 or 2 in Figure 7.8)
with each peer host to establish SPINAT states for local and/or network mobility.
The end-to-end update exchange (2 in Figure 7.8) consists of three messages that are
sent directly between end hosts [P3][P4]. The main difference from Mobile IPv6 [45]
is that part of the binding update messages are triangularly routed via a home agent
in Mobile IPv6. In addition, the end hosts do not establish SAs between them in
Mobile IPv6.
The SPINAT nodes are able to support local hand-offs (3 in Figure 7.8) after the
end-to-end exchanges between the hosts. The mobile host and the closest SPINAT
node, i.e. a mobile anchor point, establish an SA between each other during the
update exchanges (section 6.3). Due to the integrated key-sharing mechanism, the
amount of signalling is not increased during local hand-offs between the mobile host
and mobile anchor points. Basically, the three-way update exchange is optimal at
any granularity level of mobility. In practice, it is not possible to verify a location
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with fewer than two messages. The local hand-off latency, excluding the link layer
exchanges, consists of the integrated three-way update and key sharing exchange
that is run between the mobile host and the local SPINAT node.
The mobile hosts can also authorize (4 in Figure 7.8) the closest SPINAT node,
i.e. a mobile router, to run update exchanges on behalf of the mobile host to
minimize signalling inside the moving network. Furthermore, the mobile router
can delegate the signalling rights to another SPINAT node, i.e a signalling proxy,
located in the fixed network (5 in Figure 7.8), to minimize over-the-air signalling.
The authorization exchanges do not depend on the number of peer hosts. However,
the mobile host needs to run an end-to-end exchange (1 or 2 in Figure 7.8) with each
peer host via the SPINAT node to establish states for the end-to-end connections
at the SPINAT nodes.
Based on the authorization between the mobile host and the mobile router (4 in
Figure 7.8), the mobile router runs an update exchange (6 in Figure 7.8) with its
signalling proxies after its hand-off. Furthermore, the authorized (5 in Figure 7.8)
signalling proxies run update exchanges (8 in Figure 7.8) directly with peer hosts or
with other proxies at the peer side.
Also the peer hosts can authorize signalling proxies, i.e. SPINAT nodes, to run the
reachability test on behalf of the peer hosts (7 in Figure 7.8). Thus, the mobile router
hand-off results in update exchanges between signalling proxies (8 in Figure 7.8).
The amount of update exchanges is bound to the number of signalling proxies, not
to the number of end hosts. Finally, the peer hosts are informed of the mobile hosts
current location with a location update message (9 in Figure 7.8). Other kinds of
proxy based approaches that completely hide the mobility from the peer hosts are
out of scope for this thesis.
The delegation of signalling rights, and the distribution of control signalling be-
tween signalling proxies in the fixed network reduces the over-the-air bandwidth
consumption and results in optimized packet forwarding paths between end hosts.
In addition, the multiple mobility state machines running in parallel at different
signalling proxies reduce the message processing time, thus minimizing the hand-off
latency. The analysis of the hand-off times and related measurement results are
presented in publication [P9].
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7.5 Compact Implementation
Figures 7.9 (page 163) and 7.10 (page 164) illustrate the HIP specific lines of C-
code per week in the user-space daemon and in the FreeBSD6 kernel. The figures
are based on the most important C-files in the CVS repository including also the
comment lines. The required changes in libc, test suites, administration tools, crypto
libraries and header files are not included in the charts.
The end-to-end host mobility implementation requires around 13 000 lines of code
for the user-space daemon and 3500 lines of code in the kernel. Together, the 16500
lines of code support secure host and flow-based hand-offs, address-family agility at
end hosts, rendezvous functionality and the BEET mode.
Additional granularity levels require another 18 500 lines of code for the user-space
daemon and 1000 lines of code in the kernel. Together, the 19 500 lines of code add
support for transparent state establishment and update at SPINAT nodes, address-
family agility at SPINAT, BEETIN mode, flow mobility, transparent registration
with mobile routers and minimal signalling proxy functionality; i.e., it is used by
the mobile router. The SPINAT implementation is around 11 000 lines of code, while
the basic mobile router functionality requires around 7 500 lines of additional code.
It is good to notice that the current code does not contain privacy nor nested moving
network support. In addition, the earlier implemented local mobility protocol [P4] is
not supported in the CVS HEAD.
The current HIP based prototype consists of 36 000 lines code. For example, a
Mobile IPv6 implementation18 requires around 23 000 lines of code in user space
and a couple of thousand lines of code in the kernel. Moreover, the Mobile IPv6
requires an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) daemon implementation. A user-space
IKE daemon implementation19 requires around 58 000 lines of code. Together, an
IPv6 based host mobility requires over 80 000 lines of C code. The lines of code in
the presented examples are counted in the same way as in Figures 7.9 (page 163)
and 7.10 (page 164) .
It seems that the presented namespace bindings and the design choices made in this
thesis result in a compact implementation, compared to the other IP based mobility
and security protocols.
18MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux code, version 2.0.2
19Racoon in IPsec-tools 0.6.7
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Figure 7.9: Lines of code per week in the user-space daemon.
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Figure 7.10: Lines of code per week in the kernel.
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8 Conclusions
The existing Internet architecture can be seen as a framework that consists of IP
transport, a host stack, and applications. The standard interfaces between these
elements make it possible to deploy new kinds of services in the Internet without
changing the underlying architecture. In this work, the host stack is changed in a
radical way, eventually leading to new kinds of business models. Still, the untouched
IP transport and applications are able to use the old interfaces providing backward
compatibility for the existing services.
During the work, the author has incrementally introduced new pieces to the basic
HIP-based identifier-locator split architecture. Based on these contributions, the
enhanced HIP architecture covers now a rich set of new granularity levels of mobility.
This thesis defines the relationships between the presented mobility dimensions.
While it is possible to achieve most of the presented granularity levels using other
approaches, the main advantages of the approach taken in this thesis are visible
in the security mechanisms and resulting mobility optimizations. The approach
integrates host authentication, key-sharing, and mobility mechanisms together in a
novel and seamless way.
The author has defined a set of new dynamic bindings for the host stack, and
the relationships between them to support multiple granularity levels of mobility.
The presented approaches for flow mobility, local mobility, network mobility, and
address-family agility solutions are based on utilizing these bindings. The solutions
are independent of the link-layer access technology and IP version. Depending on
the solution, the new bindings are located at the end hosts or also at the intermediate
nodes.
The authentication, authorization and delegation mechanisms are integrated with
the mobility-related signalling. To overcome a number of authentication-related
problems, the approach taken in this thesis relies on cryptographic host identifiers
for both host naming and authentication purposes. The solutions integrate the
cryptographic host identifiers with mobility-management signalling to protect the
dynamic bindings from traffic redirection and DoS security vulnerabilities. The secu-
rity associations between the nodes provide integrity and confidentiality protection,
and optimized forwarding paths for payload packets.
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The presented hash-chain-based weak authentication techniques are computationally
efficient and scalable compared to using a PKI or manual keying. On the flip side,
they are more vulnerable to MitM attacks than public-key-based authentication
schemes. In addition, the author provides a solution for identity protection for end
hosts. This thesis presents the first two-round-trip authenticated Diffie-Hellman
key exchange that is able to protect the identities of the communicating hosts from
passive and active attackers when the attackers do not have prior knowledge of the
public keys or the destination of the packets.
In this thesis, delegation of signalling rights and aggregation of signalling are ap-
plied to host-identifier-based network mobility. This reduces the amount of control
signalling in a moving network, between the moving network and the Internet, and
between the peer hosts and the Internet.
To optimize local binding updates between mobile hosts and intermediate nodes,
the author also defines a three-way update exchange that is used both for local and
macro-mobility management, and for key sharing. It is the first three way exchange
that simultaneously updates a location of a mobile host and establishes a security
association between the mobile host and a mobility anchor point without requiring
a priori knowledge of the mobile host. The solution protects the nodes from MitM
attackers that are located between the mobile host and the anchor point. The
optimized key sharing minimizes the local hand-off latency without increasing the
amount of security-related signalling.
The globally unique and IP-version-independent host identifiers make it possible to
support address-family agility both at the application and network layers. The au-
thor provides the first solution supporting secure communication between different
versions of socket APIs over different IP versions. In addition, backward compatibil-
ity with most of the existing applications and the integrated implementation makes
it easy to support simultaneously multiple granularity levels of mobility.
The presented flow-mobility approach is the first IP-based solution for dividing single
traffic flows dynamically between network interfaces with user, peer and third party
defined policy rules. The introduced virtual-interface identifiers are used for identi-
fying traffic flows at the end hosts and at the intermediate nodes. The identifiers are
used for mitigating synchronization problems between communication states and for
defining static flow-policy rules in certificates.
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From the semantic point of view, the required changes in the host stack are larger
than, e.g., in the MIPv6 based solutions. However, the actual implementation size of
the approach taken in this thesis is considerable smaller than size of the comparable
MIPv6 approach. This diminishes the complexity of the implementation and results
in fewer bugs in the code. Furthermore, it speeds up the development process and
reduces implementation costs.
The author believes that the deployment of the presented architecture strongly de-
pends on the end-users’ awareness of security risks in data communication, and on
the service providers’ concern of losing good reputation as a consequence of secu-
rity flaws. From the operators’ viewpoint, the user requirements result in reactive
deployment of new technologies. The service providers can also act in a proactive
way to protect their clients from losing time or money due to security flaws. The
author believes that, in both cases, the operators will benefit from the presented
transparent security and mobility mechanisms that do not cause trade-offs in the
service usability but increase flexibility in data communication. The end users alike
benefit from private and resilient communication, independent of the available access
technologies, IP versions, and the location of the users.
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Author’s contribution
The author’s contributions are visible in the four main areas. First, in the delegation
of signalling rights scheme. Second, in the flow mobility scheme. Third, in the one-
way hash chain schemes. Fourth, in the identifier-locator translation schemes. The
detailed contributions are presented in the following.
Delegation of Signalling Rights
The author has defined a way to implement a moving network architecture using
the delegation of signalling rights scheme [P9], discussed earlier in section 6.4.
Flow Mobility
The author has analyzed the namespace problem field from the flow based mobility
point of view. He has been a member of a design and implementation team that
has defined a simultaneous multi-access architecture [P1]. The author’s main con-
tribution in the team has been following. He has defined a policy based mechanism
for selecting source and destination interfaces for outgoing flows ([P1], chapters III
(not III-A)& VII), discussed earlier in section 6.1. The author has also defined a
model of policy based socket binding ([P2], Figure 2; [P1], Figure 8; [P3], Figures 9
& 12), discussed earlier in section 6.1.
One-way Hash Chain
The author has analyzed how to secure the namespace bindings using weak authen-
tication techniques, mainly one-way hash chains and secret splitting techniques.
He has defined one-way hash chain schemes to protect mobility and multi-homing
signalling.
The author has defined a way to secure a local and macro mobility protocol us-
ing one-way hash chains, and secret splitting techniques [P4], discussed earlier in
section 6.3.
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The author has defined a way to use one-way hash chains between mobile and multi-
homed end hosts to secure a context establishment protocol [P5], discussed earlier
in sections 5.2.9-5.2.11.
The author has defined a context establishment protocol that provides identity pro-
tection for end points [P6], discussed earlier in section 5.2.6-5.2.8.
Identifier-Locator Translation
The author has analyzed the namespace binding problems from the address-family’s
point of view at end hosts and intermediate nodes. He has been a member of a de-
sign and implementation team that has defined a way to implement mobility and
multi-homing across different address families. The communicating legacy applica-
tions may use different legacy socket APIs. The author has defined a new IPsec
mode for intermediate nodes. The new mode implements address-family translation
between different addressing domains (see: [P8][P4][P9]) that is discussed earlier in
sections 5.3.5 and 6.2.
The author has defined a Security Parameter Index (SPI) multiplexed Network Ad-
dress Translation (NAT), called SPINAT. This new intermediate node transparently
establishes HIP state during end-to-end communication (see: [P7] [P6] [P4]; [P3],
chapters 4.3 & 5.3.). This is discussed earlier in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
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Appendix A State Establishment at SPINAT Nodes
This Appendix describes the locator translation functionality of a SPINAT node in
more detail than what is presented in the publications. The purpose of the Appendix
is to keep the discussion consistent and to enlarge the viewpoint also to cover the
implementation of the SPINAT. The author and his colleagues have publicly demon-
strated the implementation of the SPINAT address-family agility functionality at
amongst others, IST’05 20 , Mocca’05 21 , ECIW’06, 22 and PIMRC’06 23 conferences.
In section A.1, a state at the SPINAT node is established using the end-to-end state
establishment exchange. Section A.2 describes the state establishment from the
state update exchange viewpoint. Section A.3 presents the rendezvous functionality
of the SPINAT nodes.
A.1 Using End-to-end State Establishment Exchange
The following discussion is based on a scenario where a mobile host inside a private
IPv4 locator domain communicates with a peer host having only an IPv6 attachment
to the Internet. The on-the-path SPINAT node transparently establishes a state
during the initial end-to-end mobility state establishment signalling. The scenario
is illustrated in Figure A.1. The example can also be applied vice versa with private
IPv6 locator domains. The implementation uses site local IPv6 locators for private
IPv6 locator domains. A scenario where the peer host is also located in a private
locator domain is discussed later in section A.3.
In the approach taken in this thesis, the peer host has initially registered to a
rendezvous server that is located in the Internet. The peer host has leased an IPv4
locator from the server to be reachable from the IPv4 networks. Initially, the peer
20Oy L M Ericsson Ab, The first public demo of the SPINAT and address agility implementation,
Demonstrated at the 14th IST Mobile & Wireless Communications Summit, Dresden, Germany,
June 2005.
21Oy L M Ericsson Ab, The second public demo of the SPINAT and address agility implemen-
tation, Demonstrated at Mocca WWI Symposium, Paris, France, December 2005.
22Oy L M Ericsson Ab, The first public demo of the HIP Mobile Router and address agility im-
plementation, Demonstrated at the 5th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security
(ECIW’06), Helsinki, Finland, June 2006.
23Oy L M Ericsson Ab, The second public demo of the HIP Mobile Router and address agility
implementation (MERCoNe Project), Demonstrated at the 17th Annual IEEE International Sym-
posium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC’06), Helsinki, Finland,
September 2006.
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Figure A.1: Using State Establishment Exchange to Initialize Locator Translation
between the private domain and the Internet.
host is located in the Internet. However, once the peer host moves into a private
network, the SPINAT node between the private network and the Internet also works
as a rendezvous point for the peer host (discussed later). Furthermore, the mobile
host is attached to a private IPv4 locator domain behind a SPINAT node. The
rendezvous server is reachable both from the peer’s and the mobile host’s location.
The peer host has stored its leased IPv4 locator to the DNS together with its HI.
The mobile host receives the leased IPv4 locator of the peer host from the DNS, and
sends the I1 message to that location. The on-the-path SPINAT node establishes a
soft state for the HITs, before forwarding the I1 message to the rendezvous server.
It also translates the private IPv4 source locator to the public multiplexed IPv4
locator of the SPINAT node. The SPINAT node adds its self-signed public locator
set information to the end of the message. The locator set should contain at least
a locator per supported address-family. As earlier mentioned, the author assumes
that the Internet provides both global IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity. In addition, the
SPINAT node adds an encrypted ’echo request’ parameter to the I1 message that
is echoed back by the peer host in R1 message.
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In the presented scenario, the mobile host and the SPINAT node do not explicitly
establish a security association. Therefore, the approach is vulnerable for the fol-
lowing attack. An attacker on the forwarding path may replace the SPINAT node’s
self-signed locator set with its own. Typically, the peer host does not have prior
knowledge of the SPINAT node’s identity. However, it is good to notice that an
attacker is also able to achieve the same effect by changing the source locator of the
IP header in the unsigned I1 message. Thus, adding a self-signed locator set to the
I1 message does not change the security level of the protocol. 24
When the I1 message arrives to the rendezvous server, the server replaces the IPv4
header with an IPv6 header. The destination IPv6 address is set to the current
location of the peer host. The source locator is translated to one of the IPv6 locators
of the rendezvous server. The server adds also the received IPv4 source locator (that
is bound to the SPINAT node) to the I1 message before forwarding it. It is good
to notice that the peer host has an earlier established security association with the
rendezvous server. Therefore, the rendezvous server is able to protect the added
locator parameter using HMAC.
After receiving the I1 message, the peer host replies with the R1 message. It also
verifies the signed locator set if the packet contains authorization information, i.e.
a certificate. The peer host adds its locator set to the R1 message. The locator set
is learned later by the SPINAT node and the mobile host. Instead of sending the
packet back to the rendezvous server, the peer host uses one of the received SPINAT
node’s locators. The packet is sent directly, i.e. using optimized routing, to one of
the SPINAT node’s IPv6 locators. The output of the LPM algorithm is a global
IPv6 locator pair between the peer and the SPINAT node.
Once the SPINAT node receives the R1 message it marks the initial IPv4 locator as
verified. The peer host was reachable behind the initial IPv4 locator. The SPINAT
node also verifies that the received ’echo reply’ parameter contains the same secret
that was included in the I1 message. As mentioned above, the SPINAT node stores
the received locator set of the peer host. Furthermore, the SPINAT node translates
24The peer host stays stateless and sends the R1 message back to the locator received in the I1
message. Thus, the on-the-path attacker can cause a DoS situation only for the initiator. However,
according to the HIP specification the retransmitted I1 messages should be sent to alternative loca-
tions if possible. Therefore, the peer host should be reachable in multiple, topologically scattered,
rendezvous locations. The SPINAT node can be authorized to send location updates on behalf of
the mobile host (see section 6.4). From the peer host point view, the authorization can be used to
verify the added SPINAT node’s locator set.
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both the source and the destination IPv6 locators to IPv4 locators. The idea of
the SPINAT node is similar to that of the NAT devices. The mobile host inside
the private network does not know the private locators of the SPINAT node. For
security reasons, the SPINAT node does not use its private IPv4 locators but sets
the source locator to point to the IPv4 rendezvous location of the peer host. In
other words, the IPv4 source locator is translated to the same locator as to where
the I1 message was sent, and the destination locator is translated to the private
IPv4 locator of the mobile host.
After receiving the R1 message, the mobile host learns the peer host’s locators
carried in the message. The base exchange continues in a normal way from the
mobile host’s point of view. The I2 message is sent back to the IPv4 rendezvous
locator of the peer host. However, the SPINAT node does not forward the packet
to the rendezvous server but runs the LPM algorithm using its public locator set
and the earlier stored peer host’s locator set. The output of the algorithm is most
probably an IPv6 locator pair, because the locators contain longer prefix and thus
in several cases more common bits. Thus, the SPINAT node translates the IPv4
header to an IPv6 header containing the source IPv6 locator of the SPINAT node
and the destination IPv6 locator of the peer host. It is good to notice that only the
first I1 message was routed via the rendezvous server and the rest of the messages
are sent directly between the SPINAT node and the peer host.
Finally, after receiving the I2 message the peer host creates a state for the mobile
host. From the peer host’s point of view, the mobile host is reachable at the SPINAT
node’s locator carried in the I2 message’s IP header. The peer host flips the locators
in the header and replies with an R2 message. At this point, the SPINAT node marks
the destination locator of the earlier sent I2 message as verified. The source locator of
the R2 message and the destination locator of the earlier sent I2 message may differ
from each other. It is possible that an on-the-path attacker has changed the source
locator of the R2 message. The only thing the SPINAT node knows is that the peer
host was reachable from the destination location where the I2 message was sent.
Before forwarding the R2 message to mobile host, the SPINAT node implements
the same address translation that took place with the R1 message. The soft state
is also changed to normal state and BEETIN SAs are created at the SPINAT node
(discussed earlier in section 5.3.5).
It is good to notice that the previous scenario is vulnerable to a redirection attack
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when the peer host directly uses the source locator in the I2 message header. The
attack is possible in the basic HIP exchange, and it is not caused by the SPINAT
approach. An on-the-path attacker can change the source locator of the I2 message
before forwarding the packet to the peer host. The peer host sends the R2 reply
message back to that altered location, where another on-the-path attacker waits
for the packet. The attacker translates the destination locator to the same locator
as to where the SPINAT node sent the original I2 message from. Furthermore,
the attackers forward the first of the ESP payload packets in both directions using
the triangular route. From the peer host point of view the R2 message works as a
challenge message, and the first incoming ESP packet verifies the destination locator.
Finally, the second attacker moves away from the victim’s network where all the peer
host’s traffic ends up. The attack requires that the attacker is located simultaneously
in two locations. To prevent this kind of attack, the I2 message should contain the
signed mobile host’s and SPINAT node’s locator sets. It is good to notice that the
peer host receives the SPINAT node’s public key in the I1 message that is routed
via a different path from the rest of the messages.
A.2 Using End-to-end State Update Exchange
The previous section described how the state establishment works in a basic scenario
where the hosts are located at different locator domains and the peer host is directly
attached to the Internet. This section briefly discusses a scenario where the end-
to-end mobility state update exchange is used to establish states at on-the-path
SPINAT nodes. The scenario is illustrated in Figure A.2.
The mobile host runs the state establishment exchange with the peer host only once.
After that the mobile host updates its location to the peer host by running an update
exchange. From the SPINAT node viewpoint, the intermediate state establishment
using the update exchange differs from the state establishment exchange case. The
update exchange is only a three way hand shake, while the state establishment
exchange consists of four messages. However, we can assume that the mobile host has
learned the peer host’s current locator set during the state establishment exchange.
This observation makes it a bit easier to implement a reachability test towards the
peer host from the SPINAT node’s point of view. It is good to notice that while the
end-to-end update exchange is used for updating a state at the end host, it is used
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Figure A.2: Using Update Exchange to Initialize Locator Translation between the
private domain and the Internet.
for creating states at the SPINAT nodes.
The mobile host should sign the peer’s locator set with its own public key. The
signed peer host’s locator set and the mobile host’s public key are added to the first
update message. Once the SPINAT node receives the update message, it creates a
soft state and verifies the signature. The SPINAT node selects a locator pair of the
peer’s and its own locator sets based on the LPM algorithm. The SPINAT node
also adds its own self-signed locator set to the update message before forwarding the
message to the peer host. The earlier presented I1 message’s security considerations
also apply to this update message. In addition, the SPINAT node buffers the first
update message to be able to retransmit the message later.
The peer host replies with the challenge message and sends it directly to the SPINAT
node. The peer host should use one of the locators of the locator set included in
the first update message. The SPINAT node verifies that the source locator in the
challenge message sent by the peer host belongs to the locator set that was carried
in the first update message. In addition, the SPINAT node compares locators in the
buffered message and the received challenge message. If the destination locator in
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the buffered packet and the source locator in the challenge packet differ from each
other the packet has been routed via a rendezvous node. In that case, the SPINAT
node cannot directly start using the received source locator with the peer host.
Instead, the SPINAT node drops the received challenge message and retransmits
the buffered update message to the location where the challenge message was sent
and adds ’echo request’ parameter to the message. In other words, the SPINAT
node uses the first round trip of the update exchange as a reachability test. This
mechanism can be also applied with I1 messages.
If the peer host was reachable from its claimed location, the SPINAT node receives
the challenge message from the peer host containing correct ’echo reply’ parameter.
The SPINAT node marks the peer host’s location verified and forwards the packet
to the mobile host. If the challenge message was spoofed, the mobile host drops the
message, and the SPINAT node releases its soft state. Otherwise, the mobile host
finalizes the update exchange by sending the response message to the peer host. The
SPINAT node uses the already verified destination locator towards the peer host.
A.3 Transparent Rendezvous State establishment
The registration to the SPINAT node provides a way to implement overlay rout-
ing based on the host identifiers. Once the I1 (or update) message arrives to the
multiplexed locator of the SPINAT node, the SPINAT node checks whether it has
a rendezvous state for the corresponding destination HIT. If it finds a state, the
SPINAT node performs the required locator translation. The locator translation
between domains can be divided into two cases.
In the first case, the locators in both domains belong to the same locator family. The
SPINAT node translates only the destination locator of the packet and forwards the
packet to the peer host inside the private domain. The SPINAT node creates a soft
state for the end-to-end HIP connection only after receiving the R1 reply message
from the peer host.
In the second case, the SPINAT may receive an I1 (or update) packet with locators
that belong to a different family from the private domain locators. As a result,
the SPINAT node must translate both locators in the packet. The situation is
illustrated in Figure A.3. In the legacy HIP case, this is a problem because the initial
messages do not contain the reachability information of the sender. To overcome
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Figure A.3: An example of initializing locator translation between private domains.
the problem, the initiator should add its globally reachable locator set to the I1 and
update messages. When the initiator is inside a private domain, it does not know
the SPINAT node’s public locator. Therefore, in the approach taken in this thesis
the initiator adds the locators leased from the public rendezvous nodes to the I1 (or
UPDATE) message. Before the message leaves the private domain on the initiator’s
side, the SPINAT node adds its own publicly reachable locator set to the I1 (or
UPDATE) message as described earlier. The locator set should contain at least one
locator per locator family where the initiator is reachable.
Once the SPINAT node on the responder’s side receives the initial message, it can
select one of the locators carried in the message to be used for the source locator
translation if needed. (It is good to notice that the SPINAT node does not create
a state and stores the locator set carried in the I1 message.) After receiving the I1
message, the peer host selects the destination locator for R1 message. The SPINAT
node establishes a state for the end host pair, and forwards the R1 packet to the
destination locator defined in the R1 message header. The destination locator points
either to the initiator’s SPINAT node or to one of its public rendezvous nodes.
Once the initiator receives the R1 message (possibly routed via a public rendezvous
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node), it selects the destination locator for the I2 message. In this scenario, the
R1 message contains two locator sets, one added by the responder and one by
the responder’s side SPINAT node. The initiator and initiator’s side SPINAT node
include their locator sets also to the I2 message because the responder’s side SPINAT
node does not establish a state with the I1 message. The I2 and R2 are routed
directly between the initiator’s and responder’s SPINAT nodes.
The SPINAT nodes’ rendezvous functionality provides a way for the hosts inside
a private domain to be reachable also from the Internet. It is good to notice that
the mobile host may dynamically change its location from one private network to
another. As a result, the lifetime of the rendezvous state at the SPINAT node is the
lifetime of the end-to-end security association. Moreover, the lifetime of the security
associations should be at most the estimated stay at the host’s current location. To
achieve efficient garbage collection for dead security associations, the SPINAT nodes
may require fast rekeying sequences. Thus, the SA lifetimes at end-nodes are bound
to intermediate nodes’ state lifetimes.
A.4 Locator Family Translation for ESP packets
The creation of BEETIN SAs was presented earlier in Section 5.3.5. This section
presents a scenario where the mobile host is located in a private IPv4 domain behind
a SPINAT node, and the peer host has a direct IPv6 attachment to the Internet
(see Figure 5.1 on page 98).
The outgoing and incoming public side SAs are bound to IPv6 locators. The private
SAs are bound to IPv4 locators. It is good to notice that the SAs are not bound
to the SPINAT node’s private locators. As earlier mentioned, the SPINAT node is
transparent to the mobile host from the SA establishment point of view.
Once the mobile host sends the first ESP protected packet to the peer host, the
SPINAT node intercepts the ESP packets. All the ESP packets having an SA are
subject to IPsec processing. The incoming SA is identified using both the destination
locator and the SPI value carried in the packet. Without the destination locator
information, the incoming private side and outgoing public side SA would match
with the SPI value.
For the basic case, the BEETIN mode skips the ESP packet authentication and
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decryption. However, as mentioned in [P7], it is possible to send integrity and/or
confidentiality protection keying material to the SPINAT node through a protected
channel. This provides a way to implement lawful interception at SPINAT nodes.
Such a channel may be established during a rendezvous state establishment exchange
between the host and the SPINAT node.
The BEETIN mode works like the BEET mode from the identifier-locator trans-
lation viewpoint. In the example scenario, the IPv4 locators in the IP header are
replaced between the peer’s and mobile host’s HITs. The difference with the two
IPsec modes is that the BEET mode sends the authenticated and decrypted packet
back to IPv6 input handling, while the BEETIN mode sends the ESP packet to the
IPv6 output handling (see Figure 7.3 on page 150).
The HITs and SPI values in the outgoing ESP packet match with an IPsec policy
that is bound to the outgoing public SA. The BEETIN mode translates the HITs
in the IPv6 header to the IPv6 locators of the SA. The same mechanism takes
place in the opposite direction when the peer host sends ESP traffic back to the
mobile host. In practice, the BEETIN mode offers an overlay routing mechanism
for ESP protected traffic [P7]. The identifier-locator mappings are stored to the
IPsec policies and SAs.
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